Abstract
What if political right, or fundamental law, were a distant star already dead, but whose brilliance we still capture in a world submitted, however, to a very distinct kind of domination, predominantly managerial and administrative in nature? This is the disturbing hypothesis that Martin Loughlin advances in his work on the formation and decline of political right, a discipline that emerged at the dawn of modernity in order to frame the legal and political rationality of national and centralized states, but which would subsequently be dislodged by the gradual establishment of constitutional legality and administrative rationality.
If in drawing this decline the work of Loughlin has a somewhat archaeological inclination, the truth is that at the same time it provides us with a relevant proposal for understanding current constitutional theory and law, that is, the hypothesis of a dualist structure of the main concepts that make up public law and the constitutional state. This structure ultimately depends on a distinction between what is constitutive and what is constituted in a political community, and even more so on the hypothesis that this distinction is itself constitutive of the very possibility of a political community.
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. Loughlin (2018a), p. 1; idem, “Fundamental Law”, in this volume.
- 2.
Cf. Loughlin (2009), p. 10.
- 3.
Fundamental law is the core of public law, the subject of Martin Loughlin investigation, and a specific modern concept, not to be confused with the fundamental law of medieval times, which was understood as “natural law, a type of law regarded as ‘higher’ than and prior to ordinary (or positive) law”: cf. Loughlin (2018a), p. 12.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
As he himself acknowledges in the preface to Political Jurisprudence (2018a), p. 1, “I have recently been writing about constitutions, but the preliminaries keep getting in the way. By this I mean the most basic elements that establish the authority of the office of government”.
- 7.
Cf. Loughlin (2010), p. 48.
- 8.
It is not by chance that Loughlin quotes Claude Lefort precisely in the context of considerations of the persistence of religion in secularized societies referred to in the text: cf. Loughlin (2010), p. 48, note 169.
- 9.
Cf. Lefort (1986), pp. 279–280; Lefort (1988), pp. 216–217. Claude Lefort’s claim that “the domain known as ‘the political’ does not result from methodological criteria alone” (cf. op. cit., p. 279) seems to contradict Schmitt’s famous thesis according to which the political is founded on the distinction between friend and enemy. It seems that “politics” according to Lefort corresponds to “the political” according to Schmitt. This is not the case: as clarified by Loughlin, when Schmitt says that the political is founded on the distinction between friend and enemy he is not concerned with conflict or the practices of politics—which Loughlin calls “the second order of the political”—but with a “first order phenomenon: the concept of the political itself”. The important point here is to stress that the political points to the most intense and extreme antagonism as an inescapable aspect of the human condition: see Loughlin (2003), p. 33.
- 10.
Cf. Minkkinen (2018), p. 54.
- 11.
Cf. Steinmetz-Jenkins (2009), p. 105.
- 12.
According to Schmitt, “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development- in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver-but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology”: cf. Schmitt (2009), p. 43.
- 13.
Cf. Lefort (1986), p. 291: “We have for a long time concentrated upon this singularity of modern democracy: of all the regimes of which we know, it is the only one to have represented power in such a way as to show that power is an empty place and to have thereby maintained a gap between the symbolic and the real”.
- 14.
Cf. de Brito (2014), p. 334. Schmitt seems sometimes to acknowledge this impossibility, as when he says that “In the struggle of opposing interests and coalitions, absolute monarchy made the decision and thereby created the unity of the state. The unity that a people represents does not possess this decisionist character; it is an organic unity, and with national consciousness the ideas of the state originated as an organic whole. The theistic as well as the deistic concepts of God become thus unintelligible for political metaphysics” (cf. Schmitt 2009, p. 49).
- 15.
“cosa piú necessaria in uno vivere comune, o sètta o regno o republica che sia, che rendergli quella riputazione ch’egli aveva ne’ principii suoi”.
- 16.
Cf. Loughlin (2010), p. 104.
- 17.
Cf. Loughlin (2010), p. 106.
- 18.
Cf. Balibar (2005), p. 72: “La question n’est pas en effet de donner une justification du droit, mais de former une idée adéquate de ses déterminations, de la façon dont il opère. Et la formule de Spinoza signifie d’abord, à cet égard, que le droit de l’individu inclut tout ce qu’il est effectivement capable de faire et de penser dans des conditions données”. See also, Curley (1995), p. 322.
- 19.
- 20.
Cf. Loughlin (2010), pp. 432, 448, 463.
- 21.
Cf. Loughlin (2010), pp. 12–13, 428.
- 22.
As noted by Koekkoek (2014), p. 335 Schmitt’s condemnation of Spinoza arises particularly impressively in the assertion that “The most audacious insult ever to be inflicted upon God and man, and which justifies all the synagogue’s curses, lies in the ‘sive’ of the formula: Deus sive natura”. Cf. Schmitt (2015), p. 22.
- 23.
See also Del Lucchese (2016), pp. 188–189. The parallelism between Spinoza and Sieyès is expressly established by Schmitt, when the latter states that “In some of Sieyès’s writings, the ‘pouvoir constituant’ appears in its relationship to every ‘pouvoirs constitués’ as a metaphysical analogy to the ‘natura naturans’ and its relationship to the ‘natura naturata’ of Spinoza’s theory. It is an inexhaustible source of all forms without taking a form itself, forever producing new forms out of itself, building all forms, yet doing so without form itself (cf. die Diktatur, p. 142). But it is necessary to distinguish the positive theory of the constitution-making power, which inheres in every constitutional theory, from the pantheist metaphysic. They are in no way identical with one another. The metaphysic of the potesta constituens as well as that of the analogy to the natura naturans is part of the theory of political theology”: cf. Schmitt (2010), pp. 79–80; Schmitt (2008), p. 128.
- 24.
Cf. Spinoza [2008, pp. 80–81, 83 (Cap. II; 4-5, 8)].
- 25.
Cf. de Brito (2000), p. 383.
- 26.
- 27.
Cf. Loughlin (2015a), p. 76. See, also, Loughlin (2017b), p. 582: “In The ‘Nomos’ of the Earth he [Schmitt] shows the distinctive contribution that nomos makes to the establishment of political order. The most basic claim is that law is tied to space, that is, to a defined and bounded territory that distinguishes inside and out- side. Without this boundary, there can be no domain of the political. In this respect, it might be said that nomos is constitutive of the political”.
- 28.
Cf. Schmitt (2003), p. 347.
- 29.
Cf. Del Lucchese (2016), p. 188. It is however doubtful whether he gives the right answers. According to Lucchese, “Spinoza actually maintains a radical and original idea of constituent power, an idea that provides a solution for the paradox implicit in its modern definition. Spinoza’s concept of jus sive potentia implies a redefinition of the relationship between factual and normative whereby it is not possible to imagine a relationship of priority or superiority between constituent power and constituted power. It is only through a radical immanence that one can confront the law’s claim to obliterate constituent power. Spinoza’s philosophy allows to clarify the paradox implicit in the traditional definition of constituent power”. As he further says, “the only way to avoid violent revolutions is to maintain a state of permanent revolution, namely a situation in which the juridical does not detach itself from the factual from which it arises, but instead gives it life, in and through collaborative and conflicting relationships among subjects” (2016), pp. 188, 200. As one can see, in Lucchese’s account Spinoza does not exactly solves the paradox of constituent power, as eliminates it, by denying any meaningful role to the constituted powers.
- 30.
Cf. Mignini (2000), p. 406.
- 31.
This importance seems undeniable, even if one rejects the extreme points of view defended by such authors as Antonio Negri: cf. Aurélio (2014), p. 379 ff.
- 32.
- 33.
Despite some suggestions to the contrary: cf. Milbanks (2010), p. 28.
- 34.
Cf. Schmitt (2009), p. 52: “Der Souverän, der im deistischen Weltbild, wenn auch außerhalb der Welt, so doch als Monteur der großen Maschine geblieben war, wird radikal verdrängt. Die Maschine läuft jetzt von selbst”.
- 35.
- 36.
- 37.
Cf. Graeber and Sahlins (2017), pp. 2–3, 23.
- 38.
- 39.
Cf. Schmitt (2009), p. 18: “der Staat bestehen bleibt, während das Recht zurücktritt”.
- 40.
- 41.
- 42.
Cf. Loughlin (2003), p. 163.
- 43.
Cf. Loughlin (2018a), p. 142.
- 44.
- 45.
- 46.
The text obviously alludes to the famous Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s dictum (2006), p. 112.
- 47.
In comparison, it seems to me less relevant Emilios Chistodoulidis’s observation that the autonomy between the legal and political systems in Luhmann’s perspective [see Luhmann (2004), p. 364] is called into question by a concept of State, such as the one Loughlin has in mind, that is both political and legal [cf. Chistodoulidis (2008), p. 38]. As noted by Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law “presents a modern account of the discipline”, and if this account has been overcome by the late-modern world along the lines described by Luhmann this requires “a radical shift in thought about government, power, regulation and agency” [cf. Loughlin (2016), p. 60]. In fact, one could even claim that this shift is precisely the consequence of Loughlin’s diagnosis of the decline of public law in the transition from modernity to late-modernity.
- 48.
- 49.
Cf. Tuori (2015), p. 21 ff., who recognizes Luhmann’s influence.
- 50.
On the concept of governance and its disposition to thinking about politics as an area of administration and management, cf. Wendy Brown (2015), p. 122 ff.
- 51.
This problematic relationship is expressed by Everson and Eisner (2007), p. 27, as follows: “European integration has heralded the passing of majoritarian politics, or conventionally legitimated democracy, not simply because it has introduced elements of technocratic rule within its supranational governance structures, but because it has dispensed with demos and thus has equally dispensed with the very foundation for legitimizing political representation”. Instead, what would be at stake would be a democracy based on the opening of the political decision-making process to the manifestation of all relevant interests [see, also, Zielonka (2006), p. 117 ff.]. According to these conceptions what seems to await us is “protestation after the event, not representation before it, as the future political norm” [cf. Anderson (2009), p. 117].
- 52.
I identified these traits and tried to develop their theoretical foundations in de Brito (2016), pp. 825–826.
- 53.
- 54.
Cf. Moyn (2008), p. 71 ff. I have tried to present that contrast in de Brito (2000), p. 99. Lefort appears to side with Arendt, and against Schmitt, on this issue, [in this sense see Steinmetz-Jenkins (2009), p. 112]. But this is not entirely clear as made evident by Lefort’s recognition of the affinity between the political and the religious in what concerns the presence of the symbolical [see Lefort (1986), pp. 286, 292]. What seems more problematic, to my view, is the rapprochement between Schmitt and Arendt tempted by Loughlin (2015a), p. 91 ff.
- 55.
Cf. Arendt (1990), p. 255 ff.
- 56.
Cf. Loughlin (2003), p. 70.
- 57.
This is not to deny that it also appears to exist, as I have mentioned in the text, a continuity between divine authority and governmental rationality.
- 58.
Cf. Nietzsche (1995), p. 254: “To briefly repeat what I have said: the interests of tutelary government and the interests of religion go hand in hand with each other, so that if the latter begins to die out, the foundation of the state will also be deeply shaken. The belief in a divine order of political things, in a mystery concerning the existence of the state, is of religious origin: if religion vanishes, the state will inevitably lose its ancient Isis veil and no longer arouse reverence. Seen from nearby, the sovereignty of the people also serves to scare away the last traces of magic and superstition from this realm of feelings; modern democracy is the historical form of the decline of the state”.
- 59.
As was also suggested by Nietzsche. Although he affirmed that the prospect of the decline of the state is “not in every respect an unhappy one” (1995, p. 254), he also cautioned: “To work toward the diffusion and realization of this idea is admittedly something else: we would have to be quite arrogant about our rational capacity and hardly understand history halfway to put our hand to the plow right away—at a point when nobody can yet exhibit the seeds that later are to be strewn upon the rended earth. Let us therefore trust to ‘the cleverness and self-interest of human beings’ that the state will still persist for a good while yet and that the destructive experiments of overzealous and premature half-knowers will be repelled!” (1995, p. 255).
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de Brito, M.N. (2020). Expanding Legality and Losing Fundamental Law: On Martin Loughlin’s Dualist Conception of Public Law. In: Nogueira de Brito, M., Pereira Coutinho, L. (eds) The Political Dimension of Constitutional Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38459-3_3
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