Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to determine the ethical implications of the structure of Dasein as a social being. By beginning with some (critical) suggestions proposed by Emmanuel Lévinas—who accused Heidegger of omitting, on his philosophical path, any serious ethical investigations—I put forth the claim that Heidegger is not foreign to the question, and he is able to put, at its core, an ethical understanding of the issue. Although this question runs through all of Heidegger’s works, I will focus only on works from the 1920s and, more specifically, on certain parts of Being and Time. In the early period of his philosophical investigations, one may find two levels of reflection pertaining to the problem of ethics: phenomenological reflection and ontological reflection. I thus divided my analysis into these two parts accordingly, in order to show how these levels referred to two different domains. Indeed, if the former is an attempt to describe the mere factual conditions of Dasein’s existence (analyzing its peculiar way of being, its particular attitudes, etc.), then the second set of reflections aim at grounding this existence on its specific characteristics (that is, guaranteeing a transcendental horizon to these characteristics). At the very least, I will show how these two levels of analysis—which are typical of all the reflections found within Being and Time—are made possible by the particular (ontological) nature of Dasein.
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Notes
- 1.
E. Lévinas, Totality and Infinity. An essay on exteriority, translated by A. Lingis, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 2007, p. 134.
- 2.
See G. Anders, On the Pseudo-concreteness of Heidegger’s Philosophy, Total Recall Press, Friendswood, 1999; J. Derrida, Of Spirit. Heidegger and the question, translated by G. Bennington and R. Bowlby, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991; T. Adorno, Jargon den Eigentlichkeit: Zur Deutsche Ideologie, Suhrkamp, Berlin, 1964.
- 3.
See in particular the first section of Totality and Infinity, The Same and the Other (E. Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 33–52).
- 4.
In Levinas’ view, the Same is precisely an attempt to think of a new type of subject, as opposed to those philosophical perspectives (including the Heideggerian) where the subject is still thought of in an (theoretical-) ontological way.
- 5.
This is clear from the first few sentences in Totality and Infinity: «We do not need obscure fragments of Heraclitus to prove that being reveals itself as war to philosophical thought, that war does not only affect it as the most patent fact, but as the very patency, or the truth, of the real […]. The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality, which dominates Western philosophy. Individuals are reduced to being bearers of forces that command them unbeknown to themselves» (ivi, p. 21).
- 6.
This is not an unusual question. On this topic see: O. Pöggeler, A. Gethmann, Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie, Suhrkamp, Berlin, 1987; F. Rapp, Ontologie ohne Ethik? Zur Klärung der Heidegger-Kontroverse, in «Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung», 1989 (43), pp. 695–701; R. Branden, Warum Heidegger keine Ethik geschrieben hat?, Passagen, Wien, 1992; F. Volpi, L’etica rimossa di Heidegger, in «Micromega», 1998 (2), pp. 188 sgg; J. L. Nancy, Heidegger’s „Originary Ethics“, in «Studies in Practical Philosophy Journal», 1999 (1), pp. 12–35; A. Ardovino (ed), Heidegger e gli orizzonti della filosofia pratica, Guerini, Milano, 2003; J. Adrián Escudero, Guía de lectura de ser y tiempo de Martin Heidegger, 2 Voll., Herder Editorial, Barcelona, 2016.
- 7.
M. Heidegger, Being and Time [BT], translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, p. 120.
- 8.
«At the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein should not be interpreted with the differentiated character [Differenz] of some definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein’s everydayness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being and back into it again-is all existing, such as it is. We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein ”averageness” [Durchschnittlichkeit]» (ivi, p. 69).
- 9.
See ivi sections 15, 16 and 26.
- 10.
As we read in Being and Time: «For in addressing these entities as ‘Things’ (res), we have tacitly anticipated their ontological character. […] Ontological explication discovers, as it proceeds, such characteristics of Being as substantiality, materiality, extendedness, side-by-side-ness, and so forth. […] When one designates Things as the entities that are ‘proximally given’, one goes ontologically astray, even though ontically one has something else in mind» (ivi, p. 96). See also M. Heidegger, History of Concept of Time. Prolegomena, translated by T. Kisiel, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 36–47.
- 11.
This “dependence” of the things on Dasein is not equivalent to the dependence of res on the subiectum. As we have seen, the quality of res is not supposed to define the being of things. For this reason, if we are unable to think of Dasein as a subiectum, then we would also be unable to think of the thing as an obiectum. See M. Heidegger, The Age of World Picture, in Id., The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by W. Lovitt, Garland, London-New York, 1977, pp. 115–154; M. Heidegger, On the Essence of Truth, in Id., Pathmarks, edited by W. McNeill, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 136–154.
- 12.
BT, p. 97.
- 13.
Ivi, p. 98.
- 14.
Ibidem.
- 15.
For this point, see in particular History of Concept of Time, sections 10–13.
- 16.
BT, p. 87
- 17.
Ivi, p. 98.
- 18.
It is what happens with «conspicuousness [Auffallen]», «obtrusiveness [Aufdringlichkeit]» and «obstinacy [Aufsässigkeit]» (see ivi pp. 102–107).
- 19.
Ivi, p. 95.
- 20.
Ivi, p. 155.
- 21.
Ivi, p. 154.
- 22.
Ivi, p. 155.
- 23.
Ibidem.
- 24.
Ivi, p. 158.
- 25.
On the critique of Cartesian subjectivity (in relation to the Husserlian critique) see in particular M. Heidegger, History at the Concept of Time, sections 10–13. See also M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. I, The will to Power as Art, trans. D. F. Krell, San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1979, for a different (and broader) perspective. On the relation between Descartes and Husserl in Heidegger’s interpretations of subjectivity, see the important contributions from J.-L. Marion: Heidegger and Descartes, in C. Macann (ed.), Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments, cit., vol. 2, pp. 178–207.
- 26.
BT, p. 163.
- 27.
See, in particular, M. Heidegger, Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity, translated by J. van Buren, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2008 and M. Heidegger, Toward the Definition of Philosophy, translated by T. Sadler, Continuum, London-New York, 2000 (in particular, Phenomenology as Pre-Theoretical Primordial Sciences, pp. 55–102).
- 28.
M. Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, translated by M. Fritsch and J. A. Gosetti-Ferencei, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2004, pp. 6–7.
- 29.
See M. Heidegger, Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion, in ivi (in particular The Phenomenon of the Historical, pp. 22–37) and M. Heidegger, Augustine and Neo-Platonism, in ivi (in particular pp. 141–154).
- 30.
F. Volpi, Heidegger e Aristotele, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2010. See also, F. Volpi, Dasein as ‘praxis’, in C. Macann (ed.), Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments, IV Voll., Routdledge, London, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 90–129.
- 31.
These analyses should be considered in conjunction with Heidegger’s reflections in Die Gründbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosphie, works which had yet to be edited when Volpi wrote this book.
- 32.
In addition to these analogies, Volpi identifies other similarities: Befindlichkeit would correspond to the Aristotelian pathe, Sorge to orexis and Verstehen to nous praktikos (Cfr. F. Volpi, Heidegger and Aristotele, pp. 68–71).
- 33.
If we look at the work Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy from the year 1924, we see how carefully Heidegger examines the Aristotelian concepts. However, he prefers to work with concepts from Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric and De anima, using the references from the Metaphysics only as a horizon and not as a specific object of research.
- 34.
See BT, section 9.
- 35.
M. Heidegger, The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, translation by A. Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988, p. 63.
- 36.
Ivi, p. 64.
- 37.
Ibidem.
- 38.
BT, p. 247.
- 39.
Ivi, p. 249.
- 40.
M. Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in M. Heidegger, Pathmarks, p. 268.
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Bianchin, L. (2021). The Social Hermeneutics of Dasein. In: Di Martino, C. (eds) Heidegger and Contemporary Philosophy. Contributions to Hermeneutics, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56566-4_11
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