Abstract
In this chapter we will follow Conrad-Martius’ horizon- and essence-analyses in the realms of biology and physics.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
We will return to the question of the relevance of Conrad-Martius’ discussion soon. For an excellent sketch of the mechanistic-organistic theories as operative in contemporary biology, see Waddington 1963.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 36.
- 6.
- 7.
Conrad-Martius 1949b, p. 12.
- 8.
- 9.
Cf. Dürken 1936.
- 10.
Waddington’s position is quite close to what Conrad-Martius called the wholist position. “From the time when it is no more than a newly fertilized egg, the mouse is just as much a mouse as the creature you may see disappearing in a hole in the wainscoting; and the human egg is just as much a man (though perhaps not as much of a man) as you are” (Waddington 1963, p. 26).
- 11.
Conrad-Martius 1949b, p. 14.
- 12.
Conrad-Martius 1964, p. 135.
- 13.
Waddington 1963, pp. 52–53.
- 14.
See Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 166ff.
- 15.
Waddington 1963, p. 21.
- 16.
One can still ask, however, about the justification for making the argument for radical equipotentiality with an incomplete or equivocal set or data. Conrad-Martius repeatedly (except at Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 166) asserts the thoroughness and decisiveness of Driesch’s sea-urchin experiments. But if the strong argument for equipotentiality is, in fact, from the beginning damaged or at least in question, then the use of this position as the overarching framework to interpret Spemann’s experiments—including the one which weakens the original argument for equipotentiality—seems likewise to be weakened. Weakened but not necessarily ruined. For the experiments of both Driesch and Spemann stand in need of the organicist or wholist interpretation. The issue then is how much the wholist view stands in need of the entelechy for its completion. We have sketched Conrad-Martius’ argument. But to understand it better we must discuss the entelechy. It is perhaps not out of place at this point to mention the “internal-relatedness” of Conrad-Martius’ system and speculation. The biological analysis works into and out of the discussion of physics. That physics seems to stand in need of a realm similar to the trans-physical potencies and entelechies at a time when biology and psychology are tending to become more and more mechanistic is somewhat ironic. See Bohm 1969, p. 34.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
Gurwitsch felt that his position involved “insoluble antinomies.” Conrad-Martius believed that only the introduction of the entelechy can handle the precise issues which Gurwitsch felt to be insurmountable. See Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 34, 82.
- 20.
Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 42–43.
- 21.
- 22.
Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 42–43.
- 23.
This speculative position (which will be developed throughout this chapter), Conrad-Martius believed, was not only that one most faithful to recent biological and physical researches but also that one most faithful to the phenomenology of living substance (Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 52).
- 24.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 56. As we shall see, Conrad-Martius will extend this notion to the more proper phenomenological essence so that entelechy will found all substantial essence in the cosmos. Essence-entelechy will be the “entelechial eidé” which stand behind and ground the intelligibility and causality in the entire actual cosmos. But clearly not all eidé can be essence-entelechies, and essence-entelechies as such are not eidé as such.
- 25.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 60.
- 26.
The full context for Conrad-Martius’ critique would be the ontological-essence analyses sketched in Chap. 3.
- 27.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 62.
- 28.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 64.
- 29.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 65.
- 30.
See, e.g., Waddington 1963, pp. 40–50. Is not the category of the essence-entelechy or objectively meaningful behind the structuralist movement? It is one of the chief problems in the philosophy of culture and history to fashion a category of “objective spirit” which is constitutive of meanings and developments but which is not itself a conscious agent. The theme had an early metaphysical form in the Thomistic view, which is very close to Conrad-Martius here, that form was act. See Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 87. As we shall see, there is a way of conceiving the category of the objectively meaningful in a way which corresponds to the non-static and historical objective spirit. In the philosophy of nature, the best-known effort to establish this category is Whitehead’s notion of “eternal objects.” We will return to this theme in the final part of this work.
- 31.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 83.
- 32.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 81.
- 33.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 85. It is clear that Conrad-Martius renovates the Augustinian notion of eternal ideas and seminal ideas. Late in life she read John Scotus Eriugena’s De divisione Naturae and was quite astounded at some of the similarities. It is surely Aquinas’ De Potentia that exercised the most influence here. Conrad-Martius had for her own work translated the entire text into German.
- 34.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 76. “Metaphysical” here is closely related to our earlier (Chap. 2) discussion of speculation. Metaphysics for Conrad-Martius is a science which begins with ineluctable facts—it is not essence-analysis (her notion of ontology)—and proceeds to non-given dimensions. Concrete-individuated forms are one of these ineluctable givens for her. See Conrad-Martius 1963b, pp. 80–88. From the given one proceeds to the non-given conditions for its possibility.
- 35.
Conrad-Martius’ major discussion is in Abstammungslehre (Conrad-Martius 1949a), which is the second edition of Ursprung und Aufbau des lebendigen Kosmos (Conrad-Martius 1938). The first edition was written in an attitude of confidence that neo-Darwinism was dead. In the Foreword to the second edition she expressed surprise not only that Darwinism had returned anew and strengthened, but that it “has become such a strong scientific phalanx that it requires considerable courage to oppose it” (Conrad-Martius 1949a, p. 11). Darwinism and human evolution are topics that come up often in her writings, and were more than incidental to Conrad-Martius’ life-work.
- 36.
Conrad-Martius 1964, p. 256.
- 37.
Conrad-Martius 1964, p. 256.
- 38.
See Conrad-Martius 1949a, p. 358ff.
- 39.
The crucial issue here is the notion of “species.” We shall soon turn to this. A “race” is a specification of a species, as a Bengal tiger in contrast to another “race,” the east Siberian tiger. Both belong to the “species” of tiger (felis tigris). There are famous attempts at evolving “species” by evolving “races” or sub-species as in the case of moths. Sub-species or races have evolved, but there is no evidence of a new species, to say nothing of a higher species-form.
- 40.
Conrad-Martius 1949a, p. 400.
- 41.
- 42.
See “Das Artproblem in naturphilosophischer Beleuchtung” (Conrad-Martius 1964, pp. 183–195).
- 43.
- 44.
Conrad-Martius 1964, p. 189.
- 45.
Conrad-Martius 1964, p. 190.
- 46.
See Conrad-Martius 1949a, pp. 233–234 for a discussion of the kind of reality the species has.
- 47.
Waddington has expressed the mood of contemporary reflection in this area. “It is by no means unexpected to our present outlook to suppose that the exceedingly complex groupings which constitute genes may sometimes alter from one of their possible forms into another for no definitely ascertainable reason. There is more reason to be surprised at their stability than at their tendency to mutate. One might almost have expected structures as complex as this to show some of the properties of a house of cards, which may collapse entirely with nothing more than a light breath of wind or jog at the table” (Waddington 1963, p. 78).
- 48.
Simpson 1961, p. 97.
- 49.
Simpson 1968, p. 215.
- 50.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 230.
- 51.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 231.
- 52.
The hereditary issue of sex poses a special problem. Here the formation-potency or entelechy includes the partial potency to both masculine and feminine formation. The gene is that which determines the total formative-potency to a particular direction. See Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 232–234.
- 53.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 235.
- 54.
Kälin 1966, pp. 120–121.
- 55.
Waddington 1963, p. 67.
- 56.
Waddington himself is, as the following quote indicates, little disposed to such a reductivism, although he has not propounded a metaphysics which would separate him from a merely geneticist position. One should consult, however, his various Whiteheadian references and interest in Böhme’s (Whiteheadian) metaphysics.
- 57.
Waddington 1963, p. 85. We must note that it is not clear what Waddington means when he says that none of the “elements in the mechanism are finalistic.” Such a precision instrument will have parts whose meaning-being is in their function within a whole or their being for…. Even though they themselves do not move themselves towards their end consciously or unconsciously, they surely can be called end-oriented, just as a hammer is for hammering.
- 58.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 303.
- 59.
We cannot make the case fully which we are only sketching here, but we believe that the essence-ontological analyses of Conrad-Martius and Plessner provide the basis for the essence-analyses of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Lonergan who have shown the unique kind of non-objective presence involved in consciousness.
- 60.
- 61.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 297.
- 62.
- 63.
- 64.
Conrad-Martius 1964, p. 162. One sees here why for Conrad-Martius potency is the “Ur-sache”: As most fundamental (Ur-sache) consideration it is the pre-objective, pre-thematic dimension which is the condition for the possibility of the illumination of the given: as the most fundamental sense of causality (Ursache) because it is the condition for the possibility of the being of something. See Conrad-Martius 1949, p. 44.
- 65.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 300.
- 66.
Werner Heisenberg, quoted from Toulmin and Goodfield 1965, p. 432.
- 67.
Conrad-Martius 1964, p. 156.
- 68.
- 69.
Conrad-Martius admits that it is a good question whether in the factual given nature there is mechanical causality as it appears to us in our everydayness, on the one hand, and as classical physics considered it, on the other. It seems unlikely in the light of quantum physics and relativity theory. But if there is mechanical causality (as also transitory movement in a continuity of inertia and attraction of masses in a classical sense) it would have the characteristics sketched here, and these structures bring to light those of entelechial causality. See Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 315, and our discussion of quantum space in the last chapter and in this chapter.
- 70.
- 71.
- 72.
This example serves chiefly to illuminate the essential differences which are immediately suggested in the ordinary language usage of powerful and energetic people. The example could involve snares when pushed.
- 73.
See Conrad-Martius 1964, pp. 107–109. As we shall soon see, mechanical causality cannot fully present the proper essential properties of power and energy.
- 74.
Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 309–310.
- 75.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 310.
- 76.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 179.
- 77.
An important application of this distinction is the area of the egg in Spemann’s experiments which contain the “organizers” (Spemann 1936). This process of the “organizers” is a genuine actualizing potency, although it is wrongly interpreted to be a mere releasing factor. See Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 181.
- 78.
Conrad-Martius 1964, pp. 109–110.
- 79.
Conrad-Martius 1964, pp. 110–113.
- 80.
Conrad-Martius 1964, p. 113.
- 81.
Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 317–320. Again, this is a purely phenomenological account for the purpose of entelechial causality. Where the account implies translatory movement it must be understood transcendentally. It is beyond my competence to decide, but one may wonder, whether Conrad-Martius’ tying of gravity to the inner inertial and hyletic, as the essentially ex-static and instatic “space-making” being outside of itself, does not find some symmetry, if not confirmation, in the notion of “gravity waves,” which surfaced well after she died.
- 82.
Conrad-Martius 1964, p. 116. We have already seen this kind of redundancy in the phenomenology of the real as such. In this particular case Conrad-Martius says: Within the hierarchically layered ontological levels and dimensions the same distinguishing categories repeat themselves which designate the major ontological regions and within these the sub-regions, etc. The stacking of concepts is a necessary linguistic device to express this repetition of essential levels within essential levels.
- 83.
- 84.
Conrad-Martius 1964, pp. 51–52.
- 85.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 323. Paul Lieber has proposed that there is a dimension of universal constants in nature, which is to be understood qualitatively and which includes both the dimensions of physics and biology. The condition for this dimension of universal constants is the restoration of the notion of aether, “envisioned here as a continuously extended substance, whose essential ontological property is point-like impenetrability. With one basic exception, this idea seems in part to accord with a suggestion Einstein made in 1920 in Leyden, concerning the extension of the notion of an Aether. In this he explicitly stated that the Aether should no longer be regarded as a substance but simply as fields, etc., or the totality of those physical quantities which are to be associated with matter-free space. […] The present concept of a Neo-Aether emerging from the Dimensional Universal Constants, finds support in the sense of a correspondence principle in a study […] made by Gauss and Hertz. […] The only way which I could find to give ontological support and thus a basis in reality to the geometrical restrictions used by Gauss and Hertz to establish force on a geometrical foundation, is by introducing the idea that these geometrical restrictions must be ascribed to the point-like impenetrability of matter. It is accordingly becoming increasingly clear that impenetrability may prove to be the most fundamental ontological property of substance, that is, the ultimate property by which substance evokes its existence and thus identifies itself in space-time […] The notion of impenetrability is essentially ontological, and it therefore does not have a formal representation. […] It appears therefore according to this thinking, that ultimate processes involved in natural phenomena do not only concern the geometrization of matter but equally if not even more fundamentally, the materialization of geometry” (Lieber 1968, pp. 191–194). We cite Lieber here not only to indicate the relevance of Conrad-Martius’ life-long preoccupation with the theme of aether, but also to call attention to the apparent direction and manner of the discussion of recent theoretical physicists—a tendency that would only rejoice Conrad-Martius. Finally, there is the issue of the ontology of matter in terms of “impenetrability.” We do not pretend to have grasped completely Lieber’s discussion (it seems to be at a very formative stage in this essay) but we do want to call attention to the absolute within and intensity (as well as the absolute extasis) of “matter” in Conrad-Martius’ analysis.
- 86.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 326.
- 87.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 333.
- 88.
- 89.
But see our later remarks on Heisenberg’s development.
- 90.
- 91.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 341.
- 92.
In a footnote, Conrad-Martius remarks that the probable “metaphysical reason” for this bondage to the (Kantian) categories of thought and intuition has something to do with the non-integrity of the world and of man. But we are in fact free to an extent to see the structures of the trans-physical region if we make the effort. And we must make the effort because (1) the phenomenological structures of hyletic being, and (2) the dilemmas of modern physics, demand it. See Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 360. For more on the “disintegrity” of the world see Conrad-Martius 1949b, pp. 64–74, 132–137. Here the theological notion of “the Fall” is reflected in the natural world, foremost in death of persons.
- 93.
Material or hyletic being is understood here not to mean elementary “particles” but the eidetic structures of the finished cosmos as atoms, molecules and bodies of experience.
- 94.
See Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 344ff. Note that there are a variety or terms employed by Conrad-Martius to describe the basic potencies. Each term expresses an aspect of the same reality. “Aether” as potency is essentially the ecstatic peripheral superspace; mass-hyle, as potency, is the instatic “chaotic” underspace. In their “substantial” form they found the specific phenomena or quantum physics; in their potential form they are principles or the “earthly cosmos.”
- 95.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 346. Conrad-Martius notes here that precisely that substance which for the natural sciences is so self-evident and which we are so accustomed to is in fact more filled with paradox than is aether and is, in fact, more difficult to grasp.
- 96.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 346.
- 97.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 351. Conrad-Martius’ asserts that these two potential sources show themselves as the condition for the possibility of the radically different essential characteristics of hyletic being. See Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 347. This duet, however, is then seen to have symmetry with the repeated act-potency structures which Conrad-Martius finds on all levels of being.
- 98.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 357.
- 99.
Heelan 1965, p. 90.
- 100.
Heelan 1965, p. 72.
- 101.
Heisenberg 1958, pp. 180–186.
- 102.
Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 357–358.
- 103.
See Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 360–362. From here on the complicated character of Conrad-Martius’ project or “saving the appearances” of nature becomes evident. Nature’s appearing is not a veil of the really real, and yet the way things appear or seem is not always the way they are.
- 104.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 361.
- 105.
See Conrad-Martius 1958, pp. 192–193 and our presentation in the “Realontology of Space” in the preceding chapter. We will return to this image in the final chapter. It recalls the physicists’ discussions of the finitude of space in terms of two-dimensional beings in a three-dimensional world.
- 106.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 362.
- 107.
- 108.
See Conrad-Martius 1958, p. 210.
- 109.
- 110.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 366.
- 111.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 366.
- 112.
- 113.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 372.
- 114.
Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 374–375. This seems to us to be a crucial discussion for Conrad-Martius’ claim that her categories are the most philosophically appropriate for interpreting the quantum phenomenon. In our presentation we have occasionally fallen into “continuous space and translatory motion talk,” e.g., the light hitting the electron plate, etc. These kinds of slips must be understood as from the not-yet realontological standpoint.
- 115.
Here we are again using the perspective of continuous space and translatory motion to call attention to the phenomenon which Conrad-Martius is interpreting.
- 116.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 375.
- 117.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 377.
- 118.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 379.
- 119.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 380. See above in Chap. 3 the discussion of “Hyletic Substance.” The total “naturalization” of the concept of manifestation is not a reductionist “naturalist” understanding of mind and its agency of manifestation; nevertheless it stands in tension with transcendental phenomenology’s requirement of a “dative of manifestation” which is also a nominative and “agency of manifestation.” This is a not necessarily metaphorical sense of light and manifestness borrowed from artificial or natural light, but one that is proper to spirit and consciousness. The total naturalization of manifestation in this context also stands in tension with Conrad-Martius’ own theme that “light [of ecstatic manifesting nature] must meet light [of mind] in order that there be light [of intellectual insightful manifestation of the world].” See Conrad-Martius 1965, p. 261ff.
- 120.
“Das ex-tensive “Über sich hinaus” des bewegten Aethers aber würde dem physichen Kontinuitätsraum gelten. Sonst könnte überhaupt keine Wirkleistung im Physischen zustande kommen” (Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 384). The point here is at what level aether is on the plane or cutting line of actual existence in the physical universe. It (as well as everything else) does not have a form of translatory motion or justify the notion of continuous space.
- 121.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 384.
- 122.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 385.
- 123.
A similar point is made with respect to atoms and chemical energy. See Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 386–387. Conrad-Martius cites Alwin Mittasch in this connection who holds that the kinetic theory or heat has never been really proved.
- 124.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 388.
- 125.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 388.
- 126.
- 127.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 390.
- 128.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 390.
- 129.
Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 390–391.
- 130.
Conrad-Martius found a remark of Heisenberg’s especially to the point: “As a remedy (with respect to the satisfactory mathematical formulation of the inter-relationships of elemental particles) for the present, the assumption offers itself that in the very small spatial-temporal region, therefore in the dimension of the elemental particles, space and time are in a unique way effaced so that in such small times one cannot define correctly the notions of earlier or later. This would not, of course, change anything for the most part in the space-time structure, but one must entertain the possibility that certain processes apparently occur contrary to the order that corresponds to their causal succession” (Conrad-Martius 1954, pp. 54–55).
- 131.
Conrad-Martius 1958, p. 221.
- 132.
Conrad-Martius 1958, p. 222. Conrad-Martius’ argument for this postulation is sparse indeed. Her position can be best understood when one sees the symmetry of the basic principles and the analogia symbolorum. See the next chapter for further extensions of the analogy.
- 133.
Conrad-Martius notes that even here we must distinguish between the original qualification or relationship and the ontological functional roles. This seems to be a reference to the possibility of a reversed act-potency relationship also at this level.
- 134.
Conrad-Martius 1958, p. 223 and 95ff. Trees, triangles and judgments cannot see, but not because they are blind. Being blind means not being able to see but having the fundamental capacity to see. Even an incurably blind person can fundamentally be regarded as one who can become one who sees, e.g., through a miracle. Conrad-Martius speaks here of the normal situation (see above in text) because if one reverses the act-potency relationship at this level, the absolute future would be drawn into the real actual present through a synthesis with the absolute absent. This could perhaps illuminate ontologically the possibility of clairvoyance.
- 135.
Conrad-Martius 1958, pp. 224–225. Conrad-Martius does not regard the Timaeus’ anangke or fateful “necessity” accounting for the surds which interfere with the world’s rationality (the world is reasonable for the most part, Plato said) as supporting her theological notion of the world’s disintegrity.
- 136.
Conrad-Martius 1958, p. 226.
- 137.
See Conrad-Martius 1958, p. 228; text from Born 1921, p. 190ff. In Der Raum Conrad-Martius reviewed the heated discussion which took place in the British scientific journal, Nature, in 1957 and 1958, which showed at least that the thesis of “asymmetrical aging” is not nonsense and there are grounds to take the thesis philosophically seriously. See Conrad-Martius 1958, pp. 230–240.
- 138.
Conrad-Martius 1958, pp. 242–243.
- 139.
“Bewegung als solche reibt den Körper gleichsam aus der seinshaften Verwurzelung in demselben fort” (Conrad-Martius 1958, p. 243). Conrad-Martius believes that there has been a remarkable cycle in the history of the physical discussion of inertia. Galileo’s breakthrough was in showing that a body maintained its circumstance of motion without any additional force if no change took place. But according to relativity theory a body, once again, opposes the realization of motion itself not only that of kinetic change. It is only because of the Einsteinian theory that attention has been called to this neo-Aristotelian position because in normal relations of motion the effect is so small that it is not noticeable.
- 140.
Conrad-Martius 1958, p. 245. The final part of this section stays very close to the German text which is quite compressed. Conrad-Martius presents her own analysis or the problem in terms of elementary time and space units. She hesitates to identify those with the “smallest time units” or “smallest durations” of physics—an identification which she was more inclined to in Die Zeit. The hesitation is not founded on a positive doubt but on her uncertainty. See the discussion by Arthur March in Chap. 8 of Die physikalische Erkenntnis und ihre Grenzen (March 1955). Her own theory of elementary quanta refers to the actual absolute discontinuous spatial-temporal dimensions of material being as actualized by the ontological potencies.
- 141.
Conrad-Martius 1958, pp. 245–246.
- 142.
But what is the meaning of more acts of actualization which are more elementary time-quanta which are more extended time-parts? Apparently, the emphasis here is with respect to the less elementary space-quanta and more compressed space-parts. In as much as no time within which or space within which is being presupposed, and the absolute measure is being considered immanent within the “system,” the Einsteinian paradox requires a “shorter distance” and “more time” i.e., the absolute “from here to there” must be compressed and the absolute “from here till then” extended—in comparison with the other slower moving system. Conrad-Martius says it is possible if one thinks of the time and space as elementary units whose relativity is assured by their apeiric foundations. The notions of more actualizations and more time quanta as leading to more extended time-parts arise from the beginning fact that we are in a very fast-moving system, i.e., Conrad-Martius must express a fast-moving system from the viewpoint of the trans-physical potencies, as there is no other place to describe it!
- 143.
- 144.
- 145.
Conrad-Martius 1958, p. 251. Again, one wonders if “gravity waves” would have supported Conrad-Martius here.
- 146.
Conrad-Martius 1958, p. 251.
- 147.
See Conrad-Martius 1963a, p. 16.
- 148.
The précis of the score of this “symphony” is indicated by the table of basic concepts in Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 459–460, as well as in a diagram found in the manuscript of Metaphysik des Irdischen.
- 149.
We have only alluded to the complicated analyses which are intended to justify the notion or formation-potency in epigenesis. The greater part of the Selbstaufbau is devoted to showing how the imaginoid is the energetic pre-project of the “inner body” which itself is the ultimate pre-actual entelechial potency before the level of actual organic living substance. The imaginoid, with the spermatoid, is the actualization of the various stages of the egg material which are empirically observable in Spemann’s studies of the organization center of the egg.
- 150.
See Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 430ff.
- 151.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 439.
- 152.
Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 440–441.
- 153.
See Conrad-Martius 1964, p. 120ff. We have seen that not all pre-actual dimensions are potential potentiality dimensions. For example, at the level of light energy and electricity we saw that there is not a “pure” energetic because these presuppose the aether or mass-hyle potencies. In physical “non-genuine” forms of energy the effective power is born by a substrate; in the genuine entelechial potencies we have pure and free power existing as tending towards realization without a presupposed substrate. See Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 403–406.
- 154.
See Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 437.
- 155.
Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 410–412.
- 156.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 407.
- 157.
Note that the “argument” here is purely one of speculative conceptual analysis: An idea as such cannot be a cause of its “incarnation.” But there are incarnated ideas (forms); therefore, there must be a kind of ideal causality which is neither constituted by a mere idea, nor a blindly efficient causal factor, nor a subjectively spiritual. Thus, the speculation of the category of the objectively spiritual or essence-entelechy. But essence-entelechy could realize itself immediately without the need for an other, if there were actual pure spiritual existing forms, e.g., an angel. But, if what is realized is not just an actually spiritual (ideal-intelligible) being but incarnated extensive ideality, the essence-entelechy must have an other, which is the condition for the possibility for the non-ideal realization of the ideal, out of which that which is not ideal (but extensive, material, etc.) but idealized comes to be: the essence-material.
- 158.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 413. The English “material” expresses well the German sense of Stoff as used by Conrad-Martius in the notion of essence-material [Wesensstoff]. Cloth, lumber, bricks, mortar, etc. are “materials;” we do not normally use the more philosophical “matter” to express that out of which, e.g., a suit of clothes is made or a house is built.
- 159.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 413. Note that “substrate” here in connection with essence-entelechy does not refer to a more fundamental potential level. Conrad-Martius places it in quotation marks to indicate that here the essence-material is being referred to and that we are at the limit-case of pure energetic.
- 160.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 414.
- 161.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 415. It is clear that from the perspective of the realontology the fact that the proto hyle is over against essence, i.e., is itself other than energized Logos and in this sense is undetermined, cannot mean that it cannot be essentially eidetically grasped. Even that which is absolutely indeterminate and absolute potentiality has an essence and a place in the cosmos noetos! See Conrad-Martius 1958, p. 141, n. 68.
- 162.
See Conrad-Martius 1961, pp. 420–421.
- 163.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 422.
- 164.
Conrad-Martius 1961, p. 423.
- 165.
This is a purely formal description. The earliest “phenomenology of spirits” is a highly suggestive “vagabond” discussion of elemental spirits, water-sprites, forest-spirits, demons and angels in Metaphysiche Gespräche (Conrad-Martius 1921). It is not a compellingly convincing analysis because the subject matter itself is only alluded to. On the other hand, it is highly suggestive, and Conrad-Martius developed some of her basic categories (especially that of spirit and nature) in this early work. We are here drawing upon the unpublished Metaphysik des Irdischen (Conrad-Martius 1963a, p. 25ff) for some basic distinctions. See also Conrad-Martius 1923, §128 and Conrad-Martius 1960, p. 11.
- 166.
Even with total freedom from natural potency spirit is still, in its radical autonomy and self-constitution, dependent on the creative act of God. We will return to this in the next chapter.
- 167.
See Conrad-Martius 1949b, pp. 108–109.
- 168.
See Conrad-Martius 1960, pp. 19–22. This remarkable little book, which will be our major source in this section, is an astounding synthesis of almost all of Conrad-Martius’ thought as well as an indication of what she hoped to argue in the Metaphysik des Irdischen. But for someone not already familiar with her thought it is quite unintelligible.
- 169.
See Conrad-Martius 1960, p. 24ff. The expression “spirit-soul” should be seen as a terminus technicus of the realontology. The human person, understood as subjectivity and “I”-capability, is a subjectivity and interiority with an “earthly” archonality. For Conrad-Martius it is simply inadequate to refer alone to the human soul or spirit. The reasons were briefly sketched in our section “Pneumatic Substance” and will receive a partial completion in the following discussion.
- 170.
Conrad-Martius 1960, p. 38.
- 171.
See Conrad-Martius 1960, pp. 41–42, where Conrad-Martius discusses the biblical texts of Isaiah 43:1 and 45:4, Ephesians 1:4, and Revelations 2:14.
- 172.
- 173.
Conrad-Martius 1960, p. 46.
- 174.
- 175.
Conrad-Martius 1960, p. 50.
- 176.
Conrad-Martius never made a case for immortality as such. It is of course implicit in the content of her description of archonal being as Untiefe. And yet because of the temporal temporality of the human person, i.e., the immanence of nothingness and death in its ex-sistence, he must cease to be in a very real sense before he could be in aeonic time. The problem of the identity here was never discussed by Conrad-Martius, but it seems to me to be a serious problem to show how the archonal being whose identity is tied not only to the constituting quantum-time but also apparently to transcendental passing time could be recognizably the same with an aeonic archonal being. Because if it is not phenomenologically imaginable, then it is a serious realontological objection in the case of the I. It seems to be Thomist kinds of arguments about the indivisibility of spirit which are sometimes in the background of Conrad-Martius’ own discussions. In any case, as we shall see, with the New Heaven and New Earth the whole cosmos is “aeonized” and “resurrected” whether or not there is a real identity problem. From her own explicit question, the appropriate question is: How is death possible? See Conrad-Martius 1949b, p. 134ff. From the phenomenology of soul and body she was led to believe that a bodiless soul was an impossibility because the body was the field of expression of soul as absolute interiority; body was the excarnation of interiority. Thus, she speculated on the possibility of an aetherial body. Only in the resurrected body, however, is the body the true excarnation and revelation of the soul. We shall return to these themes in the next chapter. See also Hart 2008a.
- 177.
The argument parallels that used for the ecstatic-instatic potencies of extended material being. See Conrad-Martius 1960, p. 54ff.
- 178.
- 179.
Conrad-Martius 1960, pp. 65–66.
- 180.
The quote is taken from Woods 1924, pp. 33–34.
- 181.
Woods 1924, p. 15.
- 182.
Quoted in Wehr 1971, p. 11.
References
André, H. (1931). Urbild und Ursache in der Biologie. Munich: Oldenbourg.
Bohm, D. (1969). Some remarks on the notion or order. In C.H. Waddington (Ed.), Towards a Theoretical Biology (Vol. 2, pp. 18–40). Sketches, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
Born, M. (1921). Die Relativitätstheorie Einsteins. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Čapek, M. (1961). The philosophical impact of contemporary Physics. Princeton: Van Nostrand.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1921). Metaphysische Gespräche. Halle: Niemeyer.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1923). Realontologie. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung Vol. 6, pp. 159–333.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1938). Ursprung und Aufbau des lebendigen Kosmos. Salzburg: Müller.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1949a). Bios und Psyche. Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1949b). Abstammungslehre. Munich: Kösel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1954). Die Zeit. Munich: Kösel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1958). Der Raum. Munich: Kösel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1960). Die Geistseele des Menschens. Munich: Kösel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1961). Der Selbstaufbau der Natur: Entelechien und Energien. Munich: Kösel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1963a). Metaphysik des Irdischen (unpublished).
Conrad-Martius, H. (1963b). Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I). Munich: Kösel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1964). Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. II). Munich: Kösel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1965). Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. III). Munich: Kösel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1949). Naturwissenschaftlich-metaphysische Perspektiven: Drei Vorträge. Heidelberg: Kerle.
Conrad-Martius, H., Emmrich, Curt (1951). Das Lebendige; Die Endlichkeit der Welt; Der Mensch: Drei Dispute. Munich: Kösel.
Dürken, B. (1936). Entwicklungsbiologie und ganzheit. Leipzig: Teubner.
Gurwitsch, A. (1923). Versuch einer synthetischen Biologie. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Hart, J. G. (2008a). Archaeology of spirit and the unique self: A Husserlian reading of Conrad-Martius. Axiomathes, 18, 407–424.
Hart, J. G. (2008b). The Dignity of the individual in the polis and kosmos. In D. Gottstein, H.R. Sepp (Eds.), Polis und Kosmos. Perspektiven einer Philosophie des Politischen und einer Philosophischen Kosmologie. Eberhard Avé-Lallemant zum 80. Geburtstag. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 27–42.
Hart, J. G. (2009). Who One is, Book 1. Meontology of the “I”: A Transcendental Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Springer (Phaenomenologica, 189).
Heelan, P. (1965). Quantum mechanics and objectivity: A study of the Physical Philosophy of Werner Heisenberg. The Hague: Nijhoff.
Heisenberg, W. (1958). Physics and Philosophy. New York: Harper.
Kälin, J. (1966). Der regulative Selbstaufbau organismischer Sinngefüge in der Ontogenese. In S. von Goldschmidt (Ed.), Materie und Leben. Munich: Alber (Naturwissenschaft und Theologie, 7).
Lieber, P. (1968). Constants of nature: biological theory and natural law. In C.H. Waddington (Ed.), Towards a Theoretical Biology, (Vol. 1, pp. 180–205). Prolegomena, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
March, A. (1955). Die physikalische Erkenntnis und ihre Grenzen. Brauschweig: Vieweg & Sohn.
Merxmüller, H. (1949). Fragen des Artbegriffes in der Botanik. Naturwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 2, 68–73.
Plessner, H. (1965). Die Stufenbau des Organischen und der Mensch. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Simpson, G.G. (1961). Life of the Past: An Introduction to Palaeontology. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Simpson, G. G. (1968). The meaning of evolution. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Spemann, H. (1936). Experimentelle Beiträge zu einer Theorie der Entwicklung. Berlin: Springer.
Thirring, H. (1921). Die Idee der Relativitätstheorie. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Toulmin, S., & Goodfield, J. (1965). The architecture of matter. London: Penguin.
Vrana, C. (1963). La costituzione ontica degli organismi nel pensiero di Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Inaugural Dissertation. Pontificia Università Lateranense, Rome.
Waddington, C. H. (1963). The nature of life. London: Unwin.
Wehr, G. (1971). Jakob Böhme. Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch.
Woods, H. (1924). Augustine and evolution: A study in the Saint’s De Genesi Ad Litteram and De Trinitate. New York: Universal Knowledge Foundation.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hart, J.G., Parker, R.K.B. (2020). The Self-formation of Nature. In: Parker, R.K.B. (eds) Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Ontological Phenomenology. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44842-4_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44842-4_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-44841-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-44842-4
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)