Abstract
The 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) leaves open the question of how best to consider alternative forms of economy, social relations and governance. In this context, finance and economics on one side and corporate law on the other must be indissolubly linked to a greater extent than in the past: the former provides the resources and the latter the legal tools to manage them. Academic discourses around sustainability issues in entrepreneurship, corporate legal models and finance remain fragmented, and each specific discipline analyses these topics from a narrow perspective. However, significant barriers between financial actors and sustainable entrepreneurs exist. Starting from this perspective, this chapter adopts a multidisciplinary approach with the aim of proposing a conceptual framework that assumes the multidisciplinary nature of sustainability.
Sections 4 and 4.1 have been written by Raffaele Felicetti, while Sects. 3 and 5 by Alessandro Rizzello. The Introduction, Sects. 2 and 6 and the Conclusions have been written by the authors jointly.
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Notes
- 1.
In the US, for example, Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, in setting out the criteria for tax exemption, specifies that in corporations, community chests, funds or foundations organized and operated exclusively for some specified purpose (e.g., religious, charitable, scientific), “no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual” shall be tax exempt.
- 2.
Doeringer observes that in the US, the UBI system (“Unrelated Business Income”)—which imposes federal income taxes on nonprofits if income is derived from a (i) trade or business; (ii) regularly carried on and (iii) not substantially related to the nonprofit’s exempt purpose—poses serious impediments to financing charity through activities that have commercial qualities (Doeringer 2010). In the same sense, Taylor 2009/2010.
- 3.
See the Complaint in United Food and Comm. Union v. Mark Zuckerberg (2018), case Id. 2018-0671. In May 2012, Facebook went public with a dual-class stock structure: high-voting Class B shares—held by Zuckerberg—that have ten votes per share, as compared to Class A shares worth only one vote each. By June 2015, Zuckerberg held 60.1% of Facebook’s voting power primarily through his massive Class B holdings while controlling less than 17% of Facebook’s total outstanding shares. In its derivative suit to challenge the restructured stock plan, United Food and Commercial Workers Union claimed that “as Zuckerberg significantly ramped up his philanthropic pursuits in 2015, it became clear that achieving his personal liquidity goals would inevitably result in the loss of his Facebook founder control. Indeed, monetizing anything more than 14% of his economic interest in Facebook would cause his voting control to dip below 50.1%, effectively passing control of the Company to Facebook’s Class A stockholders—an unacceptable result for Zuckerberg.” See paragraph 3 of the complaint.
- 4.
Problems arose, in particular, when upholding these implicit contracts would become a liability to shareholders and, thus, breaching such contracts would allow buyers to realize gains. According to Shleifer and Summers, if the incumbent managers are nonetheless committed to upholding stakeholder claims, “ousting such managers is a prerequisite to realizing the gains from breach” (Shleifer and Summers 1987). Thus, the hostile bidder had incentives in offering premia to shareholders in order to gain control of the company, while incumbents were running the risk of being removed. In other words, in these cases, the interests of incumbents and those of stakeholders were aligned—both of them risked losses as a consequence of the hostile transaction. However, managers would have had a hard time if, in resisting these bids, they used the rhetoric of maximizing shareholder value because, among other reasons, these offers indeed entailed high premia for shareholders. Thus, they started using a different narrative—that is, they also owed fiduciary duties to other constituencies (Allen and Kraakman 2016).
- 5.
Section 607.0830 (6) of the Florida Business Corporation Act states that “in discharging board or board committee duties, a director may consider such factors as the director deems relevant, including the long-term prospects and interests of the corporation and its shareholders, and the social, economic, legal, or other effects of any action on the employees, suppliers, customers of the corporation or its subsidiaries, the communities and society in which the corporation or its subsidiaries operate, and the economy of the state and the nation”.
- 6.
Section 302A.251(5) of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act provides that “in discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the corporation’s employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation”.
- 7.
Delivering value to customers, investing in employees by compensating them fairly, dealing fairly and ethically with suppliers, supporting the communities in which the companies work and generating long-term value for shareholders (see Business Roundtable 2019) are, arguably, all commitments that one would expect from a company regardless of the purpose of a corporation.
- 8.
See the European Commission Communication “Social Business Initiative”, 2011. See also Article 2 of Regulation no. 1296/2013 (so-called EaSI Regulation). See also the proposal for a Regulation on the European Social Fund Plus (FSE+) (Article 2, par. 1, n. 15).
- 9.
By definition, SEs could not pursue profit and, therefore, when they were set up as companies or co-operatives they represented an undeniable exception to the for-profit nature of companies. SEs could obviously generate revenues; what was prohibited (except for social co-operatives) was their direct or indirect distribution to the SE’s directors, shareholders, workers and so on (see Article 3 (2) of Legislative Decree no. 155 of 24 March 2006. Article 3 clearly listed the profit distributions that had to be considered “indirect”; however, it has been observed that room remained to make those indirect distributions not listed by the article (Capecchi 2007)). Profits had to be either employed for the implementation of the SE’s activity or re-invested within the SE by means of a share capital increase.
- 10.
This is the “general” limit, whose purpose is ensuring that at least more than half of the SE’s annual profits are employed for the implementation of the SE’s activity or re-invested in the SE by means of a share capital increase.
Additionally, an “individual” limit is set. In fact, SEs cannot distribute to each shareholder more than the maximum interest rate of the Italian postal savings certificates (the buoni fruttiferi postali, BFP) increased by 2.5%.
- 11.
Usually, the legislation does not foresee specific caps on profit distribution, and this has been identified as one of L3Cs’ weaknesses compared to, for example, CICs (Pearce 2013).
- 12.
Since 2008, when Vermont was the first State to adopt a statute on L3Cs (Simon 2009), other American states have allowed the establishment of limited liability companies in a low-profit form. L3Cs maintain most features of classic limited liability companies, including their flexibility, but their structure has been adapted to obtain the nonprofit–for-profit hybridization. In fact, as stated above, they may distribute profits, but nonetheless must significantly pursue charitable or educative purposes pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code.
- 13.
In the US, all benefit corporations set up pursuant to statutes relying on the Model Act are required to pursue a general public benefit. Conversely, Washington and California do not require benefit corporations to pursue a general public benefit defined by the law, but only require them to pursue a specific one, identified by the companies themselves.
These benefit corporations are called social purpose corporations (Washington) or flexible purpose corporations (California) (on this benefit corporation model, see Reiser 2012).
In Italy, benefit corporations are required to operate in a sustainable and responsible manner and to seek one or more public benefit(s), identified as the production of one or more positive effects (or the reduction of negative ones) on one or more of the categories identified by law (e.g., people, communities, environment, etc.) (see Article 1, paragraphs 376 and 378, lett. a) of Law no. 208 of 28 December 2015).
- 14.
See Report on Sustainable Finance - 2018/2007(INI) adopted by the European Parliament on 4 May 2018.
- 15.
See the company’s website at https://www.laureate.net/aboutlaureate/ (last visited 8 November 2019).
- 16.
See B Lab’s website https://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-corp?field_bcorp_certified_value=&state=&title=&submit2=Go&sort_by=title&sort_order=ASC&op=Go (last visited 8 November 2019).
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Felicetti, R., Rizzello, A. (2020). Financing Sustainable Goals: Economic and Legal Implications. In: La Torre, M., Chiappini, H. (eds) Contemporary Issues in Sustainable Finance. Palgrave Studies in Impact Finance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40248-8_2
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