Abstract
The purpose of this study is to assess Husserl’s debt to Lotze’s philosophy during the Halle period (1886–1901). I first track the sources of Husserl’s knowledge of Lotze’s philosophy during his studies with Brentano in Vienna and then with Stumpf in Halle. I then briefly comment on Husserl’s references to Lotze in his early work and research manuscripts for the second volume of his Philosophy of Arithmetic. In the third section, I examine Lotze’s influence on Husserl’s anti-psychologistic turn in the mid-1890s. The fourth section is a commentary on Husserl’s manuscript titled “Mikrokosmos,” to which he explicitly refers in his Prolegomena, and which he planned to publish as an appendix of his Logical Investigations. This work contains a detailed analysis of the third book of Lotze’s 1874 Logic. The last section examines Husserl’s arguments against logical psychologism in his Prolegomena, which I discuss through the lens of Stumpf’s critique of psychologism in his paper “Psychology and theory of knowledge”. I argue that Stumpf’s early works on this topic make it possible to establish a connection between Lotze’s interpretation of Plato’s theory of Ideas and Husserl’s anti-psychologism. My hypothesis is that Stumpf’s analyses represent the background of Husserl’s critique of logical psychologism in his Logical Investigations. I conclude by showing that Husserl’s position with respect to Lotze’s philosophy remains basically unchanged after the publication of his Logical Investigations, and that Husserl’s main criticism of Lotze pertains, in the final analysis, to the absence of a theory of intentionality in Lotze’s philosophy.
Thanks to M. Ramstead for his stylistic remarks on an earlier version of this paper and the Husserl Archives in Leuven for the permission to use and quote the manuscript “Mikrokosmos” (K I 59). An earlier and shorter version of this paper has been published in Spanish under the title: “Hermann Lotze y la génesis de la filosofía temprana de Husserl”, Apeiron, Estudios de filosofia, vol. 3, 2015, p. 13–35.
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Notes
- 1.
Husserl’s Platonism is not unrelated to the idealism-realism debate in which Husserl was involved with the Munich phenomenologists after the publication of Logical Investigations. Already in the Prolegomena, Husserl used the term idealism for a rare time not to designate a metaphysical doctrine, but rather “a theory of knowledge which recognizes the ‘ideal’ as a condition for the possibility of objective knowledge in general”. (Husserl 1982a, p. 238) That said, there is nevertheless an important distinction to be made between the realism-idealism debate, which relates to a metaphysical question concerning the reality of the outside world, and that concerning Platonism in the debate on logical psychologism which relates to the ontological status of the principles and laws of logic. The metaphysical position that one takes with regard to the reality of the outside world is distinct from that which one adopts on the status of laws because one can in fact advocates a form of critical realism on metaphysical issues while adopting a form of Platonism with regard to the status of the principles of logic, for instance. This is the position that Husserl seems to have defended, if not during the Göttingen period, at least during the Halle period. As we shall see below, Husserl has always remained faithful to his Platonism, while his position towards idealism after the transcendental turn and the late influence that could have been exercised by philosophers such as Leibniz, Lotze, and Fichte in this regard is much more complicated (see Fisette 2007).
- 2.
George Croom Robertson, a student of Alexander Bain and co-founder of the famous journal Mind, studied with Lotze and the physicist Weber in Göttingen in 1862, and we know that he encouraged William Robertson Smith to attend Lotze’s lectures. During his stay in Göttingen, Robertson Smith maintained close relationships with Carl Stumpf and the mathematician Felix Klein, and we also know that he acted as an emissary of Brentano during his trip to England in the early 1870s. (cf. Maier 2009) James Sully, the author of several influential books in psychology, studied with Lotze in the late 1860s and is known to have reviewed several of Stumpf’s works for Mind. (Sully 1878, 1884, 1886, 1891) James Ward, who also studied with Lotze in Göttingen in the 1870s, is the author of the article “Psychology” published in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which is the basis of his major 1918 work Psychological Principles, in which he acknowledges his debt to Lotze, Brentano and “his Austrian connections”. (1918, p. IX) His student G. F. Stout, the mentor of Moore and Russell, was deeply interested in the work of Brentano and his students, and Bell has said of his book Analytic Psychology (1896) that it is essentially “a presentation, for an English audience, of the doctrines which have emerged some 22 years earlier in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.” (Bell 1999, p. 201) That is why it has been said that Stout served as a mediator between his students Moore and Russell, on the one hand, and Brentano and his students in the field of descriptive psychology, on the other hand (see van der Schaar 1996, 2013). Bell examined the factors and forces responsible for the emergence of analytic philosophy and argued that the most important factor concerns the debates over the emergence of the new psychology: “Moore, I have suggested, is best seen as the major, though by no means the first, British participant in an existing debate whose other participants included Ward, Stout, Russell, Meinong, Stumpf, Husserl, Twardowski and Brentano. Many of the terms and goals of this debate originated in Germany, during the 1870s, in the attempts by philosophers, physiologists, theologians and others to come to terms with, and contribute to, the emergence of psychology as a discipline in its own right”. (Bell 1999, p. 208) Of course, I would add the name of Lotze as the central piece of this complex puzzle.
- 3.
In a series of articles on James and Lotze, Krausharr nicely summarizes Lotze’s major influence on James’s Psychology: “There was so much in Lotze that coincided with and paralleled the course of James’s ideas, that he became for a time very much enmeshed in Lotze’s Problemlage. The philosophical position that is developed in the Principles of Psychology leans heavily upon Lotze’s philosophical and psychological doctrines. He did not extricate himself therefrom fully until the final working out of his philosophy of pure experience.” (1939, p. 458) Krausharr (1936, p. 245) rightly pointed out that it was under the influence of Stumpf’s Raumbuch that James became interested in Lotze’s theory of local signs.
- 4.
See Kreiser’s biography of Frege (2001, p. 86–111). Frege himself acknowledged Lotze’s influence on his thought, as evidenced by Bauch: “I heard it myself from the mouth of Frege, our great mathematician, that for his mathematical—and, if I may add what Frege modestly did not mention—epochmaking investigations, impulses from Lotze were of decisive importance”. (in Schlotter 2006, p. 45) See also Gabriel (1989) who convincingly shows the influence of Lotze’s logic on Frege.
- 5.
Gabriel’s arguments, which support his construal of Frege as a neo-Kantian, are mainly based on Frege’s personal acquaintance with Bauch in Jena and on the alleged affinities of Frege’s epistemological positions with those of the neo-Kantian Windelband, even if Frege almost never refers to neo-Kantians. Paul F. Linke, who was Frege’s colleague in Jena starting from 1907 and one of his strongest supporters in Germany, excludes any influence of his fellow neo-Kantians in Jena on Frege. (Linke 1946, p. 77) Linke was close to Husserl and to the Brentanian circles. He published in Husserl’s Jahrbuch and he was one of the first to emphasize the influence of Frege on Husserl; (Linke 1926, p. 228–229) he is the author of “Gottlob Frege als Philosoph” and in his later writings showed great interest in Frege (see Dathe 2000). Through his conversations with Linke, Frege might have been informed of Husserl’s work and that of Brentano’s students in general. In any case, it is worth remembering that Brentano’s students were responsible for the early reception of Frege’s work in Germany. Indeed, in 1882, Stumpf received a letter from Frege, in which he described the basic ideas of his Begriffsschrift in great detail and asked Stumpf to publish a review of his book, which, at that time, had been ignored since its publication in 1879. Frege feared above all that the works he was preparing on the logical foundation of arithmetic would suffer the same fate as his Begriffsschrifft and approached Stumpf for advice. Stumpf responded to Frege’s letter a few weeks later by promising to review his Begriffsschrift and recommended that Frege first publish his research in vernacular language (gewöhnlich) and postpone the publication of his theory of arithmetic based on the technical language of his Begriffsschrift. Yet, as we know, it was not Stumpf but Anton Marty, another of Brentano’s students, who in 1884 reviewed and commented Frege’s theory of judgment and his Begriffsschrift in the second article in a series of papers on subjectless propositions. (Marty 1884) Finally, let us mention Benno Kerry, another student of Brentano. Kerry was very interested in Frege’s works (see Peckhaus 1994).
- 6.
See Stumpf (1917, 1976, p. 18 ff) for an account of his activity in Göttingen between 1870 and 1873. The main subject of Stumpf’s Raumbuch is the nativism-empiricism controversy; Stumpf’s starting point is Lotze’s theory of local signs, which represents, according to many, his main contribution to the problem of space perception. Lotze responded to Stumpf’s criticism in his “Mitteilung an Stumpf,” which is annexed to Stumpf’s work. (1873, p. 315–324) After leaving Göttingen, Stumpf continued to consider Lotze’s work. Besides his reminiscences of Lotze published in Kantstudien (Stumpf 1917) and the constant references to his work, Stumpf reviewed most of Lotze’s posthumous works published in German between 1882 and 1892 (see Fisette 2015d). In 1893, he published an article in which he revised his position on local signs. (Stumpf 1893) In his inaugural address as Rector of the University of Berlin, delivered in 1907 under the title “The renaissance of philosophy”, Stumpf associates Lotze’s thought with a revival of German philosophy in the mid-nineteenth century. Stumpf distinguishes two main orientations of German philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century, the first being neo-Kantianism, which advocated a return to Kant, and the second being the so-called Erfahrungsphilosophie. At the time, in Germany at least, Erfahrungsphilosophie was the common denominator of several schools of thought, including the school of Brentano, which sought to practice philosophy in the spirit of the natural sciences. Stumpf maintains that, through their empirical work in the field of philosophy of mind and physiological psychology, philosophers like Lotze and Fechner contributed significantly to a renaissance of philosophy in Germany.
- 7.
Windelband’s and Rickert’s positions on psychology come out clearly from their classification of sciences into idiographic and natural sciences, which was intended to replace the traditional classification based on the distinction between Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften. Windelband’s and Rickert’s main argument is that, methodologically, the new psychology was more akin to natural than to moral science and therefore could not be considered an idiographic science. In his 1927 lecture Natur und Geist, Husserl criticizes their interpretation of Lotze’s theory of values from the perspective of a philosophy of culture based on a “critical science of values” and accuses them of ruling out intentional psychology, to which Husserl assigns a central place in his Freiburg phenomenology. (Hua XXXIII, p. 80–81, 95)
- 8.
Although Husserl acquired a copy of Lotze’s Microcosmos as early as 1880 (Schuhmann 1977, p. 8), nothing indicates that he was interested in Lotze’s philosophy at that time; and it is unlikely that he had any direct contact with Lotze, who arrived in Berlin in April 1881 and passed away in July of the same year.
- 9.
- 10.
Husserl seeks to avoid Brentano’s concept of physical phenomenon because it does not properly designate an analogy, gradation, etc., and he instead prefers the concept of primary or immanent content. Nevertheless, the concept of intentional inexistence, which is Brentano’s criterion for the distinction between these two classes of phenomena, remains the basis for the classification of relations in this work. (Husserl 2003, p. 73)
- 11.
The importance of the distinction between these two classes of relations is confirmed by several other texts belonging to the Halle period (see Fisette 2000).
- 12.
Husserl writes: “It need only be acknowledged that the intentional object of a presentation is the same as its actual object, and on occasion the same as its external object, and that it is absurd to distinguish between them. The transcendent object would not be the object of this presentation, if it was not its intentional object. This is plainly a merely analytic proposition. The object of the presentation, of the ‘intention’, is and means what is presented, the intentional object”. (Husserl 1982b, p. 127)
- 13.
These distinctions are also central in Husserl’s criticism of Twardowski. (Husserl 1994, p. 374–375, 388–390; 1982b, p. 125–127) In a footnote to his Prolegomena (1982a, p. 318), Husserl confirms Frege’s influence: “G. Frege’s stimulating work Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884, p. vi) (I need hardly say that I no longer approve of my own fundamental criticisms of Frege’s anti-psychologistic position set forth in my Philosophie der Arithmetik, I, pp. 129–32). Here, I may seize the opportunity, in relation to all of the discussions of these Prolegomena, to refer to the Preface of Frege’s later work Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. I (Jena, 1893)”. However, this reference to the Grundgesetze is problematic because Frege’s main argument against logical psychologism is based on the normative character of the laws of logic, an argument that Husserl dismisses in the Prolegomena. This is shown by the following excerpt from Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik: “It is commonly granted that the logical laws are guidelines which thought should follow to arrive at the truth; but it is too easily forgotten. The ambiguity of the word “law” here is fatal. In one sense it says what is, in the other it prescribes what ought to be. Only in the latter sense can the logical laws be called laws of thought, in so far as they legislate how one ought to think. Every law stating what is the case can be conceived as prescriptive, one should think in accordance with it, and in that sense it is accordingly a law of thought. This holds for geometrical and physical laws no less than for the logical. The latter better deserve the title “laws of thought” only if thereby it is supposed to be said that they are the most general laws, prescribing how to think wherever there is thinking at all.” (Frege 2013, p. XV)
- 14.
This dual influence is well documented in Husserl’s work, particularly in his 1903 review of M. Palágyi, in which he once again confirms the influence of Lotze’s and Bolzano’s contributions: “In particular, Lotze’s reflections about the interpretation of Plato’s theory of forms had a profound effect on me. Only by thinking out these thoughts from Lotze—and in my opinion he failed to get completely clear on them—did I find the key to the curious conceptions of Bolzano, which in all their phenomenological naivety were at first unintelligible, and to the treasures of his Wissenschaftslehre.” (Husserl 1994, p. 201)
- 15.
“And so, we will have to be content with Lotze’s at first arguably strange view that arithmetic is only a relatively independent and since ancient times particularly sophisticated part of logic. In fact, in practical terms, it also represents the greatest instrument the human mind has ever devised for the purposes of deduction” („Und so werden wir uns der zunächst wohl befremdlichen Auffassung Lotzes befreunden müssen, dass die Arithmetik nur rein relativ selbständiges und von alters her besonders hoch entwickeltes Stück der Logik sei. Tatsächlich repräsentiert sie auch in praktischer Hinsicht das großartigster Instrument, das der menschliche Geist zu Zwecken der Deduktion ersonnen hat“). (Husserl 2001b, p. 271–272) Husserl discusses several other aspects of Lotze’s logic in this lecture: § 44 („Inhaltsinterpretation dieser Form“ p. 152–153; § 45 „Die negativen kategorischen Sätze und die Bedeutung der Negation“, p. 155–157, 162. It is also worth recalling that, in his correspondence with Stumpf in the early 1890s as well as in a letter to Brentano published recently (Husserl 2015), Husserl emphasized the urgent need for a thorough reform of logic. He already considered the hypothesis that the arithmetica universalis “is a segment of formal logic.” (1994, p. 17) However, logic was at that time defined as a practical science, as “a symbolic technique” and not as a purely theoretical logic or as a theory of science, as will be the case starting from his 1896 lecture on logic.
- 16.
Husserl 1982a, p. 108, 136 ff; Briefwechsel VII, p. 97). In his Prolegomena and Formal and Transcendental Logic (1969, p. 83), Husserl refers to the following passage of Lotze’s Logic: “It is necessary, however, to expressly point out that all calculation is a kind of thought, that the fundamental concepts and principles of mathematics have their systematic place in logic, and that we must retain the right, at a later period, when occasion requires, to return without scruple upon the results that mathematics have been achieving, as an independently progressive branch of universal logic.” (Lotze 1884, p. 26)
- 17.
Lotze’s Logic belongs to the last period of his work (1869–1881), during which he began to develop a comprehensive and systematic exposition of his philosophy, which he calls his system of philosophy. His 1874 Logic is actually the first book of his “System of philosophy”; the second book is his Metaphysics , published in 1879. The third volume, which has never been published, was to contain his aesthetic, moral theories as well as his philosophy of religion. His Logic is divided into three parts. In the first book, titled “Pure logic,” Lotze describes systematically the formation of concepts, judgments, and inferences independently of their context of application, and especially of psychology. In the second book, “Applied logic,” Lotze explains how the particular contents of our representations are subject to the ideal forms of concepts, judgments, and inferences. The third book, titled “On Knowledge,” addresses the question of how our thoughts can lay claim to an objective understanding of the objective correlates and causes of our representations, i.e., the real world. In the first chapter of this third book, Lotze discards the skeptical arguments by arguing, as Husserl does in his Prolegomena, that skeptical doubt presupposes a recognized truth and that skepticism is a contradictory doctrine. The second chapter, “The world of ideas” (§§ 313–321), contains Lotze’s well-known interpretation of Plato’s Ideas, which Lotze seeks to defend against the objection of hypostasis, as well as the famous notion of Geltung.
- 18.
“In any case, we could only give our consent to these misinterpretations of speech, if, contrary to the wording, the meaning of the ‘relation’ here, as in all cases, is only one, and that the differences lie only in the affirmed matter. I am far from thinking that the affirmation is an act” („Jedenfalls könnten wir dieser, Missdeutungen nicht unzugänglichen Rede unsere Zustimmung nur geben, wenn sie, dem Wortlaut entgegen, meinte, dass der Sinn der « Beziehung » hier wie in allen Fällen nur einer sei und dass die Unterschiede bloß in der bejahten Materie lägen. Die Bejahung als Akt liegt uns aber fern“). (K I 59, p. 8a–9a)
- 19.
Das Denken denkt nur den Inhalt, d.h. es bezieht sich, auf ihn mittelst dieser oder jener Gedanken. Der Gehalt an objektiven Gedanken (z.B. an Begriffen, an Sätzen) kann wechseln, aber der Gegenstand, den sie (und mittels ihrer und in anderer Weise die Denkakte) intendieren, bleibt identisch derselbe. [...] Was das heißt, es beziehen sich Gedanken, etwa verschiedene Sätze, auf denselben Gegenstand, davon haben wir das unmittelbarste und sicherste Wissen, kein Bild kann uns das Evidente noch evidenter machen, kann das, was wir direkt sehen, verdeutlichen wollen). (K I 59, p. 11a)
- 20.
„Freilich, wer im Subjektivismus zu einer Hälfte stecken bleibt, wer einerseits Dinge, Ereignisse, Welten als an sich existierend annimmt, und auf der anderen Seite doch alles Logische in den subjektiven Denktätigkeiten aufgehen lässt, für den öffnet sich, eben als Konsequenz der unklaren Halbheit dieser Abgrund von Wunderbarkeit : Hier die Dinge, dort unser Denken. Wie kommen beide zusammen, wie das Wunder ihrer Harmonie erklären? Und für diesen Standpunkt bleibt es ein Wunder. Aber merkt man denn nicht, dass wenn alles Logische subjektivistisch verflüchtigt wird, auch vom Sein der Dinge nichts übrig bliebe und wieder dass auch von der Harmonie zwischen Denken und Sein nichts übrig bliebe?“ (K I 59, p. 10a)
- 21.
“… gehören zusammen und stimmen zusammen, wie Wahrheit und wahre Sache, das Eine so objektiv wie das andere, und beide korrelativ, also untrennbar aufeinander bezogen”. (K I 59, p. 10a) Compare with what Husserl says about the mythical conception of Lotze’s two worlds in the draft of a preface to the Logical Investigations: “Another such presupposition in Lotze is a mythological metaphysics: he distinguishes a representational world (Vorstellungswelt), which has merely human-subjective validity, from a metaphysical world of monads in-themselves, concerning which, under the label of metaphysics, we can venture metaphysical proposals by completely mysterious methods. Such proposals are inferior to novels, since novels have an aesthetic truth, and hence, an essential common ground with reality that is intelligible, something which is necessarily lacking in all such metaphysical fiction”. (Husserl 1975, p. 47)
- 22.
Although these two works by Stumpf were written before the publication of Lotze’s greater Logic in 1874, one can find in Lotze’s Microcosmos, first published in 1864, an outline of his interpretation of Plato’s Ideas in terms of Geltung, as well as the distinction between concept and proposition (see Lotze 1899, Book VIII, chapter I, p. 325 ff.).
- 23.
“My work shows that my struggle against Psychologism is in no way a struggle against the psychological grounding of Logic as methodology, nor against the descriptive-psychological illumination of the origin (Ursprung) of the logical concepts. Rather, it is only a struggle against an epistemological position, though certainly one which has had a very harmful influence upon the way in which logic is done”. (Husserl 1994, p. 199)
- 24.
Opinions diverge as to whether Frege would share ranks with the Kantians or with the phenomenologists. Some argue that Frege’s anti-psychologistic arguments are based on normativity and it is precisely on this point that he differs from the Husserl’s position. Others, such as Dummett, dispute this interpretation of Frege’s logic as a normative science. According to Dummett, there are no significant differences between the positions of Husserl and Frege on that issue: “a characterization of logic as a normative science is quite superficial, for logic is best regarded as the theoretical science underlying the relevant normative principles; the important question is the proper characterization of the subject-matter of this theoretical but non-prescriptive science”. (Dummett 1991, p. 225)
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Fisette, D. (2021). Hermann Lotze and the Genesis of Husserl’s Early Philosophy (1886–1901). In: Parker, R.K.B. (eds) The Idealism-Realism Debate Among Edmund Husserl’s Early Followers and Critics. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 112. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62159-9_2
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