Abstract
Democratic deliberation assumes and requires agents capable of rational, autonomous reasoning and judgment. Decades of research from psychology suggests that the agent required for deliberation may not, however, exist. The phenomenon of motivated reasoning poses a special challenge to democratic deliberation: it fundamentally undermines the idea that individuals are the originators of their reasons and that they can communicate those reasons to others.
In this chapter I ask “Can we deliberate?” I argue that motivated reasoning poses a critical challenge to democratic deliberation, especially to the capacity of autonomy required for deliberation, but one that can be overcome through personal practices and institutional design. So, rather than abandon democratic deliberation because of the challenges raised by motivated reasoning, proponents of this approach to political decision making should use findings from social and political psychology as a tool. With an understanding of motivated reasoning in hand, what it is and how it works, theorists and practitioners of deliberation can produce better deliberative practices and institutions that include mechanisms to protect and enhance the critical capacities of rationality and autonomy.
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Moscrop, D.R.H. (2021). Can We Deliberate? How Motivated Reasoning Undermines Democratic Deliberation and What WeCan Do About It. In: Sinnott, J.D., Rabin, J.S. (eds) The Psychology of Political Behavior in a Time of Change. Identity in a Changing World. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38270-4_18
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