Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Rule of Law Principle in the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The Rule of Law in Europe

Abstract

Grasping the nature and scope of the “rule of law” concept in the case-law of the European Court of Justice (CJUE) might be a painstaking endeavour due to the broad character of this principle. Moreover, the use of the “rule of law” by the CJUE shall always take into account the singular physiognomy of the legal order of the European Union. The Article examines the role of the “rule of law” in the case-law of the CJEU under two main heads. Firstly, it explores how the “rule of law” is deployed in the CJUE’s case-law to develop the primacy of EU law and mutual trust, and, secondly, it delves into the role of the rule of law in the EU’s application of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in particular into the case-law on restrictive measures. The Article concludes that by defending the rule of law and ruling on cases that go to the heart of the Member States’ constitutional arrangements, the CJUE is merely defending the vision of a liberal democracy against the backdrop of an economic, political and migratory crisis, which is still ongoing in a number of European Union Member States. It is true that, triggering the interpretative potential of Article 2 TEU and the “rule of law” has a potential to become a powerful tool as it enables the CJUE to deal with very different situations and to intervene in constitutional debates. Nonetheless, the latter should be particularly cautious in its use, as an excessive reliance on this concept could be seen by the Member States as an over-intrusive means of interference in national issues.

This contribution is based on a paper given to a colloquium under the title “International and European law and the Challenges to the Rule of Law”, organised on 14 December 2018 at the European Court of Human Rights by Judge Iulia Motoc and Professor Alina Miron of Angers University. An initial version of the paper was published in French in In Memoriam Stavros Tsakyrakis, edited by Lucy Kiousopoulou, Marialena Tsirli and Panayotis Voyatzis (Nomiki Vivliothiki, Athens, 2020). The author wishes to thank for their precious help Panayotis Voyatzis and Linus Hoffmann, respectively référendaire and trainee in his cabinet. Any opinions expressed are personal to the author.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 119.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Aristotle, Politics, Book III, Part 16 (translated by Benjamin Jowett, Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999).

  2. 2.

    The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has played a major role in giving effect to the rule of law through its case-law. By way of example, in Klass it found that “[t]he rule of law implies, inter alia, that an interference by the executive authorities with an individual’s rights should be subject to an effective control which should normally be assured by the judiciary, at least in the last resort, judicial control offering the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure” (ECtHR judgment, Klass and Others v. Germany, no. 5029/71, 6 September 1978, para. 55). See also Spielmann (2009), pp. 179–188; Nußberger (2017), p. 173.

  3. 3.

    See Heuschling (2002), passim.

  4. 4.

    The recent work of the Venice Commission for democracy through law (the “Venice Commission”) is highly pertinent in this connection. See, esp., Venice Commission, Rule of Law Checklist, adopted at its 106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11–12 March 2016). While emphasising that the Checklist is “neither exhaustive nor final” and that “it could change over time” (para. 30), the Commission summarises the concept as follows: “the notion of the Rule of Law requires a system of certain and foreseeable law, where everyone has the right to be treated by all decision-makers with dignity, equality and rationality and in accordance with the laws, and to have the opportunity to challenge decisions before independent and impartial courts through fair procedures” (para. 15). It points out the need to “take into account the whole context, and avoid any mechanical application of specific elements of the checklist” (para. 27). The Venice Commission also stresses that the “[f]ull achievement of the Rule of Law remains an on-going task, even in the well-established democracies” (para. 29). See also Drzemczewski (2017), pp. 14–18.

  5. 5.

    See, in this connection, Spielmann and Voyatzis (2017), pp. 904–907.

  6. 6.

    CJEU, Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., para. 168.

  8. 8.

    CJEU, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parliament, Judgment of 23 April 1986, C-294/83, EU:C:1986:166, para. 23.

  9. 9.

    Article 2 TEU. This Article is identical to Article I-2 of the 2004 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.

  10. 10.

    Article 7 TEU. One of the possible sanctions is the suspension of the voting rights of the representative of the government of the Member State in the Council, but Article 7 provides that other rights arising from the treaties may be suspended, without expressly identifying them. The Council thus has a degree of freedom in deciding on the type of sanctions. To date the Council has not yet imposed sanctions on Member States under Article 7, and this can be explained in particular by the requirement of a unanimous vote to initiate that procedure.

  11. 11.

    CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Judgment of 27 February 2018, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117, para. 32.

  12. 12.

    CJEU, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament, Judgment of 23 April 1986, C-294/83, EU:C:1986:166, para. 23. More generally, the General Court of the European Union, as an administrative court reviewing the acts of the EU’s institutions, organs and bodies, plays a fundamental role in terms if effective judicial protection.

  13. 13.

    CJEU, Rosneft, Judgment of 28 March 2017, C-72/15, EU:C:2017:236, para. 73.

  14. 14.

    CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Judgment of 27 February 2018, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117, para. 32.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., paras. 34 and 35.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., para. 35.

  17. 17.

    CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Judgment of 27 February 2018, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paras. 36 and 37.

  18. 18.

    Ibid., paras. 44 and 45. See also Wilson, Judgment of 19 September 2006, C-506/04, EU:C:2006:587, para. 51, and of Margarit Panicello, Judgment of 16 February 2017, C-503/15, EU:C:2017:126, para. 37 and the case-law cited. It should also be observed that the primary aim of the principle of judicial independence is to guarantee the separation of powers. The objective of this principle is to protect the courts from pressure on the part of the executive. To ensure this structural independence, the Venice Commission has drawn attention to the need for “objective procedures and criteria for judicial appointments, tenure and discipline and removals”, which must be enshrined in the Constitution rather than ordinary legislation (Venice Commission, Rule of Law Checklist, p. 33). In order to determine the level of independence of the judiciary, the ECtHR has found that “regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of safeguards against outside pressures and the question whether it presents an appearance of independence” (ECtHR, Incal v. Turkey, Judgment of 9 June 1998, No. 22678/93, para. 65).

  19. 19.

    CJEU, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), Judgment of 24 June 2019, C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531, para. 47.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., para. 58.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., para. 71–97.

  22. 22.

    Bonelli and Claes (2018), p. 636.

  23. 23.

    K. Lenaerts, “La jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne concernant l’État de droit”, speech delivered on 23 May 2019 during the visit of the diplomatic conference of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

  24. 24.

    In this context it is useful to refer to the case-law of the ECtHR. In Hirschhorn v. Romania, it took the view that “[the] right [to a court] would be illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative” (Hirschhorn v. Romania No. 29294/02, Judgment of 26 July 2002, para. 49). Similarly, in the Hornsby judgment, the ECtHR had already made a connection between the right of access to a court and the proper enforcement of judgments: it has found that “the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters,... would be illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party. [This] would be likely to lead to situations incompatible with the principle of the rule of law which the Contracting States undertook to respect when they ratified the Convention” (Hornsby v. Greece, Judgment of 19 March 1997, Reports 1997-II, p. 510, para. 40).

  25. 25.

    CJEU, Commission v Poland (Forest of Białowieża), Order of 20 November 2017, C-441/17 R, EU:C:2017:877, paras. 102 and 104. See Wennerås (2019), pp. 541–558.

  26. 26.

    Ibid.

  27. 27.

    CJEU, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 19 October 2018, C-619/18 R, EU:C:2018:852 para. 25 (free translation). See also Zoll and Wortham (2019), pp. 920 ff.

  28. 28.

    CJEU, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), Order of the President of the Court of 15 November 2018, C-619/18, EU:C:2018:910, para. 25.

  29. 29.

    Spielmann and Voyatzis (2017), p. 911; Platon (2019), pp. 16–22.

  30. 30.

    CJEU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Judgment of 5 April 2016, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, para. 78.

  31. 31.

    Safjan (2018), pp. 552–560.

  32. 32.

    CJEU, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), Judgment of 24 June 2019, C-619/18, para. 42.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., para. 43.

  34. 34.

    CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality, Judgment of 25 July 2018, C-216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, para. 36. See Konstadinides (2019), pp. 743–770.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., para. 48.

  36. 36.

    See also Article 21 para. 1 TEU.

  37. 37.

    EU General Court, Mabrouk v Council of the European Union, Judgment of 5 October 2017, T-175/15, EU:T:2017:694, para. 64; see also, for example: Article 2 (c) of the Common Position 98/350/CFSP, 25 May 1998, defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa, OJ L158, 2 June 1998, p.1.

  38. 38.

    Aumond (2011), pp. 365–385. On the general historical development, see Candela Soriano (2005) pp. 5–42.

  39. 39.

    Council of the European Union, Factsheet on EU restrictive mesures, 29 April 2014, at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135804.pdf.

  40. 40.

    Ibid.

  41. 41.

    See Bertrand (2015), pp. 555–577.

  42. 42.

    EU General Court, Klyuyev v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 15 September 2016, T-340/14, EU:T:2016:496, para. 88.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., para. 83.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., para. 89.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., para. 91.

  46. 46.

    EU General Court, Yanukovych v. Council of the European Union, judgment of 15 September 2016, T-346/14, EU:T:2016:497, para. 96.

  47. 47.

    Ibid., para. 99.

  48. 48.

    EU General Court, Mabrouk v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 5 October 2017, T-175/15, ECLI:EU:T:2017:694, para. 64.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., para. 64.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., para. 65.

  51. 51.

    CJEU, Azarov v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 19 December 2018, C-530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031, paras. 28- 30. See also EU General Court Yanukovych v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 11 July 2019, T-244/16 and T-285/17, EU:T:2019:502; Yanukovych v. Council of the European Union, T-245/16 and T-286/17, EU:T:2019:505; Klymenko v. Council of the European Union, T-274/18, EU:T:2019:509; Arbuzov v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 11 July 2019, T-284/18, EU:T:2019:511; Pshonka v. Council of the European Union, T-285/18, EU:T:2019:512; Klyuyev v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 11 July 2019, T-305/18, EU:T:2019:506. The General Court, applying the jurisprudential principles from the Court of Justice’s judgment in Azarov v. Council of the European Union, took the view that the reasoning of Council acts extending restrictive measures did not include the slightest reference to any verification of compliance with such rights.

  52. 52.

    See, for example, EU General Court, CW v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 30 June 2016, T-224/14, EU:T:2016:375, para. 69; Tomana and others v. Council and Commission, Judgment of 28 July 2016, C-330/15 P, EU:C:2016:601, para. 48; Rotenberg v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 30 November 2016, T-720/14, EU:T:2016:689, para. 176.

  53. 53.

    See, for example, Yanukovych v. Council of the European Union, T-346/14, para. 97; Klyuyev v. Council of the European Union, T-340/14, para. 87.

  54. 54.

    Mede (2018), p. 589 [our translation].

  55. 55.

    See, among many others, Mounk (2018); Waelbroeck and Oliver (2017), pp. 299–342; Labayle (2018), pp. 485–496.

  56. 56.

    Carrera and Bárd (2018).

References

  • Aumond F (2011) La participation de l’Union européenne à la préservation de la paix et de la sécurité internationales par l’adoption de mesures restrictives. In: Lamblin-Gourdin A-S, Mondielli E (eds) Le droit des relations extérieures de l’Union européenne après le traité de Lisbonne. Bruylant, Brussels, pp 365–385

    Google Scholar 

  • Bertrand B (2015) La particularité du contrôle juridictionnel des mesures restrictives : Les considérations impérieuses touchant à la sûreté ou à la conduite des relations internationales de l’Union et des États membres. Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen:555–577

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonelli M, Claes M (2018) Judicial serendipity: how Portuguese judges came to the rescue of the Polish judiciary. Eur Const Law Rev 14(3):622–643

    Google Scholar 

  • Candela Soriano M (2005) Analyse de l’évolution de l’action extérieure de l’UE dans le domaine des droits de l’homme, de la démocratie et de l’État de droit. Revue de la Faculté de Liège:5–42

    Google Scholar 

  • Carrera S, Bárd P (2018) The European Parliament vote on Article 7 TEU against the Hungarian government: too late, too little, too political?. CEPS Commentaries. www.ceps.eu/publications/european-parliament-vote-article-7-teu-against-hungarian-government-too-late-too-little. Accessed 15 Mar 2020

  • Drzemczewski A (2017) Le Conseil de l’Europe et l’État de droit : à propos de la liste des critères de l’État de droit élaborée par la Commission de Venise. Revue Universelle des Droits de l’Homme 23:14–18

    Google Scholar 

  • Heuschling L (2002) État de droit, Rechtsstaat, Rule of Law. Dalloz, Paris, pp 1–739

    Google Scholar 

  • Konstadinides T (2019) Judicial independence and the rule of law in the context of non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant. Common Market Law Rev 56(3):743–769

    Google Scholar 

  • Labayle H (2018) Winter is coming : l’État de droit devant les institutions de l’Union. Remarques sur les crises polonaises et hongroises. Revue des affaires européennes 3:485–496

    Google Scholar 

  • Mede L (2018) L’État de droit à l’épreuve de l’intégration européenne. Revue de l’Union européenne 622:589–597

    Google Scholar 

  • Mounk Y (2018) The people vs. democracy: why our freedom is in danger and how to save it. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Nußberger A (2017) The European Court of Human Rights and rule of law – a tale of hopes and disillusions. In: Zubik M (ed) Essays in Honour of Professor Leszek Garlicki. Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warsaw, pp 162–173

    Google Scholar 

  • Platon S (2019) Confiance mutuelle et crise de l’État de droit dans l’Union européenne. L’observateur de Bruxelles 115:16–22

    Google Scholar 

  • Safjan M (2018) Domestic infringements of the rule of law as a European Union problem. Osteuropa Recht 64:552–560

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spielmann D (2009) La jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur l’État de droit. In: Société Française pour le Droit International (ed) Colloque de Bruxelles, L’État de droit en droit international. Pedone, Paris, pp 179–188

    Google Scholar 

  • Spielmann D, Voyatzis P (2017) L’étendue du contrôle du respect des droits fondamentaux à l’aune de l’expérience juridique comparée. Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 112:897–952

    Google Scholar 

  • Waelbroeck M, Oliver P (2017) La crise de l'État de droit dans l’Union européenne : que faire ? Cahiers de droit européen:299–342

    Google Scholar 

  • Wennerås P (2019) Saving a forest and the rule of law: Commission v. Poland. Common Market Law Rev 56(2):541–558

    Google Scholar 

  • Zoll F, Wortham L (2019) Judicial independence and accountability: withstanding political stress in Poland. Fordham Int Law J 42:875–948

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France

    Dean Spielmann

Authors
  1. Dean Spielmann
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Dean Spielmann .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Judge at European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France

    María Elósegui

  2. Professor at University of Angers, Angers, France

    Alina Miron

  3. Judge at European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France

    Iulia Motoc

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Spielmann, D. (2021). The Rule of Law Principle in the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In: Elósegui, M., Miron, A., Motoc, I. (eds) The Rule of Law in Europe. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56001-0_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56001-0_1

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-56000-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-56001-0

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation