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When Parents and Children Disagree: Diving into DNS Delegation Inconsistency

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Passive and Active Measurement (PAM 2020)

Abstract

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical, decentralized, and distributed database. A key mechanism that enables the DNS to be hierarchical and distributed is delegation [7] of responsibility from parent to child zones—typically managed by different entities. RFC1034 [12] states that authoritative nameserver (NS) records at both parent and child should be “consistent and remain so”, but we find inconsistencies for over 13M second-level domains. We classify the type of inconsistencies we observe, and the behavior of resolvers in the face of such inconsistencies, using RIPE Atlas to probe our experimental domain configured for different scenarios. Our results underline the risk such inconsistencies pose to the availability of misconfigured domains.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This covers 96% of names with disjoint NSSets, the remaining 4% are indeterminate due to unresolvable names in the NSSets.

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Acknowledgments

We thank John Heidemann, Ólafur Guðmundsson and Ülrich Wisser for feedback provided in the early stages of this research. We also thank the PAM2020 anonymous reviewers, our shepherd, Steve Uhlig, and Philip Homburg, from RIPE NCC. This work uses measurements from RIPE Atlas (https://atlas.ripe.net), an open measurements platform operated by RIPE NCC.

This work is partially funded by the NWO-DHS MADDVIPR project (Grant Agreement 628.001.031/FA8750-19-2-0004), the PANDA project (NSF OAC-1724853) and the EU CONCORDIA project (Grant Agreement 830927). This material is based on research sponsored by Air Force Research Laboratory under agreement number FA8750-18-2-0049. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of a sponsor, Air Force Research Laboratory or the U.S. Government.

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Correspondence to Raffaele Sommese .

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A Longitudinal View on Inconsistency

A Longitudinal View on Inconsistency

1.1 A.1 NS Inconsistency over Time

The results presented in Table 1 show NS inconsistency for a single day. However, it is also interesting to understand how this misconfiguration evolves over time. We analyzed NS inconsistency for the case \(P \ne C\) over the two and a half year-period preceding the date of the analysis presented in Table 1. Figure 7 shows the results of this analysis. The figure clearly demonstrates that the fraction of domains affected by this misconfiguration remains similar over time. This result suggests that NS inconsistency is a long-term misconfiguration in the DNS ecosystem.

Fig. 7.
figure 7

NS inconsistency (\(P \ne C\)) from 2017-04-01 until 2019-10-01

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Sommese, R. et al. (2020). When Parents and Children Disagree: Diving into DNS Delegation Inconsistency. In: Sperotto, A., Dainotti, A., Stiller, B. (eds) Passive and Active Measurement. PAM 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12048. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44081-7_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44081-7_11

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