Abstract
In his commentary on the first verse of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ, Bhāviveka discusses the Hindu concept of īśvara or “Lord” as one of several “no-causes” (ahetu) that allegedly have created the world. By “no-cause” he means that, while the Lord may exist, he does not perform the action of creating the world. In this sense, the Lord is like a woman who is “no-wife” or a son who is “no-son.” They may exist, but they do not perform the actions that are appropriate to these particular social roles. Basing his argument on a verse in the Mahābhārata that speaks bitterly of the injustice of the Lord, Bhāviveka argues that a Lord who is capricious and cruel could not have created a world that is orderly and just. Instead, he proposes that, from a conventional point of view (saṃvṛtyāpi), the world is created not by a Lord, but by karma. Bhāviveka develops this argument further in two places in his own independent work, The Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way (madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikāḥ), and in its commentary The Flame of Reason (Tarkajvālā). In his further elaboration of the argument, he gives a vivid account of what he considers the moral inadequacies of the Lord in Hindu mythology, focusing not only on the terrifying and destructive aspects of Śiva as Rudra, but also on the morally questionable aspects of Viṣṇu as Kṛṣṇa the cowherd who destroys demons and seduces other men’s wives. In the process, Bhāviveka gives us a distinctive and lively picture of the perennial conflict between Hindus and Buddhists about the role of the Lord in the creation of the world.
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Notes
- 1.
This essay was first published in the International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture 29 (2019), 29–51. It is reprinted with the kind permission of the Academy of Buddhist Studies, Dongguk University, Korea.
- 2.
Quotations from the Sanskrit text of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikās are drawn from the text in Siderits and Katsura 2013.
- 3.
The relationship between this verse and other expressions of the tetralemma is discussed in Katsura 2000, 210.
- 4.
This passage is translated and discussed in MacDonald 2015, 148–52. Candrakīrti gives a somewhat more expansive discussion of uncaused production in Madhyamakāvatāra 6.99-103.
- 5.
de ston pa’i rjes su dpag pa med pa’i phyir dang / rjes su dpag pa dang / grags pa’i gnod par ‘gyur ba’i skyon yod pa’i phyir yang ngo zhes bya bar dgongs so // de la rjes su dpag pa’i gnod pa ni kun rdzob tu khas blangs pa nang gi skye mched kyi dngos po rnams rgyu med pa las skye ba med de / spyi dang khyad par nyid dang ldan pa’i phyir / dper na myu gu bzhin no // grags pa’i gnod pa ni ‘jig rten ‘di na yod pa gang yin pa de ni rgyu las skye bar grags te / dper na rgyu spun dag las snam bu dang / rtsi rkyang dag las sab ma skye ba la sogs pa bzhin no // (Derge, Tsha 50b / 5-7). My translations of Prajñāpradīpa, chapter one are adapted from Ames 1993, 209–59.
- 6.
The classic account of these two kinds of negation in the work of Bhāviveka is found in Kajiyama 1973, 161–75.
- 7.
The different placement of the negative particle in these two sentences has led Bimal Krishna Matilal to distinguish paryudāsa and prasajya-pratiṣedha as “nominally bound negation” and “verbally bound negation” (Matilal 1971).
- 8.
yang na rgyu med ces bya ba ni rgyu ngan pa ste / chung ma med pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa bzhin no // rgyu ngan pa gang zhes na / ngo bo nyid dang / dbang phyug dang / skyes bu dang / gtso bo dang / dus dang / sred med kyi bu la sogs pa ste / yang dag pa ma yin pa’i phyir ro // dngos po rnams rgyu med pa de las skye ba med de / de las skye bar ston pa’i rjes su dpag pa med pa’i phyir dang / rjes su dpag pa’i gnod par ‘gyur ba’i phyir yang ngo zhes bya bar dgongs so // (Derge, Tsha 50b/7 - 51a/1).
- 9.
In his commentary on this passage, Avalokitavrata adds the comparison of a bad or faulty (skyon chags / duṣṭa) son who fails to do what a son should do: dper na chung ma ngan pa skyon chags pa dngos por gyur pa yod kyang chung ma’i bya ba ni mi byed pas de la chung ma med zhes bya ba dang / bu ngan pa skyon chags pa dngos por gyur pa yod kyang bu’i bya ba mi byed pas de la bu med pa zhes bya ba bzhin du / (Derge, Wa 114a/1-3). Vasubandhu uses the same comparison in the bhāṣya on Abhidharmakośa 3.29b to explain the meaning of the term “ignorance” (avidyā): “Ignorance (or no-knowledge) is another dharma, in the same way that a bad wife is called ‘no-wife’ and a bad son ‘no-son.’ Ignorance also is like this” (dharmāntaram evāvidyā / yathā tarhi kubhāryā abhāryety ucyate kuputraś cāputraḥ / evam avidyā ‘py astu). The point here is that ignorance (or no-knowledge) and knowledge constitute distinct and separate phenomena.
- 10.
Derge, Wa 114a/3-4.
- 11.
This passage is discussed in Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp 2006, 169–202. van der Kuijp points out (190) that similar lists of five alleged causes appear in three other places in the Tarkajvālā: īśvara, puruṣa, pradhāna, kāla, and Nārayaṇa (MHK 3.137-8); īśvara, puruṣa, pradhāna, atoms (aṇu), and Viṣṇu (MHK 3.223); Keśava (sred med), īśa (Śiva), puruṣa, pradhāna, and atoms (MHK 3.248). Verse 50 of the Suhṛllekha, which is attributed to Nāgārjuna, says that the skandhas are created by avidyā, etc., not by any other causes, such as īśvara (dbang phyug), puruṣa (skyes bu), both (gnyi ga), kāla (dus), prakṛti (rang bzhin), niyati (nges pa), vikṛti / vikāra (‘gyur ba = pariṇāma), etc. See Lindtner 1982, 222. The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya on verse 2.64d (“and not from īśvara and so forth because there is succession and so forth”) expands the phrase “īśvara and so forth” to include īśvara, puruṣa, pradhāna, and so forth. While the elements of these lists seem largely conventional, it is worth noting that Bhāviveka goes out of his way to include various designations of Viṣṇu in addition to īśvara (apparently associating īśvara with Śiva, as in the quotation from the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad that follows this passage in the Prajñāpradīpa). Why Bhāviveka would have a particular interest in Viṣṇu is not immediately obvious, but it is worth noting that his account of the Buddha’s Form Body in MHK 3.256-7 describes the central rainbow-like figure as adorned with splendor (śrī) and glory (lakṣmī) consisting of the various characteristics of the Buddha.
- 12.
Derge, Wa 115a/5-6.
- 13.
An example of this position appears in the Buddhacarita (Acts of the Buddha) by Aśvaghoṣa. In the discussion between the royal counselor (mantradhara) and prince Siddhārtha in Buddhacarita 9.58-64, the counselor argues that human effort is useless when the evolution of the world is driven by inherent nature (svabhāva), the Lord (īśvara) or the self (ātman). He then offers a useful illustration of the function of inherent nature: “That entering the womb, it develops hands, feet, abdomen, back, and head; That his soul then is united with it—all this, experts in these matters explain, is just the work of inherent nature. Who produces the sharpness of a thorn? Or the diversity of beasts and birds? All this happens through inherent nature; there is no role here for willful action, how much less for any human effort” (Buddhacarita 9.61-2, trans. Olivelle).
- 14.
The word īśvara is often translated as “God” rather than “Lord” to stress similarities with arguments in the Western tradition about the existence and character of God. A more circumspect option would be to follow Parimal G. Patil’s example and refer to it as “a God-like being called ‘īśvara’” (Patil 2009, 3).
- 15.
gan zhig phrar gyur gcig pu skye gnas ‘dug // de yis ‘di kun skye zhing ‘jig par byed // de ni dbang dag (read bdag with Avalokitavrata) mchog sbyin lha mchod bya // yon tan byed pa shin tu zhi ba thob // (Derge, Wa 51a/7-51b/1). Kajiyama (1963, 56) first identified this verse as a variant of Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 4.11: yo yoniṃ yonim adhitiṣṭhaty eko yasminn idaṃ saṃ ca vi caiti sarvaṃ / tam īśānaṃ varadaṃ devam īḍyaṃ nicāyyemāṃ śāntim atyantam eti // (Hauschild 1927). Ames (1993, 247) notes that the same verse is quoted in the commentary on MHK 8.16 in a version that is closer to the Sanskrit. In his subcommentary on this verse, Avalokitavrata explains that it attributes four distinctive features (khyad par / viśeṣa) to the Lord: he is subtle (phra mo), one (gcig pu), dwells as the source (skye gnas ‘dug), and creates and destroys the world (de yis ‘di kun skye zhing ‘jig par byed) (Derge, Wa 122a/6-112b/3).
- 16.
ajño jantur anīśo ‘yam ātmanaḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ / īśvaraprerito gacchet svargaṃ vā śvabhram eva vā //. Translation is adapted from van Buitenen 1975, 281.
- 17.
dbang phyug kun rdzob tu yang ‘gro ba mtha’ dag skye ba’i rgyu yin par mi rung ste / la la’i dga’ ba dang / yongs su gdung ba’i rgyu yin pa’i phyir dper na ba lang ‘dzi bzhin no // (Derge, Tsha 51b/ 2).
- 18.
‘gro ba ni rgyu byed pa po dbang phyug ces bya ba gcig pu dang ldan pa ma yin par nges te / gzhal bya yin pa’i phyir dper na dbang phyug bzhin pas kun rdzob tu yang dngos po rnams de las skye ba med do // (Derge, Tsha 51b/ 2-3).
- 19.
Derge, Wa 125b/2.
- 20.
Derge, Tsha 51b/3-4.
- 21.
Derge, Tsha 51b/4-5. By making this proposal, Bhāviveka places himself in a venerable Buddhist tradition about the creative function of karma. For example, we read in Abhidharmakośa 4.1 that “the diversity of the world is born from karma” (karmajaṃ lokavaicitryam). The bhāṣya that introduces this verse speaks of “the multifaceted diversity of sentient beings along with their physical environment (sattvabhājanalokasya bahudhā vaicitryam).” For an account of the evolution of this argument in later Buddhist literature, see Steinkellner 2006. A thorough study of the argument against īśvara in later Buddhist logic can be found in Patil 2009. In Ratnakīrti the focus shifts from the unity of īśvara to īśvara’s “intelligence,” but Ratnakīrti makes a similar move with regard to karma. He is willing to accept that the world has an intelligent (or “intelligence possessing” buddhimat) maker, but insists that it constitutes mental construction, exclusion, and determination (the constituents of karma) rather than the Naiyāyikas’ īśvara. Patil explains: “In this he supports the long-standing Buddhist commitment to there being a conscious maker of our world, while also showing that such a maker need not be the single, permanent, omniscient maker whose existence his Naiyāyikas have worked so hard to establish” (Patil 2009, 309–310).
- 22.
- 23.
For a discussion of this text with its commentaries, see Powers 2016.
- 24.
kasyacit prītihetutvāl loko neśvarakartṛkaḥ / vidadhāno yathā prītiṃ neśa īśvarakartṛkaḥ // (MHK 3.215). All quotations from chapters 1–3 of the MHK are taken from Heitmann 1998.
- 25.
dbang phyug ‘jig rten byed po min // la la’i dga’ ba’i rgyu yin phyir // dper na dbang phyug dga’ byed pa’i // byed po dbang phyug ma yin bzhin // (Derge, Tsha 110a/4-5).
- 26.
sāmagryā bhāvanirvṛtteḥ kaścinn eko ‘sti neśvaraḥ // (MHK 3.218ab).
- 27.
seśvaraṃ cakṣurādīṣṭaṃ bahutvād yadi dāsavat // (MHK 3.219ab).
- 28.
sakartṛkam athābhīṣṭaṃ racitatvād ghaṭādivat / anirdiṣṭaviśeṣeṇa kartā cet siddhasādhanam // (MHK 3.220).
- 29.
atha nityaikasūkṣmādiviśeṣeṇa na te ‘nvayaḥ / anityamūrtajātatvadoṣāpattiś ca tasya vaḥ // (MHK 3.221).
- 30.
sattvabhājanasaṃkhyātalokavaicitryakāraṇam / karmeśvaraś cet saṃvṛtyā siddham eva prasādhyate // (MHK 3.222).
- 31.
The question of how far the contents of this chapter correspond to the historical tradition of the Mīmāṃsā has been much discussed. For a summary of the issues, see Ham 2016.
- 32.
trayīmārga-praṇetṛṇāṃ brahmakeśavaśūlinām / dṛṣṭvā kleśātmikāṃ caryāṃ yuktaṃ yat tyajate trayī //. The Sanskrit text of MHK chapter nine is quoted from the edition by Lindtner 2001. The translation is mine. I will adhere, however, to the commonly accepted numbering in the edition of Kawasaki 1976–88.
- 33.
jñānena jñāninaḥ pāpaṃ dahaty agnir ivendhanam / atas tejoviśeṣāc ca na teṣāṃ pratyavāyitā // yat kleśadahanāyālaṃ tajjñānaṃ jñānino viduḥ / nātaḥ prakurute pāpaṃ jñānī taddhetutvasaṃbhavāt //.
- 34.
brahmahā madyapaḥ kāmī dṛṣṭatattvo yadīśvaraḥ / kā kathādṛṣṭatattvānāṃ tatpaddhatyanugāminām //.
- 35.
parastrīdraviṇādāna-māyāśāṭhyapravṛttayaḥ / kiṃ na tyaktā hi vāñchāsti tasya ced dharmaguptaye //.
- 36.
A key passage on this point is Bhagavad Gītā 4.7-8: “Whenever righteousness declines and unrighteousness increases, O Bhārata, I create myself. To protect those who do good, destroy those who do evil, and maintain Dharma, I come into being from age to age” (yadā yadā hi dharmasya glānir bhavati bhārata / abhyutthānam adharmasya tadātmānaṃ sṛjāmy aham // paritrāṇāya sādhūnāṃ vināśāya ca duṣkṛtām / dharmasaṃsthāpanārthāya saṃbhavāmi yuge yuge //).
- 37.
neśādikāraṇaṃ viśvaṃ yuktam ity uditaṃ purā / saty apīśādikartṛtve kiṃ hi tat kṛtakaṃ bhavet //.
- 38.
anyānya-bhaksaṇād bhītais tiryagbhir durlabhotsavaiḥ / niṣpeṣacchedadāhādiduḥkhārtair nārakair api // nṛbhir janmajarārogabhaya-śokaklamārditaiḥ / prīyate yo namas tasmai rudrāyānvarthasaṃjñine // (MHK 9.108-9).
- 39.
bauddhā hi sukhinaḥ kecit (tad)bhaktā duḥkhinaś ca kim // īśvarājñāvidhānāc ca puṇyabhāk kiṃ na pāpakṛt // vaicitryakarmaṇo ‘jñasya taddhetutvena vācyatā / etena sṛṣṭikartṛtvaṃ pratyuktaṃ brahmakṛṣṇayoḥ // (MHK 9.112-13).
Abbreviations
- Derge:
-
sDe-dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan ḥgyur Preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tokyo, 1977.
- MHK:
-
Madhyamakahṛdayakārikāḥ (Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way) of Bhāviveka.
- MMK:
-
Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ of Nāgārjuna.
- PP:
-
Prajñāpradīpa (Lamp of Wisdom) of Bhāviveka.
- TJ:
-
Tarkajvālā (Flame of Reason) commentary on the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikāḥ of Bhāviveka.
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Eckel, M.D. (2021). Who or What Created the World? Bhāviveka’s Arguments Against the Hindu Concept of God. In: Eckel, M.D., Speight, C.A., DuJardin, T. (eds) The Future of the Philosophy of Religion. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44606-2_13
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