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Liberties, Rights and Punishments in Modern Natural Law

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Criminal Law and Morality in the Age of Consent

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 84))

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Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to show the intersection of law and moral in criminal law from the point of view of legal theory in early Modernity. To understand this question, the chapter treats succintly the concepts of law, crime and moral good in the legal science of ius commune; this conception was based on an objectivized notion of justice; consequently, criminal law was conceived as a protection of basic moral goods. Legal theory of early modernity (centered here in the Modern School of Natural Law) described the law as a natural bundle of individual liberties. The legal order is designed to protect that freedom and, specifically, the aim of criminal law was to protect basic individual freedoms. Modern thought distinguished theological goods from legal principles, but the intention was the protection of the most important moral good: the individual freedom.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Tomás y Valiente (1969), 93 ff., 238 ff. See also Prieto Sanchís (2001), 158 ff. Along similar lines, see Ferrajoli (1989), 157 ff. 211–212; and for an alternative viewpoint, Masferrer (2017), 693–756.

  2. 2.

    D’Ors (1980), 306 ff.

  3. 3.

    D’Ors (1955), 825. Roman Law was not a compendium of laws or individual powers, but instead a group of doctrines elaborated by the prudent when resolving problems put before them. D’Ors (1975), 11 ff. In any event, this issue has been a subject of discussion among scholars of Roman law. On this question, see Megías (2003), 35–54.

  4. 4.

    That was the sense that Acursius gave to the identification of Law with an ars. See Acursius (1628) gloss “i” in Digesto, I, I, I. Some time later, Baldus degli Ubaldi also sees ius as a concretization of the tenets of justice; see degli Ubaldi (1599) com. 9 to De iustitia et iure, I, I, fol. 7. Concerning the process of establishing Law by the interpretatio of legislators and jurists, see Vallejo (1992), 40 ff., 302 ff. Paolo Grossi highlights the independence between political power and common law: Law is not a product of political will, but rather of discovery, interpretation and adaptation by the intelligence of jurists; see Grossi (1996), 40 ff., 153.

  5. 5.

    Villey (1979), 87 ff. Along similar lines, see also Hervada (1978), 42 ff. Hervada (1987), 156. See also, Carpintero (2002), 26; Carpintero (2004), 50 ff.

  6. 6.

    On the question of how common law jurists worked, see Carpintero (1982). See also Lombardi (1975), 104 ff.

  7. 7.

    Tierney (1997) per totum. See also, Kriechbaum (1996), 29 ff.; Helmholz (2003), 301.

  8. 8.

    Carpintero (2003), 71 ff; Guzmán (2009), 21 ff.; also Brett (1997), Folgado (1960), 13–330.

  9. 9.

    Carpintero (2003) and Guzmán (2009), 197 ff.

  10. 10.

    Roman texts offered different meanings of natural law: what always is good and equitable, what nature teaches to every living being, the freedom of the state of nature, the basic moral tenets obtained through reason, the juridical solutions created by natural reason and existing in every nation (that is to say, the ius gentium which is always half way between natural and positive law). I am indebted to Francisco Carpintero’s accurate and detailed study of these iusnaturalist doctrines characteristic of ius commune; see Carpintero (2000), 20 ff.

  11. 11.

    See Carpintero’s monograph (1977a, b) per totum. More recently, Carpintero (2000), 159 ff.

  12. 12.

    This idea was also widespread among Romanists; a particularly illustrative example is the work by Hughes Doneau.

  13. 13.

    Actually, this individualism was quite relative because the basis upon which to build the State through a social contract in many modern iusnaturalists is not the individual considered in isolation, but rather society. See Böhme (1993), 14 ff. According to him, this attitude is amended to some degree at the end of the eighteenth century.

  14. 14.

    See Hervada (1987), 249 ff.

  15. 15.

    Hans Welzel stated that modernity had defended two notions of human nature: one empirical and “existentialist” like Hobbes, and another idealized like Grotius: Both lines of thought would be present in Pufendorf’s writings. See Welzel (1971), 116 ff., 133. Recently, Ian Hunter has described two paths in German Modern Iusnaturalism: one “metaphysical”, which includes Christian Wolff and Inmanuel Kant; and another followed by Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius, which was built on jurisprudence and more empirical knowledge, concerned with building a society from civic humanism and individualistic empiricism. See Hunter (2001) 127 ff., 148 ff., 217 ff. Regardless of these differences, as pointed out in the following pages, all of them would agree on describing the basis of law as a strictly individual power or freedom.

  16. 16.

    A good example of this historiography that enthrones Grotius as the initiator of this School is Christian Thomasius’ book (1719), 65. On these iusnaturalist modern attitudes, see Francisco Carpintero’s study (1988), 383–412.

  17. 17.

    Francisco Carpintero points out that Grotius is an epigone of juridical humanism, and Pufendorf to some extent also. See Carpintero (1977b) in fine. Cfr. Also Bergh (2002), 70, 84.

  18. 18.

    It is worth recalling that Protestantism maintained (and still does) a problematic relationship with the idea of natural law. Luther’s fallen nature cannot sustain the kind of reasonable justification typical of iusnaturalist thought. On this problem, see Bohn (2004) per totum. It seems that this modern iusnaturalism had to look for its doctrines elsewhere, as did Scholasticism, in spite of the disdain that it inspired. In the middle of the twentieth century, Hans Welzel highlighted the historiographic renewal that shed light on the scholastic influences in modern iusnaturalism; Welzel (1971), 110 ff. Of course, modern iusnaturalists gave a different meaning to those contributions, but leaves room to question whether this difference came from the protestant position. Nevertheless, some authors see Lutheran influence in Samuel Pufendorf, for example, in his individualistic view. This is what Malte Diesselhorst stated in (1981), 198. However, this is a complex matter which requires further research.

  19. 19.

    Grotius (1651) book I, chap. I, § IV ff., 2 ff.

  20. 20.

    Grotius (1651) book I, chap. II, § I, 15.

  21. 21.

    Pufendorf (1759) book I, chap. I, § XX, 20.

  22. 22.

    In fact, Pufendorf was the last manifestation of a tendency which began centuries before. All scholasticism that had followed the line taken by Duns Scotus since the fourteenth century posed moral life as adjusting to a series of commandments which, in the end, came from God. Less distant in time, Francisco Suárez had specified that obligation born from law was a necessary moral effect of the legislator’s will, and this effect was completely different from effects resulting from physical causes. See Suárez (1967) book III, chap. XX, 9, 284. Concerning moral entities in Pufendorf, see Welzel (1986), 20–22.

  23. 23.

    Pufendorf (1759) book I, chap. I, § XX, 20.

  24. 24.

    Ibidem.

  25. 25.

    On this question see Guzmán (2009), 223–224.

  26. 26.

    Thomasius (1718), book. 1, chap. 1, § 13–14, 19 ff.

  27. 27.

    Gundling (1728) chap. I, § LVIII, 19.

  28. 28.

    Gundling (1728) chap. I, § II ff, 3 ff.

  29. 29.

    Gundling (1728) chap. I, § LXI–LXII. Concerning changes in the German University by Thomasius, a critic of the dogmatically Lutheran teachings and a defender of a concept of a secularized law based on a theory of affections with empirical basis, see Hammerstein (1972), 61 ff., 73 ff.

  30. 30.

    Wolff (1754), I, tome 1, § 45–46, 29–30.

  31. 31.

    Nettelbladt (1767) pars III. Sect. IV, membrum I, De iure in se spectato. Chap. I, tit. I. § 229, 90. Cfr. Darjes (1764) special part, sect. I, chap. II, § 278, 146.

  32. 32.

    Achenwall (1774) tit III § 37, 22 § 23–24.

  33. 33.

    Achenwall had taught in Göttingen, where the German Enlightenment influenced by Thomasius was widespread. See Hammerstein (1972), 311–312.

  34. 34.

    Baumgarten (1763) chap. 2, § 124–125, 57–58.

  35. 35.

    Baumgarten (1763) chap. 2, § 156, 70.

  36. 36.

    Cattaneo (1981), 69. Carpintero (1989), 16 ff.

  37. 37.

    Schmalz (1795), 17.

  38. 38.

    Schmalz (1795) chap. 4, § 39 ff., 43 ff.

  39. 39.

    Kant (1982) § C, 337. See Carpintero (1989), 103 ff.

  40. 40.

    Aquinas (1978) II-II, q. 61 ff.

  41. 41.

    Soto (1968) book. I. q. 1, 382.

  42. 42.

    Molina (1614) tome II, dispositio I, 1.

  43. 43.

    Castro (1921), book I, 332–333.

  44. 44.

    Castro (1921), book I, 5–7 and 17.

  45. 45.

    Gómez (1794), tome 3, chap. 1, 34.

  46. 46.

    See Gómez (1794), tome 3, chaps. 2–7.

  47. 47.

    On this question, see Masferrer (2017) per totum.

  48. 48.

    This characteristic of the thomist theology and the ius commune has been revealed by Carpintero (1992), 21–200. Carpintero (1992), 351–394. Carpintero (2000), 13 ff., 95 ff.

  49. 49.

    See Vázquez de Menchaca (1564) book I, chap. 18, 3, p. Book 2, chap. 45, 3, p. 15.

  50. 50.

    Soto (1968) book 5, q. art. 8.

  51. 51.

    María Paz Alonso offers some examples of these damages for the individual in (1982) per totum.

  52. 52.

    According to Benjamín González Alonso, the judicial decision was not always a caprice and an irregularity, because it was limited by doctrine and judicial style. See González Alonso (2003) p. 228 ff. A similar nuance is expressed by Pedro Ortego (2004), 230–233.

  53. 53.

    Grotius (1651) book. 2, chap. 20, 2, p. 291.

  54. 54.

    Grotius (1651) book. 2, chap. 20, 4, pp. 292–293.

  55. 55.

    Grotius (1651) book. 2, chap. 20, 4, p. 294.

  56. 56.

    Grotius (1651) book. 2, chap. 20, 9, p. 297 and 13, p. 302.

  57. 57.

    Pufendorf (1759) book 8, chap. 3, § 4–5, 314 ff.

  58. 58.

    Pufendorf (1759) book. 3, chap. I, § 1, pp. 297–98, § 7, 306–308.

  59. 59.

    Pufendorf (1731) book 2, chap. 13, § 6 ff., 350–351.

  60. 60.

    Pufendorf (1759) book 8, chap. 3, § 14, 356 ff. The relevant role of utility in Pufendorf is highlighted by Krieger (1985), 92 ff. Fiorillo (1992), 44, 50–51.

  61. 61.

    Pufendorf (1759) book 8, chap. 3, § 18, 342–343.

  62. 62.

    Pufendorf (1759) book 8, chap. 3, 14, 332–334.

  63. 63.

    Carpintero (2013), 101–109.

  64. 64.

    Thomasius (1702) book III, chap. 6, § 12, p. 555, § 26, p. 558.

  65. 65.

    Thomasius (1702) book 3, chap. 7, § 32 ff, 590 ff. Concerning the aims of punishment in Thomasius, see Cattaneo (1976), 24 ff. Cattaneo places this jurist among the initiators of the German Enlightenment and highlights his disengaging criminal law from theological roots. He also points out that the emendatio generalis has nothing to do with the re-education of the criminal but rather concerns intimidating in general. Cattaneo (1976), 33, 47–48.

  66. 66.

    Thomasius (1718) book 3, chap. 7, § 3 ff., 278–279. Here the officia circa poenas appear among the duties of the people who live in society.

  67. 67.

    Thomasius (1718) book 3, chap. 7, § 47, 158.

  68. 68.

    Gundling (1744) chap. 13, § 5 and 6, 270 ff. Id. (1747) chap. 35, § 16–17, 424 ff. § pp. 430–431. Id. (1728) chap. 36, § 29 ff., 441–442.

  69. 69.

    Achenwall (1774) chap. 6, § 109, 99.

  70. 70.

    Achenwall (1774), book 3, Sect. 6, § 191, 193–194, pp. 175–177.

  71. 71.

    Baumgarten (1763), chap. 2, § 148, pp. 67–68.

  72. 72.

    Baumgarten (1763), chap. 1, § 24, p. 86.

  73. 73.

    Baumgarten (1763), chap. 6 ff § 123 ff., pp. 116 ff.

  74. 74.

    Wolff (1754) § 90–95, pp. 56–59.

  75. 75.

    Wolff (1754) p. II, § 972, p. 697, § 1028, pp. 740–741, § 1043, pp. 754–755.

  76. 76.

    Schmalz (1795) chap. 9, 93, p. 75.

  77. 77.

    Schmalz (1807) book 4, chap. 3, 147–149, pp. 135–136.

  78. 78.

    Schmalz (1807) book 4, chap. 3, 137.

  79. 79.

    Schmalz (1807) book 4, chap. 3, 141.

  80. 80.

    Schmalz (1807), 144.

  81. 81.

    Schmalz (1807), 147.

  82. 82.

    Schmalz (1795), chap. 11, 172, p. 113. Schmalz T von (1807) book 5, chap. 5, pp. 377 ff.

  83. 83.

    Schmalz (1807), book 5, chap. 5, p. 380.

  84. 84.

    Schmalz (1795), chap. 9, 93, p. 75.

  85. 85.

    Ibid.

  86. 86.

    Krug (1811) § 25, pp. 123 ff.

  87. 87.

    Bauer (1808) § 39, p. 44.

  88. 88.

    Bauer (1808) § 224, pp. 255–256.

  89. 89.

    Bauer (1808) § 248, p. 284.

  90. 90.

    Kant (1982), 452 ff. One analysis of the polemics about the retributive concept of punishment expounded by Kant is given by Mario Cattaneo (1981) pp. 189 ff. Cattaneo thinks that Kant’s greatest contribution to criminal law is supporting a person’s dignity conceived as an end in itself. Cattaneo M (1981), 270.

  91. 91.

    Naucke (1969), 30 ff.

  92. 92.

    Kant (1982), 452 ff.

  93. 93.

    Beccaria (2008) § 1 ff, pp. 4 ff, § 7, p. 15. Beccaria bitterly criticises Romanist juridical science (cfr. Preface p. X ff.) and asks that it be removed from juridical interpretations of laws (§ 4, pp. 8–9).

  94. 94.

    Lardizábal (2001), 111–112. On the other hand, Lardizábal criticises Rousseau’s contractualism (pp. 117–118), because he believes it is contrary to Christianity.

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  1. Departmente of Public Law, University of Cadiz, Jerez de la Frontera, Spain

    Manuel Rodríguez Puerto

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  1. Manuel Rodríguez Puerto
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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain

    Aniceto Masferrer

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Rodríguez Puerto, M. (2020). Liberties, Rights and Punishments in Modern Natural Law. In: Masferrer, A. (eds) Criminal Law and Morality in the Age of Consent. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 84. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64163-4_3

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