Abstract
In his chapter, Searle points out the systematic ambiguity of “ought”—its meaning being at times theoretical and at times practical. He proposes to make the practical sense explicit by introducing the concept of reason for action. However, he does not distinguish between further meanings of “ought.” This chapter therefore attempts to make up for that lack of nuance by distinguishing among three kinds of “ought”—a bouletic, an axiological, and an eidetic “ought”—and suggesting that this distinction can be used to cast light on the question of the validity of Searle’s derivation as a whole, as well as the validity of the “ought” he arrives at in its final step.
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Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Amedeo Giovanni Conte, Edoardo Fittipaldi, and Lorenzo Passerini Glazel for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter. Any errors are mine alone.
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Di Lucia, P. (2021). “Ought” Is Spoken in Many Ways. In: Di Lucia, P., Fittipaldi, E. (eds) Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is". Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3_10
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