Abstract
Network governance scholarship has demonstrated connections between the structure of networks and the types of problems actors face. However, much of this scholarship is highly social in focus and has traditionally not incorporated how rules and governance protocols shape collective action. This chapter bridges that gap by analyzing the design of formal rules using a network analysis framework, testing whether collective action problems are addressed through different rule structures. The analyzed case is an inter-governmental agreement created to secure New York City’s access to unfiltered drinking water sources. The analysis relies on hypergraph, bipartite, and unipartite networks to identify variations in graph subcomponents, clustering and centralization, and redundancy and closeness. Findings show that actors design rules anticipating that different kinds of collective action problems require different governance structures.
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Notes
- 1.
New York City disinfects its water using chlorine and ultraviolet disinfection. Beginning in 2015, it began filtering water from the Croton Watershed.
- 2.
It is important to note that, while social relationships are modeled dyadically, a core justification for the use of graph-based modeling approaches is the role of hyperdyadic dependence (i.e. pairwise relationships are influenced by surrounding relationships) (Cranmer and Desmarais 2016). Thus the distinction we draw here is not based on the idea that social dyads are independent (in most cases they are not), but rather that dyads are the base unit in which social ties within governance networks have traditionally been considered (e.g. Desmarais and Cranmer 2012; Yi and Scholz 2016).
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Olivier, T., Scott, T.A., Schlager, E. (2020). Institutional Design and Complexity: Protocol Network Structure in Response to Different Collective-Action Dilemmas. In: Fischer, M., Ingold, K. (eds) Networks in Water Governance. Palgrave Studies in Water Governance: Policy and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46769-2_10
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