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Introduction: Between Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality

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Groups, Norms and Practices

Part of the book series: Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality ((SIPS,volume 13))

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Abstract

Inferentialism and theories of collective intentionality are two important strands in the current philosophical research. Each tradition recognizes the crucial role that collective norms and practices play in human lives; and each maintains that social attitudes or activities of sorts underlie them. But they have been barely confronted in the literature up to now. This volume brings together new essays, which tackle the issue at hand from different angles, often drawing on and comparing the core ideas developed in each approach. This introductory chapter provides a basic theoretical background and map of the terrain explored by the essays included in the volume.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Normative inferentialism is to be distinguished from causal or dispositional versions of the inferential-role semantics that construe meanings of expressions (or contents of concepts) partly or wholly in terms of actual inferential transitions or dispositions to such transitions.

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Acknowledgments

Work on this chapter was supported by the joint Lead-Agency research grant between the Austrian Science Foundation (FWF) and the Czech Science Foundation (GAČR), Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality, GF17-33808 L.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Králové, Hradec Králové, Czechia

    Ladislav Koreň

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  1. Ladislav Koreň
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Correspondence to Ladislav Koreň .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Filozofická Fakulta, Univerzita Hradec Králové, Hradec Králové, Czech Republic

    Ladislav Koreň

  2. Institut für Philosophie, Universität Wien, Wien, Wien, Austria

    Hans Bernhard Schmid

  3. Filozofická Fakulta, Univerzita Hradec Králové, Hradec Králové, Czech Republic

    Preston Stovall

  4. Institut für Philosophie, Universität Wien, Wien, Austria

    Leo Townsend

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Koreň, L. (2021). Introduction: Between Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. In: Koreň, L., Schmid, H.B., Stovall, P., Townsend, L. (eds) Groups, Norms and Practices. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_1

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