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The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

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Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2020)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 12495))

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Abstract

We study the efficiency of sequential multiunit auctions with two buyers and complete information. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 1/T for auctions with T items for sale. For concave valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded below by \(1-1/e\simeq 0.632\). This bound is asymptotically tight as the number of items sold tends to infinity.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Statistics, McGill University, Montréal, QC, Canada

    Mete Şeref Ahunbay

  2. Department of Mathematics and Statistics, School of Computer Science, McGill University, Montréal, QC, Canada

    Adrian Vetta

Authors
  1. Mete Şeref Ahunbay
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  2. Adrian Vetta
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Correspondence to Mete Şeref Ahunbay .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Xujin Chen

  2. Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China

    Nikolai Gravin

  3. Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    Martin Hoefer

  4. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA

    Ruta Mehta

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Ahunbay, M.Ş., Vetta, A. (2020). The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions. In: Chen, X., Gravin, N., Hoefer, M., Mehta, R. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12495. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-64945-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-64946-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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