Abstract
A new characterization of the deontic operators of permission and prohibition is introduced based on a distinction between action types and action tokens. The resulting deontic action logic constitutes a hyperintensional system providing resources for a fine-grained study of the basic deontic notions. The logic is proved to be complete with respect to an appropriate semantics, where models include both possible worlds and action tokens, and the philosophical significance of the distinction is demonstrated by showing that a number of puzzles afflicting current accounts of the deontic operators find intuitive solutions in the new framework.
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Notes
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A further interpretation, the one proposed by Segerberg, is in terms of action outcomes. The intuition is that, since the execution of an action gives rise to different outcomes in different circumstances, then the action itself can be viewed as the set of these outcomes. See [15].
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This is the option proposed in [19], where the semantics of DAL is extended by introducing a set of required examples of actions. This move gives us the freedom to put forward conditions on the connections between \(\mathbb {O}\), \(\mathbb {P}\) and \(\mathbb {F}\) that are consistent with our intuitions.
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I say that a conduct is constituted by a certain number of tropes. The relation of constitution is not further analyzed, but it could be characterized in terms of the part-whole relation, by assuming that the agent’s conduct is a particular event whose parts are action tropes.
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In [23] what we intend as an agent’s conduct is presented as an individual action. Tropes, intended as particular actions, and individual actions in von Wright’s sense are not to be confused.
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Giordani, A. (2021). Deontic Logic with Action Types and Tokens. In: Giordani, A., Malinowski, J. (eds) Logic in High Definition. Trends in Logic, vol 56. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53487-5_7
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