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Political Ambition in Latin America

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Politics and Political Elites in Latin America

Part of the book series: Latin American Societies ((LAS))

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Abstract

Research has increasingly focused on political ambition and the implications thereof. In Latin America, ambitions and politicians’ career paths have been identified as more dynamic than the classical US model, where legislators generally aim for reelection rather than seeking other offices. For over a decade, the PELA project has provided comparative data on Members of Congress’ ambitions, filling a crucial empirical gap on a comparative understanding on politician’s office goals based on their own statements. This chapter provides an overview of available political offices and a descriptive analysis of politician’s career goals as stated during their stint in Congress. The data show that reelection is one of the most desired goals in most of the countries included in the study. Furthermore, the data show that that the desirability of certain offices is dynamic and subject to change within a legislative period and from one legislative period to the next. The chapter concludes with some possible avenues for ambition research in the future.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Rehfeld (2009) refers to aims, source of judgement, and responsiveness to sanctions as the main dimensions defining representational modes.

  2. 2.

    https://presidential-power.com

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    Theresa Kernecker

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  1. Theresa Kernecker
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Correspondence to Theresa Kernecker .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Instituto de Iberoamérica, University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain

    Manuel Alcántara

  2. Instituto de Iberoamérica, University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain

    Mercedes García Montero

  3. Instituto de Iberoamérica, University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain

    Cristina Rivas Pérez

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Kernecker, T. (2020). Political Ambition in Latin America. In: Alcántara, M., García Montero, M., Rivas Pérez, C. (eds) Politics and Political Elites in Latin America. Latin American Societies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51584-3_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51584-3_2

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-51584-3

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