Abstract
I use here the concept of German Idealists in a broad sense, including Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, but will restrict my examination of contemporary New Confucians only to Mou Zongsan (牟宗三 1909–1995) and Tang Junyi (唐君毅 1909–1978). The latter two are central figures of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism in twentieth century and above all they have many connections with the German Idealists in the development of their philosophy. At first sight it seems that Mou’s thought orients more on Kant than Hegel. Mou himself is an excellent Kant interpreter. His new transformation of Chinese philosophy starts from a critique of Kant, for example in his main works, Appearance and Thing-in-itself and Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy. On the contrary Tang’s seems to be more Hegelian than Kantian. But the distinction between Mou (Kant) and Tang (Hegel) lies in the following two features. In the first place Hegel and Tang evolve their systems by means of one single concept (for Hegel, Spirit, and for Tang Junyi, Mind). Secondly, their systems can be subsumed under a common theoretical model, namely monism (one is all).
The question I am concerned with here is the following: How far does the thought of German Idealists influence the development of the philosophical systems of Mou and Tang? The influence of German Idealists can be divided into two perspectives: (1) the perspective of the historical interpretation of Confucianism, between Mou’s three-lineage doctrine (三系說) and Tang’s one-lineage doctrine (一系說); (2) the perspective of construction of universal philosophy or I will call it “philosophy of all philosophies.” This chapter attempts to retrace exactly the sources of German Idealism and to make clear how these sources affect their philosophical development.
This paper is partial result of a three-year research project granted by Minister of Science and Technology R.O.C (Taiwan): Humanity and Individual Self-A Comparative Study of the Theories of German Idealism and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, NSC 99-2410-H-002-035-MY3. I am grateful for this grant.
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Notes
- 1.
One can obviously see this similarity from the above-mentioned Liang Qichao’s paper and the following letter from Xiong Shili to Mou Zongsan.
- 2.
The Chinese text comes from Xiong 1947: 327–328.
- 3.
Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai 張君勱 1887–1969), another representative figure of Contemporary New Confucianism, was also deeply influenced by Kant’s practical philosophy. Chang emphasized the similarity between Kant and Wang Yangming without trying to dispute with Kant as Mou Zongsan did (Carsun Chang 1955: 12; Chang 1962: 13f. Cf. Lee 2016: 14–19). I consider therefore Carsun Chang as a transitional figure between Liang Qichao and Mou Zongsan. (See also chapter “Zhang Junmai: The Political and Cultural Thought of a New Confucian”—Ed.)
- 4.
Mou Zongsan mentioned in his Autobiography at Fifty (五十自述) that he met Tang Junyi several times from 1937–1942 and was very impressed by Tang’s understanding of Hegel, but he himself tended to understand more of Kant. In spite of this, Mou tried to access the system of Hegel through Lectures on the Philosophy of History and Elements of the Philosophy of Right (MCW 32: 99–103). Stephan Schmidt emphasizes the influence of Hegel in Mou’s later theory of self-negation of innate moral awareness (良知自我坎陷) (Schmidt 2011: 279–286). On the influence of Hegel on Mou, see also Jiang (1991), Lai (1997), and Tseng (2015).
- 5.
See chapters “Beyond the Horizon: Late Work of TANG Junyi” and “MOU Zongsan: Between Confucianism and Kantianism”—Ed.
- 6.
On Mou’s three-lineage teaching, see MCW 5: 52–53. Whether Tang holds to the three-lineage teaching is controversial. Yang Zebo (楊澤波) mentioned in Critique of MouZongsan’s Three-lineage Theory (牟宗三三系論論衡) that Liu Shuxian once asked Tang Junyi about the question of three-lineage teaching, and Liu remembered, “Tang would not make a value judgment on certain figures; he only said their master Xiong Shili (熊十力) did not want to talk about the problem of three lineages, and he did not recognize Hu Wufeng’s (胡五峰) thought as an independent system” (Yang 2006: 2–3). In Tang’s works we do not find any textual support for the three-lineage teaching. On the basis of the headings of three sections of chapter 19 of An Inquiry into Chinese Philosophy: Inquiry into Teaching, Lai Shen-chon argues that Tang approves of the three-lineage teaching (Lai 1997: 66). But according to my reading, these three headings should rather be interpreted as three phases of one line. In fact Tang argues that the development of Song-Ming Mind-Nature theory (xinxing lun心性論) is a kind of stepped theory in three phases corresponding to three headings: (1) the first phase including Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai (周張), the Cheng brothers (二程), and Zhu Xi (朱熹), in which the second group is more progressive than the first, and Zhu Xi more progressive than the second group (TCW 17: 496–497); (2) the second phase including Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming (陸王), in which, according to the same logic, Wang is more progressive than Lu and Zhu Xi (TCW 17: 500–501); (3) the third phase including successors of Wang Yangming and Liu Jishan (劉蕺山), in which Liu is more progressive than the successors of Wang and noteworthy is that for Tang, Liu Jishan is more progressive than Wang Yangming (TCW 17: 504). The last philosophers of every phase are the main figures constructing a triad (Zhu Xi—Wang Yangming—Liu Jishan). Accordingly Tang’s version of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism should be understood as a teaching of three phases of one lineage, rather than a three-lineage teaching.
- 7.
See chapter “Beyond the Horizon: Late Work of Tang Junyi”—Ed.
- 8.
Romanizations changed to pinyin to conform to the rest of the volume—Ed.
- 9.
The three phases of The Formation of Moral Self appear to be similar to the three phases of individual existence in Kierkegaard’s famous book Either/Or; at least they are all based on personal experience as their foundation. But Tang and Kierkegaard are at least different in the following points: (1) Tang tries to interpret his own formation of self as a universal model common to all human minds, but Kiekergaard’s remains individual; (2) Kierkegaard’s three phases exclude each other (either/or), while Tang’s phases could penetrate (or imply) each other. In this respect is Tang closer to Hegel. But if one considers the meaning of aufheben in Hegel’s sense, that is, the succeeding phase is higher and preserved the preceeding phase, Tang would hold that these phases are rather three different perspectives of one and the same mind-substance (心體), although the third phase is more complete than the first two, and the former two are reflected somehow in a vague way in the latter.
- 10.
This point I owe to the recent study of Andrew Davis (2012).
- 11.
Whether the representative of third phase is Wang Fuzhi or Liu Jishan is the question here. In chapter “Contemporary Confucianism and Ethical Theory” Tang mentions Liu, but here Wang. I leave this question unanswered here.
- 12.
I draw the term “henology” from Henrich’s Between Kant and Hegel. “One could say Platonism is “henology” (to hen= The One) as opposed to “ontology” (Henrich 2003: 85–86). Lao Siguang (勞思光) claims that Tang’s philosophical method is the idea of “All is One, One is All” from Huayan Buddhism (Lao 2001: 81–89). I owe this to Chiu Kingpong (Chiu 2016: 2, 178). Fröhlich disagrees with Lao’s interpretation: “If Huayan thought was really the hidden foundation of Tang’s philosophy, as Lao Sze-kwang suspects, it would be odd, to say the least, that Tang downgraded Buddhism, including Huayan, to a lower stage within the historical development of Chinese humanism and also never explained (as he did with respect to Confucianism) how the Huayan tradition would have to be reconstructed under modern conditions” (Fröhlich 2017: 38). I think Lao is right, because he sees Tang and Huayan under henology as a common theoretical model shared by both Eastern and Western philosophers. They all maintain some “Metaphysical One,” but each has different conceptions of the One.
- 13.
In the context of above long quotation in addition to the triads of German Idealism and Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, Tang also mentioned three other triads in the Eastern and Western history: (1) in Greek: Socrates (Reason), Plato (Consciousness), Aristotle (Existence); (2) in Pre-Qin Confucianism: Confucius (Pattern), Mengzi (Mind), Xunzi (Qi); (3) in Buddhism of Wei-Jin-Sui-Tang: Seng Zhao僧肇 (Pattern); Jizang 吉藏, Zhiyi 智顗, Xuanzang 玄奘, Fazang 法藏, Huineng 慧能 (Mind); Vinaya school 律宗, Esoteric Buddhism 密宗, Pure Land Buddhism 淨土宗 (Qi, Existence) (TCW 17: 667).
- 14.
See also chapter “Mou Zongsan: Between Confucianism and Kantianism”—Ed.
- 15.
One has to notice that Mou’s concept of autonomy is not an innate idea as Schmidt suggests, because according to Mou human nature is both existent and active (既存在又活動) rather than static in its character. Furthermore, human nature consists of the faculty of constitutive mind in a broader sense of reason rather than of nonrational genetic predisposition.
- 16.
For intellectual intuition in the real sense cf. Critique of Pure Reason B307, in the sense of free activity cf. Critique of Practical Reason, §7 (AA5: 31).
- 17.
In Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy Mou emphasizes that intellectual intuition manifests at any time in the heart-mind (本心隨時呈現, MCW 20: 249). It seems to be actual rather than potential. But according to Appearance and Thing-in-Itself “Human beings are not definitely infinite, but can be infinite in spite of their finitude” (人雖有限而可無限MCW 21: 25–30). This “can” (可) in the above citation suggests on the contrary that intellectual intuition is potential rather than actual. According to my interpretation, to say that intellectual intuition manifests at any time in a human mind does not mean the same as this human mind possesses intellectual intuition and becomes an infinite being. Only Confucian sage or Buddha possesses intellectual intuition actually (MCW20: 28) and ordinary people possess it potentially. This does not exclude intellectual intuition actually manifesting in ordinary people.
- 18.
According to Mou the infinity of intellectual intuition in Chinese tradition is different from the infinity of God in Christianity (MCW 21: 28–29). He didn’t explicate much about their distinction. According to my reading, there are at least three different aspects between them: (1) whereas in Chinese tradition the finite and infinite are inseparable, in Western thought the infinite being transcends finite beings (MCW 21: 28); (2) the logical relation between virtue and happiness analytic in the former, but synthetic in the latter (MCW 21: 29); (3) God as infinite being is a person in the teaching of Christianity, but in Chinese the infinite being is “daoti” (道體) (MCW 15: 374).
- 19.
According to Lee Ming-huei, Scheler’s own conception of autonomy is not the same as Kant’s. Scheler proposes his as “autonomy of personality” in opposition to Kant’s “autonomy of will.” Lee calls Scheler’s ethics “value realism” (Lee 2012: 74–75). I would suggest that Scheler’s conception of autonomy is very close to TangJunyi’s.
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———. 1944b. The Experience of Life 人生之體驗. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju (台灣學生書局) (TCW v.1-1). (Three meditations on the meaning of life written in an old temple.)
———. 1953. The Spiritual Value of Chinese Culture 中國文化的精神價值. Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju (正中書局). (TCW v.4) (A philosophical reflection on the value of traditional Chinese culture in comparison with Western as background.)
———. 1955. The Reconstruction of the Humanistic Spirit 人文精神之重建. Hong Kong: Xinya yanjiusuo (新亞硏究所). (TCW v.5) (A theoretical reconstruction of humanism in general based on some reflections of the cultural conflict between East and West.)
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———. 1975a. Chinese Humanism and the Contemporary World 中華人文與當今世界. 2 vols. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju (台灣學生書局). (TCW v.7-8) (Various studies on the possibility of a renaissance of traditional Chinese values in the modern world.)
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———. 1968. An Inquiry into Chinese Philosophy – Inquiry into the Way 中國哲學原論.原道篇. Taipei: Taiwan xueshengshuju (台灣學生書局). (TCW v.14-16)
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———. 1941. Logical Paradigm 邏輯典範. Hong Kong: Shangwu yinshu guan. (商務印書館). (MCW v.11)
———. 1956. Critique of the Cognitive Mind 認識心之批判. Taipei: Taiwan xueshengshuju (台灣學生書局). (MCW v.18-19) (An extensive research on the transcendental cognitive subject as the foundation of logic and on the moral subject as foundation of transcendental subject.)
———. 1970. Heart-Mind as Reality and Human Nature as Reality 心體與性體. Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju. (正中書局). (MCW v.5-7) (A historical interpretation of the three-lineage theory of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism according to Kantian concept of autonomy.)
———. 1971. Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy 智的直覺與中國哲學. Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan (台灣商務印書館). (MCW v.20) (An interpretation of Chinese philosophy with the positive meaning of intellectual intuition denied by Kant.)
———. 1975. Appearance and Thing-in-itself 現象與物自身. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju (台灣學生書局). (MCW v.21) (A theoretical construction of two-tiered ontology based on Kant’s transcendental distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself.)
———. 1989. Autobiography at Fifty 五十自述. Taipei: Ehu chubanshe (鵝湖出版社). (MCW v.32)
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Pong, Wb. (2021). The Influence of the German Idealists on the Contemporary New Confucians. In: Elstein, D. (eds) Dao Companion to Contemporary Confucian Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56475-9_18
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