Abstract
We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property (EFX) and three new and related properties (EFX\(_0\), EFX\(^3\) and EF1\(^3\)) in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1\(^3\) allocation. With \(-\alpha /0/\alpha \) utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX\(^3\) and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With \(-\alpha /0/\beta \) utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Aleksandrov, M., Aziz, H., Gaspers, S., Walsh, T.: Online fair division: analysing a food bank problem. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth IJCAI 2015, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 25–31, 2015, pp. 2540–2546 (2015)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Filos-Ratsikas, A., Hollender, A., Voudouris, A.A.: Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX. CoRR abs/2001.09838 (2020)
Amanatidis, G., Birmpas, G., Markakis, V.: Comparing approximate relaxations of envy-freeness. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018, Stockholm, Sweden, July 13–19, 2018, pp. 42–48 (2018)
Aziz, H., Caragiannis, I., Igarashi, A., Walsh, T.: Fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-19, pp. 53–59. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, July 7 2019
Aziz, H., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F.: A polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation. CoRR abs/1909.00740 (2019)
Aziz, H., Rey, S.: Almost group envy-free allocation of indivisible goods and chores. In: Bessiere, C. (ed.) Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-20, pp. 39–45. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, July 2020. main track
Barman, S., Krishnamurthy, S.K., Vaish, R.: Finding fair and efficient allocations. In: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on EC 2018, pp. 557–574. ACM, New York (2018)
Barman, S., Krishnamurthy, S.K., Vaish, R.: Greedy algorithms for maximizing Nash social welfare. In: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, AAMAS 2018, Stockholm, Sweden, July 10–15, 2018, pp. 7–13 (2018)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F., Yanovskaia, E.: Dividing BADS under additive utilities. Soc. Choice Welfare 52(3), 395–417 (2018)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F., Yanovskaya, E.: Competitive division of a mixed manna. Econometrica 85(6), 1847–1871 (2017)
Brams, S.J., Taylor, A.D.: Fair Division - From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1996)
Budish, E.: The combinatorial assignment problem: approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. J. Polit. Econ. 119(6), 1061–1103 (2011)
Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, C., Kanellopoulos, P., Kyropoulou, M.: The efficiency of fair division. Theory Comput. Syst. 50(4), 589–610 (2012)
Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A.D., Shah, N., Wang, J.: The unreasonable fairness of maximum Nash welfare. In: Proceedings of ACM Conference on EC 2016, Maastricht, The Netherlands, July 24–28, 2016, pp. 305–322 (2016)
Chevaleyre, Y., Dunne, P., Endriss, U., Lang, J., Lemaitre, M., Maudet, N., Padget, J., Phelps, S., Rodrguez-Aguilar, J., Sousa, P.: Issues in multiagent resource allocation. Informatica 30, 3–31 (2006)
Dobzinski, S., Vondrák, J.: Communication complexity of combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. SODA 2013, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia, PA, USA, pp. 1205–1215 (2013)
Dubins, L.E., Spanier, E.H.: How to cut a cake fairly. Am. Math. Monthly 68(11), 1–17 (1961)
Foley, D.K.: Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Econ. Essays 7(1), 45–98 (1967)
Hugo, S.: The problem of fair division. Econometrica 16, 101–104 (1948)
Kyropoulou, M., Suksompong, W., Voudouris, A.: Almost envy-freeness in group resource allocation. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019, pp. 400–406. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, August 2019
Lipton, R.J., Markakis, E., Mossel, E., Saberi, A.: On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods. In: Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on EC, New York, NY, USA, May 17–20, 2004, pp. 125–131 (2004)
Moulin, H.: Fair Division and Collective Welfare. MIT Press, Cambridge (2003)
Pareto, V.: Cours d’Économie politique. Professeur á l’Université de Lausanne. vol. I. pp. 430 1896. vol. II. pp. 426. F. Rouge, Lausanne (1897)
Plaut, B., Roughgarden, T.: Almost envy-freeness with general valuations. In: Proceedings of the 29th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2018, New Orleans, LA, USA, January 7–10, 2018, pp. 2584–2603 (2018)
Sandomirskiy, F., Segal-Halevi, E.: Fair division with minimal sharing. CoRR abs/1908.01669 (2019)
Young, H.P.: Equity - In Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1995)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
A A Complete Version of Algorithm 1
A A Complete Version of Algorithm 1
For reasons of space, we presented a short version of Algorithm 1 in the main text. We present in here a complete version of it.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this paper
Cite this paper
Aleksandrov, M., Walsh, T. (2020). Two Algorithms for Additive and Fair Division of Mixed Manna. In: Schmid, U., Klügl, F., Wolter, D. (eds) KI 2020: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. KI 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12325. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58285-2_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58285-2_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-58284-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-58285-2
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)