Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Tertium datur. Time as Meditation in Kant and Heidegger

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Heidegger and Contemporary Philosophy

Part of the book series: Contributions to Hermeneutics ((CONT HERMEN,volume 8))

  • 351 Accesses

Abstract

This paper argues that in both Kant and Heidegger the relation between thought and the world is possible only by means of the transcendental mediation of time. Where is the difference, then, between Kant’s and Heidegger’s temporal ontology? Whereas for Kant the schema is a “product of the imagination”, and thus a product of a transcendental faculty of the subject, for Heidegger the three temporal ecstases of transcendence are simply a neutral, structural articulation of the relation between Dasein and world. They are not a product of subjectivity – least of all can they be brought back to the transcendental constitution of a consciousness.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    On this classic issue, cf. R. N. Boyd, “On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism,” in Erkenntnis, 1983, 19, pp. 45–90; Id., “What Realism Implies and What it Does Not,” in Dialectica, 1989, 43, pp. 5–29.

  2. 2.

    Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part I: Science of Logic, trans. and ed. by K. Brinkmann and D. O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), §§ 19–78, pp. 47–125. For a closer examination of this issue, and with regard to Kant’s critical philosophy, see T. Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), pp. 91–97.

  3. 3.

    Ibid., § 28, p. 68.

  4. 4.

    Ibid.

  5. 5.

    B. Spinoza, Ethica, II, 7.

  6. 6.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part I: Science of Logic, § 37, p. 78.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., § 69, p. 119.

  8. 8.

    Parmenides, B 3 (Diels-Kranz), in The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy. The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics (2 vol. set), translated and edited by D. W. Graham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), I, p. 212.

  9. 9.

    Needless to say that with being here, I do not comprehend the Heideggerian, ‘ontological’ concept of being, but rather the ontic one, that is to say: being as the totality of ‘inworldly’ entities.

  10. 10.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part I: Science of Logic, § 43, p. 88.

  11. 11.

    I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 193–194 (“Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind” (KW III (Kritik der reinen Vernunft I), A 51/B 75, p. 98). For a discussion of this passage, see P. Kitcher, Kant’s Transcendental Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 110–111. On this issue, see also the classic discussion in C. Knüfer, Grundzüge der Geschichte des Begriffs,Vorstellung‘ von Wolff bis Kant (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 19992), p. 82.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., A 12/B 25, p. 133.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., A 137/B 177, pp. 271–272.

  14. 14.

    For a coherent reconstruction of Kant’s argument in his Doctrine of Transcendental Schematism, see H. Mörchen, Die Einbildungskraft bei Kant (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 19702), pp. 42–129. On the same issue, see also M. Wunsch, Einbildungskraft und Erfahrung bei Kant (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007), pp. 84–130.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., A 141/ B 181, p. 273.

  16. 16.

    Cf. Plat. Symp., 203 b-c.

  17. 17.

    Cf. K. R. Westphal, Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 136: “[…] Kant states that the schema of substance is ‘permanence of the real in time’ (A144/B183), and he repeatedly stresses the role of the permanent in appearance throughout the Analogies. Later in the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection, Kant stresses a point, especially important here, about the role of the permanent in appearance. The permanent in appearance is to be found only in space […], and it is directly associated with spatial extension.”

  18. 18.

    I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 181/A 142, pp. 273–274.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., A 140/B 180, p. 273.

  20. 20.

    On the sensible character of the schema, conceived as a “[…] representation […] that Kant requires be on the one hand ‘pure’, in other words emptied of all the empirical element, and on the other hand ‘sensible’, in other words homogeneous with the empirical element” (p. 133), see G. Didi-Huberman, Devant l’image. Questions posées aux fins d’une histoire de l’art (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1990), trans. by J. Goodman, Confronting Images. Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press), 2005, pp. 132–138.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., B 177, p. 272.

  22. 22.

    On the con concept of Gleichartigkeit, cf. H. Cohen, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (Berlin: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhandlung), 1871, p. 179.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., B 177/B 178/A 139, p. 272.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., A 142, p. 274.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., A 142, p. 274.

  26. 26.

    Ibid., A 33, p. 163.

  27. 27.

    Anaximander, B 1 (Diels-Kranz), in The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy. The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics, I, p. 51.

  28. 28.

    I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 139, p. 272.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., B 177/B 178/A 139, p. 272.

  30. 30.

    M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by R. Taft (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 19915), § 10, p. 34. M.

  31. 31.

    Cf. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 38, B 46, p. 157, p. 162.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., A 24, A 31, p. 158, p. 162.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., A 26/B 42, p. 159.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., A 33, p. 163.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., B 39, p. 158.

  36. 36.

    Ibid., A 31, p. 162.

  37. 37.

    M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, § 10, p. 35.

  38. 38.

    Parmenides, B 3 (Diels-Kranz), in The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy. The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics, I, p. 212.

  39. 39.

    M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, § 35, p. 141.

  40. 40.

    Besides Hermann Mörchen’s Die Einbildungkraft bei Kant (cit.), on Heidegger relation with Kant—and precisely with Kant’s doctrine of the transcendental schematism –, see also: R. Findler, The Problem of the Imagination for Subjectivity. Kant and Heidegger on the Issue of Displacement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); W. D. Blattner, Temporal Synthesis and Temporality in Kant and Heidegger (Ann Arbor: U.M.I, 1989); U. Schultz, Das Problem des Schematismus bei Kant und Heidegger (Elmshorn: Koch, 1963); R. Tremblay, Métaphysique et ontologie chez Kant et Heidegger (Québec City: Presses de l’Université Laval, 1984); V. Perego, Finitezza e libertà. Heidegger interprete di Kant (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2001); E. Mendieta, Heidegger’s Existential Analytic as Epistemology: Kant and Heidegger, in The Adventures of Transcendental Philosophy (Lanham: Rowman & Littelfield Publishers, 2002), pp. 1–35.

  41. 41.

    HGA XXIV (Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie), § 15 c, pp. 229–230 [The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, trans. and ed. by A. Hofstadter (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 161].

  42. 42.

    M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 200121), § 69 c, p. 415.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., § 69 c, p. 417.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., § 69 c, p. 416.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., A 142, p. 274.

Bibliography

  • Blattner W. D., Temporal Synthesis and Temporality in Kant and Heidegger (Ann Arbor: U.M.I, 1989).

    Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R. N., “On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism,” in Erkenntnis, 1983, 19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R. N., “What Realism Implies and What it Does Not,” in Dialectica, 1989, 43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen H., Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (Berlin: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhandlung), 1871.

    Google Scholar 

  • Didi-Huberman G., Devant l’image. Questions posées aux fins d’une histoire de l’art (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1990); trans. by J. Goodman, Confronting Images. Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press), 2005.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diels-Kranz, The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy. The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics (2 vol. set), translated and edited by D. W. Graham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), I.

    Google Scholar 

  • Findler R., The Problem of the Imagination for Subjectivity. Kant and Heidegger on the Issue of Displacement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hegel G. W. F., Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part I: Science of Logic, trans. and ed. by K. Brinkmann and D. O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger M., Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by R. Taft (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 19915).

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M., GA XXIV (Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie), § 15 c, pp. 229–230; The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, trans. and ed. by A. Hofstadter (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant I., KW III (Kritik der reinen Vernunft I), A 51/B 75; Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher P., Kant’s Transcendental Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

    Google Scholar 

  • Knüfer C., Grundzüge der Geschichte des Begriffs,Vorstellung‘von Wolff bis Kant (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 19992).

    Google Scholar 

  • Mendieta E., Heidegger’s Existential Analytic as Epistemology: Kant and Heidegger, in The Adventures of Transcendental Philosophy (Lanham: Rowman & Littelfield Publishers, 2002).

    Google Scholar 

  • Mörchen H., Die Einbildungskraft bei Kant (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 19702).

    Google Scholar 

  • Perego V., Finitezza e libertà. Heidegger interprete di Kant (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2001).

    Google Scholar 

  • Rockmore T., Kant and Phenomenology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011).

    Google Scholar 

  • Schultz U., Das Problem des Schematismus bei Kant und Heidegger (Elmshorn: Koch, 1963).

    Google Scholar 

  • Tremblay R., Métaphysique et ontologie chez Kant et Heidegger (Québec City: Presses de l’Université Laval, 1984).

    Google Scholar 

  • Westphal K. R., Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wunsch M., Einbildungskraft und Erfahrung bei Kant (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007).

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA

    Marcello Barison

Authors
  1. Marcello Barison
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Filosofia “Piero Martinetti”, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milano, Italy

    Carmine Di Martino

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Barison, M. (2021). Tertium datur. Time as Meditation in Kant and Heidegger. In: Di Martino, C. (eds) Heidegger and Contemporary Philosophy. Contributions to Hermeneutics, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56566-4_16

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation