Abstract
This chapter is on the methodology and philosophy of psychology as a science. By reflecting on Jan Smedslund’s critique of the empirical research paradigm of scientific psychology as tending towards pseudo-empiricism and lacking sufficient grounding in conceptual analysis and definitions—the chapter investigates the relevance of meanings of words and reflecting on these to the practices and possibilities of psychology as a science. Specifically, the chapter investigates the role to scientific psychology of reflecting on the meanings of words (i.e., conceptual investigations or analyses); the need in psychology to distinguish conceptual from empirical investigations; the nature of the meanings of psychological terms and statements; and the method of analyzing the meanings of psychological terms and statements. The chapter ends by pointing to ways in which Jan Smedslund’s system of Psycho-logic importantly reveals the import to psychology of reflecting on the meanings of words—but misleads on the nature and implications of such reflections.
I would like to thank Tobias Gustum Lindstad for his helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this chapter
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Notes
- 1.
Axioms have two defining features: (i) they imply numerous and important other sentences, yet cannot themselves be derived from any more basic sentences; (ii) they are experienced as necessary (Smedslund 2012b, p. 296).
- 2.
I take it that Smedslund by “feeling” in this axiom means the same as “emotions” and does not include sensations/sensory experiences such as the feeling of wind against one’s face.
- 3.
Conversely, it would not be a logical contradiction to claim that it is not certain that feelings will follow from any given combination of wants and beliefs. Although not a typical response, a person may believe that they are in grave danger—say because of being in a crashing plane to take an extreme example—and very much want to get out of the danger, yet do not feel fear (or feel little fear). Maybe because the situation gave rise to a razor-like focus and bare presence to the situation or because they are trained to deal with situations of danger or are advanced meditators who can remain calm and collect even in such situations. This may amaze us, but should not strike us as logically contradictory. To this Smedslund may respond that since it is commonplace that the capacity for simultaneous attention is limited, a person may indeed believe that they are in grave danger, but still are not afraid because, say, all of their attention is on getting out of the dangerous situation (cf. Smedslund 1999a, p. 7). This could be an explanation for some cases where there seems to be a given combination of wants and beliefs without a corresponding given emotional response, but not for all such cases. For example, a person may feel no fear or little fear when confronting a situation that they believe that it involves grave danger to their lives and very much would like to avoid—such as facing terminal cancer—and without being distracted, preoccupied, or absorbed by something else, but still not feeling fear because, say, they have resigned themselves to the situation or become so used to it that it no longer scares them or make them feel sad for what the situation means (such as an irrevocable loss to themselves and their loved ones) rather than fear.
- 4.
Here—again without presuming that Smedslund would disagree—it would be insufficient to propose as a counter-argument that “low self-esteem” and “depression” are not synonymous; that having “low self-esteem” is not a sufficient or even necessary condition of being depressed; that low self-esteem is a feature of a wide range of other clinical conditions too such as learning disorders, stuttering, and social phobia; or that the correlation between having low self-esteem and being depressed varies across empirical studies, that feelings of worthlessness are present only in a portion of individuals diagnosed with depression and do not belong to the most frequent depressive symptoms (Sowislo and Orth 2013, p. 216). For even if it only is sometimes that people who suffer from depression also suffer from low self-esteem as part of their depression or that people with low self-esteem develop clinical depression during their life time—still, having low self-esteem will increase the probability of having or developing major depression. In addition, with or without the clinical understanding and definition of depression it makes a lot of sense to claim that persons with low self-esteem are more prone to depression and little or no sense to claim that it will make no probable difference or likely make persons less prone to depression. For instance, feeling worthless or lousy about oneself as a person, inadequate in living up to basic standards of who one thinks one ought to be and so on—is itself a reason to become or be depressed.
- 5.
Leaving aside for now issues of psychology as a domain of empirical inquiry such as the empirical status of psychological phenomena and their relative variance or invariance.
- 6.
In response to Smedslund’s “hedonism axiom” (cf above and 2011, p. 131), neither is it so that, say, or joyfulness or cheerfulness need to be based on any particular evaluation of something or other as good; people may even be joyful or cheerful despite evaluations of something or other as bad and something they do not want (like being turned down on an application or not having a job).
- 7.
There are two other interpretations that both seem to cancel themselves out as axioms since they are not about the meaning or nature of “learning” per se (i.e. a second and a third interpretation). On a second interpretation, the axiom states that we as human persons take for granted that we have the ability and also the inclination to think that what will happen in the future (after now) follows from what we thought happened in the past (before now)—and that we have an ability and inclination to “learn” in this sense and that we take for granted of each other that we do. On a third interpretation, everything we think will happen in the future (after now) follows from what we think happened in the past (before now) and is a kind of “learning” that we take for granted of each other.
- 8.
This was used by me as an example to put into question an axiom (4.6.4) on anger, “P is angry at O, if and only if, P believes that at least one person whom P cares for has, intentionally or through neglect, been treated without respect by O, and P has not forgiven O” (Smedslund 1997, p. 53).
- 9.
Rom Harré and Michael Tissaw also refer to examples of how words used as reminders (Harré and Tissaw 2005, pp. 159, 162). Although they do not say whether such reminders are to be understood in a first-person sense as I do, judging from Harré’s social constructionist view on language and psychological terms and for example the following quote by him; it would seem that they would understand such reminders as first- and third-person: “Instead of asking the question, ‘What is anger?’ we would do well to begin by asking, ‘How is the word ‘anger,’ and other expressions around it, actually used in this or that cultural milieu and type of episode” (Harré 1986, pp. 4–5). Cf. Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations: “The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling recollections for a particular purpose” (2009/1953, §127).
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McEachrane, M. (2020). Meanings of Words and the Possibilities of Psychology: Reflections on Jan Smedslund’s Psychologic. In: Lindstad, T., Stänicke, E., Valsiner, J. (eds) Respect for Thought. Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43066-5_6
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