Abstract
The notion of the infinite population limit of large population games where agents are realized by controlled stochastic dynamical systems is introduced. The theory of infinite population mean field games (MFGs) is then presented including the fundamental MFG equations. Proofs of the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium solutions to the MFG equations are discussed, and systems possessing major agents along with the standard asymptotically negligible agents are introduced. A short bibliography is included.
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Caines, P.E. (2021). Mean Field Games. In: Baillieul, J., Samad, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Systems and Control. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44184-5_30
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44184-5_30
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