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The Ombud and Own-Initiative Investigation Powers

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A Manifesto for Ombudsman Reform

Abstract

This chapter argues that the ombud should be granted own-initiative powers of investigation. The case for this is four-fold: prevalence and successful experiences internationally; evidence in relation to complaining behaviour and the non-emergence of disputes; evidence in relation to under-representation of vulnerable groups; and identification of clear added-value contributions arising from own-initiative powers. The chapter explores how own-initiative powers should be calibrated and framed. International practice is analysed on investigation triggers, criteria for launching investigations and topics commonly investigated. The chapter considers three arguments against own-initiative powers—the “red-tape”, “mission drift” and “rogue ombud” arguments—and suggests that each of these can be answered through appropriate legislative framing. The chapter concludes that broad powers are required, controlled through reporting requirements that balance accountability and effectiveness.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Including: the Health Service Ombudsman, the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman, the Housing Ombudsman Service and the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education.

  2. 2.

    The committee recommended own-initiative powers in 1977, 1993 and 2014. For discussion, see Harlow (2018).

  3. 3.

    The Gordon Review proposed that a new Parliamentary Commission should be created to hold the ombudsman to account for its performance and to set its budget, while the role of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee would be focused on using intelligence produced by the ombudsman to hold government departments to account.

  4. 4.

    Proposals for more joint working between ombudsman offices and courts have previous been made by Lord Woolf in the 1990s, and more recently—in relation to ombudsman and offices and tribunals—by Sir Ernest Ryder.

  5. 5.

    For the approach used in Ontario, Canada, see Jones (2009).

  6. 6.

    The examples in the table are drawn from Diez (2018).

  7. 7.

    Again the examples in the table are from Diez (2018).

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Correspondence to Chris Gill .

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Gill, C. (2020). The Ombud and Own-Initiative Investigation Powers. In: Kirkham, R., Gill, C. (eds) A Manifesto for Ombudsman Reform. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40612-7_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40612-7_5

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-40611-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-40612-7

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

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