Abstract
The primary focus of this paper is the so-called “qua-problem” for names, a problem which I argue is spurious and thus apt for dissolving rather than solving. This pseudo problem can be conceptualized (following Devitt and Sterelny’s Language and Reality) as involving a pair of questions which appear to put pressure on the causal theorist to introduce a descriptive element into her theory of reference. One question concerns how a name can be grounded in a whole object when only a (spatio-temporal) part of the object is perceived; the other question asks for an explanation of failed groundings in cases where the speaker is very wrong about the perceived object they have attempted to name. I deny that causal theorists need to make any concessions to descriptivism in order to adequately address these concerns. In response to the first question, I appeal to a default, psychologically motivated, practice of naming only whole objects; in response to the second question, I suggest, through a series of thought experiments, that reference does not in fact fail even in cases where the speaker is radically mistaken about the perceived object they are attempting to name. After responding to a trio of objections Devitt has made to the proposed dissolution of the qua-problem for names, I compare the case of names to the far more complex case of natural kind terms, where (I suggest) there may indeed be a genuine qua-problem, even if one not amenable to the particular solution proposed by Devitt and Sterelny.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
For another nice, if less vivid, characterization of the qua-problem (that encompasses both names and natural kind terms), see Miller 1992: 426.
- 2.
As Andrea Bianchi has pointed out to me, it might be questioned whether this initial perceptual contact is sufficient to make the groundings in question unambiguously “causal.”
- 3.
It is my belief (the justification of which is irrelevant here) that some such “imaginary friends” are in fact perceptual rather than imaginary in nature, being hypnagogic or hypnopompic hallucinations. Such hallucinations are experienced by many very young and mentally healthy children. The relevance of this point is that it suggests that such “friends” can in fact be named. In this connection, see example (v) in Sect. 7.7 of the present paper, which involves naming a hallucination, and doing so successfully.
- 4.
Including, most notably, Saul Kripke (1980).
- 5.
However, in “Should proper names still seem so problematic?”, Devitt writes: “One thing we look for is a solution to what became known as ‘the qua problem’: In virtue of what is a certain object the focus of perception rather than a spatial or temporal part of the object? I have struggled mightily with this problem … but I now wonder whether this was a mistake: perhaps the problem is more for psychology than philosophy” (2015: 115n).
- 6.
- 7.
Alternatively, one might suspect that the child was, for whatever reasons, conceptualizing the parts in question as wholes unto themselves and thus as apt for naming.
- 8.
For a similar point, see Miller 1992.
- 9.
This is the actual name of the Hasbro toy in question.
- 10.
Today the name “Vulcan” might abbreviate an importantly different description, such as “the mythical planet between Mercury and the Sun.”
- 11.
Devitt appears to have expressed some doubt on this point. See Miller 1992: 427 n. 6.
- 12.
These ideas are echoed in Andrea Bianchi’s (p.c.) question: Suppose we find something that looks and acts like that, but has a very different nature. Would we be inclined to call it a cat?
- 13.
Miller (1992) believes that he may have solved this problem via a purely causal account of the reference-grounding of natural kind terms.
- 14.
But see Miller 1992 for a contrary view.
References
Devitt, M. 2015. Should proper names still seem so problematic? In On reference, ed. A. Bianchi, 108–143. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Devitt, M., and K. Sterelny. 1987. Language and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Miller, R.B. 1992. A purely causal solution to one of the qua problems. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4): 425–434.
Putnam, H. 1962. It ain’t necessarily so. Journal of Philosophy 69: 647–658.
Salmon, N. 1998. Nonexistence. Nous 32 (3): 277–319.
Sterelny, K. 1983. Natural kind terms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 110–125.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Reimer, M. (2020). The Qua-Problem for Names (Dismissed). In: Bianchi, A. (eds) Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 142. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-47640-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-47641-0
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)