Abstract
The foundations of morals is a complex topic. Today there is deso. The cause is rooted in theological discussions from the Late Middle Ages and onward. That discussion is centred in the opposition between Thomists and nominalists. Aquinas and his followers thought that practical norms were founded in teleological principles. Nominalists thought that norms were imperative: the key was the will of God, not the reason of the precept. At last, the winner was the nominalist way, and the idea of moral diffused in our culture was a system of imperatives. This legacy makes difficult to speak today about reason in ethics.
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Notes
- 1.
The reader will excuse a tone as egocentric in the quotes. It happens that the fundamental subjects of the reflection about Law have been assumed by the Author of these lines and what he has considered interesting in other studies, that has been assumed in those of his works which are quoted.
- 2.
For further reading on this, see my study, Carpintero (2012a) per totum. For more general studies, see: Carpintero (2010/1), 20–58; Carpintero (2012b), 11–52; Carpintero (2012c), 315–352. These articles are available at www.franciscocarpintero.com.
- 3.
Carlos Massini notes this paradox of the relativists who, nevertheless, do affirm human rights. It is the paradoxical attitude of those who state that rights are indemonstrable, etc., yet they take for granted that they are “desirable”. See Massini (1994), 137. On page 104 he points out that that according to these relativists we would have to understand that rights could only be defended accidentally.
Andrés Ollero calls this attitude “Double language culture”. See Ollero (2007), 240. He adds that, “to be positivist and rigorous at the same time is easy when you are willing to accept that ethical demands (both moral and legal) are not open to any rational foundation; something so at odds with the daily reality of Law, so as to assume that judges cannot give any ‘judgement’”. Ollero (2007), 318. He refers to R. L. Vigo, who writes, “It seems quite evident that legal positivism moves around more comfortably in the academic world than among legal practitioners and legal practice”. See Vigo (2003), 200.
- 4.
Massini writes that “stating (i) the demands of justice can be truly known, while at the same time (ii) the Law is totally independent from these demands, inevitably leads to a kind of intellectual schizophrenia. There would accordingly be a strict duty to obey a commandment which is objectively recognized—with pretensions of truth—as grave and evidently iniquitous. The reality is the human intellect intrinsically demands unity a need for coherence, which makes it unattainable to attempt to maintain two statements which strictly imply an unsurmountable contradiction.” Massini (2004), 67.
- 5.
- 6.
Carpintero (2002), 11–60; Carpintero (2003a, b), 13–117. On a topic which has raised a good deal of debate see, Carpintero (2000), 470–530. Available at franciscocarpintero.com.
- 7.
See my study Carpintero (2019) per totum.
- 8.
For an overview see my study Carpintero (2014), 63–128.
- 9.
- 10.
He synthesises his doctrine on this by stating that “Quia vero forma est principium actionis, necesse est quod omne illud quod ex abundanti participatione influxus superioris agenti acquirit actionem ejus, habeat duas actiones: unam, scilicet, secundum propriam formam; aliam, vero, secundum formam participatam a superiori agente: sicut cultellus ignitus secundum propriam formam incidit; inquantum vero est ignitus, urit. Sic igitur et supremorum intelligentiarum unaquaeque, quae divina dicitur, habet duplicem actionem: una quidem inquantum participat abundantem bonitatem divinam; alia autem secundum propriam naturam”. Aquinas (1972) § 386.
- 11.
There are many Thomistic texts which expound the difference between the knowledge of the first principles, which is a task belonging to synderesis, and the conclusions reached by man when reasoning, by the application of those prima principia. A wide explanation, contrasting conscience with free will, see. Aquinas (1570) L. II, Dist. 39, q. 1, art. 2.
Since one is the ratio participata, and another one the results which are reached by reason when it works essentially. The dimension of reason that St. Thomas calls “ratio essentialiter” must work “secundum naturam rerum, de similibus ad similia” so that man goes after real human goods, that is to say, without moving away from what he already is. Thomas’s golden rule in these matters is what we could enunciate as the treatment subiectam materiam, that implies we can ask for or demand no more than what belongs to the matter we are studying. See in particular Aquinas (1964) § 135, where he writes that “In singularibus subiectam materiam, prout scilicet proprium est illi doctrina, quae circa illam materiam versatur”.
- 12.
My study (1998), 11–38.
- 13.
See in particular, Aquinas (1961) § 2724–2725; or Aquinas Suma teológica, I, q. 105, art. 4.
- 14.
See my study (2009), 95–120.
- 15.
See Aquinas (1978) II-II, q. 58, todo el art. 10.
- 16.
It might seem that Molina, being a scholastic, was left behind in the race of typically modern liberties. But Alfred Dufour points out that “Dans cette perspective rénovatrice du Droit naturel, ouvert tant à l’historicité qu’à l’spécificité du droit en un monde changeant, les premiers jalons d’une doctrine de l’autonomie de l’ordre moral par rapport à la volonté divine seront posées de manière significative par le grand apologète de la liberté humaine, célèbre dans l’histoire de la théologie par son doctrine de la Grâce fustigée par Pascal, mains dont l’oeuvre juridique présente en fait un intérêt autrement capital pour l’histoire de la science du Droit: Luis de Molina”. Dufour (1972), 54–55.
- 17.
Suárez could not speak of the ex objecto criterion, but leaves his axiomatic moral doctrine set in Stone, which leads to the same results as Vázquez de Belmonte.
- 18.
“Sed ratio potest aliquid intimare dupliciter. Uno modo absolute; quae quidem intimatio exprimitur per verbum indicativi modi: sicut si aliquis alicui dicat: Hoc est tibi faciendum. Aliquando autem ratio intimat aliquid alicui movendum ipsum ad hoc. Et talis intimatio exprimitur per verbum imperativi modi: puta, cum alicui dicitur: Fac hoc … Ratio movet imperando, sit ei ex virtute voluntatis. Unde reliquitur, quod imperare sit actus rationis, praesupponitur actus voluntatis, in cujus virtute ratio movet per imperium ad exercitium actus … radix voluntatis est voluntas, sicut subjectum; sed sicut causa est ratio”. Aquinas (1978) I-II, q. 17, art. 1.
- 19.
My study (2011), 562–588.
- 20.
See my study (2009), 95–120.
- 21.
This is a thesis which is fully developed by Michel Bastit (1990) per totum.
- 22.
I refer to my study (2009).
- 23.
Aquinas’ dealt extensively with this. It occasionally notes that reasonings that deal with principles are different from the reasonings that deal with conclusions. See Aquinas (1961) § 475. At other moments it explains that there is no necessary connection between principles and conclusions. Aquinas (1978) I, q. 82, art. 2. In stronger terms it explains that there have to be two distinct intellects: one which deals with conclusions and the other that deals with principles. Aquinas (1961) § 1247. There is a generally pervading attitudes which concludes that there exists no need between principles and their outcomes in “ea quae sunt ad finem”. See, Aquinas (1992) q. 22, art. 6.
- 24.
Regarding the doctrines about the jus naturale in Common Law, and the “derogations” which Natural Law has undergone, see my study (1981), 33–100. Another study which should not be overlooked is Bonuci (1906) per totum, whose solitary efforts were not surpassed for many decades. A more recent, and comprehensive study is by Weigand (1967) per totum.
- 25.
Georgette of St. Hilaire sets out approximately forty precepts that Aquinas bases directly on Natural Law. See St. Hilaire (1962) per totum.
- 26.
Thomas Aquinas, especially in his comprehensive works written during his youth, repeatedly rejected this doctrine. As one example, see Aquinas (1570) L. II, Dist. 34, q. 1, a. 3.
- 27.
This not been dealt with much in the literature. For example, Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 49 q. 1 a. 3 states that “Ergo se habet ad opposita. Beatitudini autem opponitur miseria. Ergo si potest aliquis appetere beatitudinem, potest etiam appetere miseriam.” However, generally speaking the word misery refers to those cases in which the lack of freedom and willingness to do good caused by vices. This term is also used to refer to extreme poverty, which results in the duty to give alms.
- 28.
Full title: Johannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis Summa Theologica. Ex universis operibus ejus concinnata, juxta ordinem et dispositionem S. Thomae Aquinatis per Fratrem Hieronymum de Montefortino.
- 29.
Man, according to Scotus, was placed so high, with so much superiority over what surrounds him, that he is a being who ask questions, but they are questions that cannot be answered from within his environment: He only has God as a speaker. An attitude well-suited to a mystic like Scotus. As might be expected, the notion of Natural Law disappears in his hands, because the very idea of Natural Law implied that human beings are recognised in their natural tendencies and, now, in the Franciscan thinking which he proposes, Nature is rather the enemy of humans. He only recognises one law of God towards us, which is composed of three kinds of precepts: the “nota ex terminis”: the tenet of non-contradiction, those belonging to the law of God’s Love, and those behaviours which “are consonant” with the law of love.
- 30.
“Allegat Gratianus: “Omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis hominibus, et vos facite illis”, Matthei 7. Idem dicendum de una vel pluribus uxoribus habendis. Etsi enim non necessario sequatur ex notis lumine naturae”. Scotus (1728) I-II, q. 94, art. 1.
- 31.
Scotus writes that “Lex ergo naturae vel inditum lumen intellectus non est proprie lex, quia etsi indicat quae oportet facere, non tamen imperat … Accedit, quod leges aliquae generalis de operabilibus dictantes, praefixae sunt a voluntate divina, et non ab intellectu, ut praecedit actum voluntatis divinae, quia in illis legibus non invenitur necesitas ex terminis”. I–II, q. 90, art. 1 de la Suma Theológie Johannis Duns Scotus… Tomus tertius. Ex universis operibus ejus concinnata, juxta ordinem et dispositionem S. Thomae Aquinatis per Fratrem Hieronimus de Montefortino, mentioned earlier.
- 32.
In reference to usucapio, he writes: “Istud etiam apparet probabile per hoc, quod si quilibet posse suum dominium transferre in alium, tota communitas posset cujuslibet de communitate transferre dominium in quamlibet (quia in facto communitatis suppono inclusi consensu, cujuslibet) ergo illa communitas habens justum consensum, quasi jam oblatum, in hoc quidem quilibet consentit in leges justas condendas a communitati vel principe, potest per legem justam cujuslibet dominium transferre in quemlibet”. Ockham (1626) L. IV, distinctio XV, q. 2, 10.
- 33.
“Et potentia obedientialis … pertinet ad dependentiam causati ad causam”. Scoto (1530) L. III, q. 1, art. 4.
- 34.
See my book (2013), previously cited.
- 35.
Jean Gerson wrote: “Nulla trangressio legis naturalis, ut naturalis est vel humana, est de facto peccatum mortale … quia lex naturalis est humana, ut tales sunt, non possunt attingere ad cognitionem aeternitatis in poena vel praemio; non ergo seruntur ad finem supernaturalem”. Liber de vita spirituali, Lectio IV, Corollarium Primum, columna 38. He took this way of thinking from Scotus, who wrote that, “Quare non intellecto voluntatis imperio adstringentis alios ad servadum legem, quaecumque representarentur contra judicium rationis, esse reputanda mala, non moralia, vel theologica, sed mala naturae et philosophiae … Homo faciens contrarium, contra naturam, comitti malum, sed non esse talem malum reputandum demeritorium aut offensa Dei”. Johannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis Summa Theologica. Ex universis operibus ejus concinnata, juxta ordinem et dispositionem S. Thomae Aquinatis per Fratrem Hieronymum de Montefortino, I-II, q. 91, art. 2.
- 36.
Gabriel Biel, who lived during the last fifteenth century, wrote: “Nam per si impossibile Deus non esset, qui est ratio divina: aut ratio illa divina esset errans, ad huc si qui sageret contra recta rationem angelicam, vel humanam, velalia maliquam, si qua esset, peccaret. Peccatum est voluntaria carentia conformitatis ad rationem rectam debiti voluntati”. Biel (1574) L. II, Dist. 28, quaestiounica, p. 165-E.
This thought was used by Scoto, who wrote ‘'Quare non intellecto voluntatis imperio ad stringentis alios ad servadum legem, quae cum que representarentur contra judicium rationis, esse reputanda mala, non moralia, vel theologica, sed mala naturae et philosophiae…Homo faciens contrarium, contra naturam, comittimalum, sed non esse talem malum reputandum demeritorium autoffensa Dei’. Scotus (1728) I-II, q. 91, art. 2.
- 37.
This period has not been sufficiently studied by historians of legal thinking. See, Cabrera (2001) per totum.
- 38.
Juan Belda-Plans (2000) per totum.
- 39.
The complete title is Johannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis Summa Theologica. Ex universis operibus ejus concinnata, juxta ordinem et dispositionem S. Thomae Aquinatis per Fratrem Hieronymumde Montefortino.
- 40.
Koellin (1589).
- 41.
A doctrine which could be summarized in one of his sentences “Conclussio est, voluntas discordans a ratione, sive recta, sive errante, semper est mala”. Vázquez de Belmonte (1611) q. 19, art. 6, Disp. 58, p. 415.
- 42.
“Quia lex naturalis non reguletur per convenientiam ad naturam sensitivam; sed ad rationalem. Sensitivam autem respicit solum ut contractam, et speciali modo perfectam per differentiam rationalem; ergo illa convenientia generica impertinens est ad distinguendam legem naturalem”. Suárez (1967) L. II, cap. 17, § 6. He follows Duns Scotus Vid. Scotus (1728) I-II, q. 94, art. 3. This causes Bastit to reflect that: “La loi concernera d’abord l’homme et son action morale détaché du cosmos. Si l’on a dû ainsi détacher la loi proprement dite des inclinations naturelles, c’est que celles-ci n’ont plus du tout pour Suarez le même sens que pour Saint Thomas, elles sont des états de fait dont ne peut dire qu’ils sont obligatoires». Bastit (1990), 313.
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Carpintero Benítez, F. (2020). The Fundamentals of Ethics. In: Masferrer, A. (eds) Criminal Law and Morality in the Age of Consent. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 84. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64163-4_7
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