Abstract
CRYSTALS-Dilithium is a lattice-based cryptography algorithm which claims to provide a signature scheme that is unforgeable against quantum-computers; it is the first such algorithm we consider in-depth, of the eight in this book. This algorithm has three components: key generation, signature generation, and signature verification. We select four variants of CRYSTALS-Dilithium with distinct security strength and make these variants capable of synthesis by a High-Level Synthesis (HLS) tool. We summarize all the changes in the C code to make it capable of synthesis. Using HLS, we generate FPGA and ASIC designs for all three components of the four variants. For CRYSTALS-Dilithium hardware architectures, we evaluate trade-offs in power, area, speed, and security. We explore the design-space through a detailed analysis of FPGA and ASIC designs. The evaluation leads to the conclusion that the FPGA implementation of Dilithium’s security level 3 variant has the highest latency and area overhead, while its ASIC-specific implementation shows that it has the best security with minimal latency and area overhead.
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Soni, D., Basu, K., Nabeel, M., Aaraj, N., Manzano, M., Karri, R. (2021). CRYSTALS-Dilithium. In: Hardware Architectures for Post-Quantum Digital Signature Schemes. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57682-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57682-0_2
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