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Post-Quantum Hardware Security

Physical Security in Classic vs. Quantum Worlds

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Abstract

This chapter concerns how the evolution of quantum technology could influence the field of hardware security. Besides this question, the impact of hardware security on the quantum systems, and in particular, quantum cryptosystems, is discussed in detail. This impact goes beyond the direct effect of quantum computers on the security of cryptosystems since it also encompasses the risk imposed by physical attacks known in the classic world. In this respect, the main message conveyed by this chapter is that post-quantum cryptosystems can suffer from not only quantum-enhanced attacks, but also classic physical attacks; hence, in their design, it is crucial to revisit the adversary models and design flows.

Part of this study has been carried out, when Fatemeh Ganji was with Florida Institute for Cybersecurity Research, University of Florida.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that this section provides a gentle introduction to the concepts studied in the quantum mechanics and quantum computation. For more formal definitions and discussions, we refer the readers to [65].

  2. 2.

    \(S=\frac {K}{n}\), where K is the order of the information within the challenge and n is the cumulative number of photons.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge the support of AFOSR under award number FA 9550-14-1-0351. We would like to thank Spencer Dupee, who has contributed to the survey [16], which is the extended version of this chapter.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Florida Institute for Cybersecurity Research, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA

    Ana Covic, Sreeja Chowdhury, Rabin Yu Acharya & Domenic Forte

  2. Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, USA

    Fatemeh Ganji

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Covic, A., Chowdhury, S., Acharya, R.Y., Ganji, F., Forte, D. (2021). Post-Quantum Hardware Security. In: Tehranipoor, M. (eds) Emerging Topics in Hardware Security . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64448-2_8

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