Abstract
In this chapter, we provide a normative analysis of the relational dimension of poverty, that is, an account that is concerned with certain patterns of social and political relations amongst poor and non-poor individuals. While a relational dimension of poverty has been increasingly acknowledged in the literature, many share an underdeveloped notion of what exactly this means. One plausible way to develop it is by analysing the inferior social position held by poverty-stricken individuals in terms of an increased risk of being dominated by others and of a systematic lack of esteem. In this understanding, the agency of an impoverished individual is undermined at both the individual and institutional level, divesting those in poverty of the full capacity to make important decisions affecting their lives. In this vein, first, we will argue that this understanding hints at the possibility of recognising the agency of impoverished individuals by rethinking the way we design public policies to alleviate poverty. Second, that a deliberative strategy is a promising way for redressing the relational dimension of poverty by considering the poor as full citizens with power to make important decisions, capable of speaking by and for themselves and of making joint decisions with policy-makers on what should be done to alleviate poverty.
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Notes
- 1.
Whether poverty ought to be described in additional terms is an issue we will not be addressing here. We will preliminarily claim that both resourcist and relational elements should be part of an adequate conception of poverty.
- 2.
Indeed, status inferiority or relational deprivation may also result from factors other than problematic social interactions, such as lack of resources. The two basic elements of our hybrid account (namely, lack of resources and relational deprivation) are interlocked in correlations and causal interactions. On the one hand, a person’s lack of resources in comparison with others affects her socio-political standing in a given society. On the other, a person’s lack of valuable socio-political relations in comparison with others impacts her access to resources (Sen 2009; Wolff 2015; Putnam forthcoming).
- 3.
Whether this is true or not is of course an empirical matter. There remains a conceptual question related to the kinds of elements that should be part of an account of poverty. For instance, should an account include only causal elements or should it also include elements that may refer to the experience of the phenomenon without playing an actual causal role in it? Those who assume the latter could argue that even if relational elements had no proper causal role, they should nevertheless be part of an account of poverty.
- 4.
In Laborde and Garrau’s words: “Vulnerability supposes the existence of a relationship of dependency between agents who have the power to act on one another, and potentially, to harm one another” (Laborde and Garrau 2015: 52).
- 5.
Other examples are family configurations in which, due to the absence of equal rights protections, husbands can subjugate wives; or situations in which, given the scarcity of real opportunities to get well-paid and decent work, workers are led to accept unsafe working conditions and low wages imposed by their employers (Pettit 1997: 61).
- 6.
See, for instance, I. M. Young’s account of structural injustice (2012). Structural injustice takes place “when social processes put large categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities” (Young 2012).
- 7.
This aspect is illustrated by Glenn Loury’s remark: in the context of racial discrimination, black people are haunted by “insidious habits of thought” (Loury 2002: 193).
- 8.
In Schuppert’s definition, domination occurs: “if either an agent A (which can be an individual, a group or an institution) has the power to intentionally and arbitrarily interfere with an agent B (which can be an individual or a group) or if an individual’s, a group’s or an institution’s actions and practices structurally disadvantage (i.e., over a longer period of time through an identifiable mechanism), without due concern for her relevant fundamental interests, an agent B with regard to her status as a free and equal person” (Schuppert 2015a: 450). It is relevent to note that Schuppert’s definition relies on an intentional account of domination and differs, thus, from non-intentional ones.
- 9.
One could distinguish between the wrong of the prejudices and stigmas and the harmful consequences that arise from them. Such well-known negative stigmas and prejudices are wrong per se and can be seen as a form of injustice, and very often entail a series of harmful consequences (such as restricting or precluding access to job opportunities) (Axelsen and Bidadanure 2018).
- 10.
We are not taking a stance in the debate about whether mental states may be successfully reduced to behavioural dispositions or any other observable manifestation. Rather, we only wish to highlight the external manifestations of what might otherwise be seen as a private phenomenon.
- 11.
This example is inspired by Anderson’s writings on stigmas and prejudices. On this issue, see: Anderson 2010: 53.
- 12.
Indeed, the background norms governing how social esteem is assigned in this “meritocratic” fashion can be highly problematic. For one thing, judgments of “desert” may be socially and culturally biased or reflect dominant understandings that bear exclusionary and discriminatory consequences.
- 13.
In proposing an institutional approach, we are not denying that individuals may eventually bear responsibility for transforming the social relations in which they are embedded. This is simply not the focus of our analysis here.
- 14.
According to Sharon Krause, this notion of agency as non-sovereignty implies that the meaning of one’s action escapes individual intentionality and requires that others recognise one’s contribution in the public sphere (Krause 2013: 196). Sharon Krause is inspired by Hannah Arendt’s notion of agency as non-sovereignty, and she advances the idea that agency implies an interpersonal criterion. In her view, producing outcomes in the public sphere presupposes that others recognise and respond to one’s action.
- 15.
Institutions (endorsed by the state) are part of the problem; but they may also be part of its solution. If they are given the right design, institutions can work as a means to challenge the inequalities of esteem and power that affect the poor; as having the potential to positively transform interactions amongst the poor and non-poor.
- 16.
Wisor follows Chambers’s distinction. See Chambers, R. (2008). Revolutions in Development Inquiry. London: Earthscan (chapter 4).
- 17.
Extractive and deliberative forms can appear in the same public policy, but in different steps. For instance, it is possible to hold consultations during a first stage, followed by deliberations later.
- 18.
We would link to thank Andrew Walton for this formulation.
- 19.
Axel Honneth’s (1996) theory can be a source of valuable insight into the lack of recognition or the forms of misrecogntion suffered by the poor. Although we take some inspiration from Honneth’s ‘recognition’ account and allude to concepts such as social esteem (one of the three basic forms of recognition in Honneth’s theory), our understanding of recognition in contexts of poverty goes beyond the author’s conception and is detached from the normative assumptions underpinning its value theory and social ontology. For one thing, when analysing the harms of domination and lack of social esteem in contexts of poverty, we are adopting here a broad social egalitarian framework that is independent from Honneth’s own understanding of the “grammar of social conflicts”.
- 20.
First, we acknowledge that resourcist measures are also important. Second, a deliberative approach needs to be sensitive to contextual elements in order to respond more effectively to the problematic social interactions underlying the relational aspect of poverty.
- 21.
We are especially grateful to Gottfried Schweiger for his thorough and very helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks as well to Andrew Walton and Mark Rogers for their reading. Earlier versions were presented at the Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics (Louvain-la-Neuve) and at the workshop on Recognition and Poverty held at Salzburg.
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Pitasse Fragoso, K., Lippmann, P. (2020). Relational Poverty, Domination and Social Esteem: Recognising the Poor’s Agency via a Deliberative Approach to Anti-Poverty Policies. In: Schweiger, G. (eds) Poverty, Inequality and the Critical Theory of Recognition. Philosophy and Poverty, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45795-2_12
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