Abstract
My goal is to address one of the most common objections to a view called neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism (henceforth: “Aristotelian naturalism”). G. E. M. Anscombe (1981) is sometimes seen as the spearhead of this view in contemporary Anglophone philosophy, but it was developed into its currently recognizable form primarily by Philippa Foot (especially 2001, 2004), Rosalind Hursthouse (1999, 2012) and Michael Thompson (1995, 2004, 2008). As neo-Aristotelians, they hold that ethics is aimed at human flourishing, and that human flourishing involves living virtuously. As ethical naturalists, they hold that the traditional table of moral virtues are natural excellences, where what counts as a natural excellence is determined by facts about human nature. I will simplify this roughly as the claim that ethical goodness is a kind of natural goodness. I will call this the core thesis.
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Notes
- 1.
For simplicity, I will also frequently refer to neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalists simply as “Aristotelians,” mindful that that not all neo-Aristotelians would identify as neo-Aristotelian naturalists.
- 2.
- 3.
Foot (2001, 30) goes further than Thompson in distinguishing between mere divergence from what typifies a life form from divergence in a way that implies harm. The second she labels defect; the first counts only as abnormality.
- 4.
See also Thompson (2004), 59.
- 5.
See also Copp and Sobel (2004), 543.
- 6.
- 7.
Although Foot focuses on these three categories of reasons, she also thinks there could be other distinct sources of reasons, such as family or friendship relations (Foot 2004, 9).
- 8.
- 9.
See also Roger Teichmann (2011, xviii) who, though Aristotelian in bent himself, is suspicious of identifying reason-related normativity with that found woven into Aristotelian naturalism’s life form system.
- 10.
I am not suggesting the natural/normative distinction is identical to the fact/value distinction, but I do think they are similarly motivated.
- 11.
Joseph Raz (1999), 67, voices this understanding when he says that “[t]he normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons.” Other examples are easy to find. For a small sample, see Broome (2013), Scanlon (2014, p. 2), Korsgaard (1996), 8, and Wedgewood (2007), 23.
- 12.
- 13.
Philippa Foot (2001), 47, clearly notes this parity when she says: “The meaning of the words ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is not different when used of features of plants on the one hand and humans on the other, but is rather the same as applied, in judgments of natural goodness and defect, in the case of all living things.”
- 14.
Some will disagree. For example, one might hold that P1 looks less plausible if we include in our discussion reasons for attitudes along with reasons for action. One might think, for example, that even if there are natural-normative judgments that give us no reason to act, in the ordinary sense, they may still give us no reason to adopt certain attitudes toward goodness or defect. If so, then my defense of P2 fails. I do not have space to address this criticism properly. I will say only that even if one can show that all natural-normative judgments are practical, this does not show that natural-normative judgments are logically entailed by NH-judgments, as Aristotelian naturalists claim. For, I think that practical-normative concepts are still conceptually distinct from evaluative concepts. The only other way I know how to defend this is to show that reasons make sense only within a practical or agential standpoint, whereas evaluative concepts, such as the concept of natural goodness, are perfectly at home within a non-practical or non-agential standpoint. Having opened that can of worms, I shall now leave it alone. I thank Nathan Carson for discussion on this point.
- 15.
Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, associates goodness with the desirable. For example, in Summa Theologica Part I, Question 5, Article 1, he says “The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): ‘Goodness is what all desire’” (Aquinas 2008). See also Stump (2005), 62.
- 16.
- 17.
See Lott (2014), 772.
- 18.
For full details, see Parish (2017), Chapter 3, Section 4.
- 19.
- 20.
See Parish (2017), Chapter 3, Section 4.
- 21.
See Parish (2017), Chapters 4 and 5.
- 22.
- 23.
Mark LeBar (2013) has also developed an approach he calls “Aristotelian constructivism.” However, his view would not be congenial to the Foot-Thompson-Hursthouse-style of Aristotelian naturalism, as he thinks there are no truths about living well as a human being that are both general and substantive enough to be useful for ethical purposes (LeBar 2013, 100).
- 24.
This paper presents in revised and sharpened form some arguments originally developed in my doctoral dissertation. I especially wish to thank my advisor, Linda Zagzebski, for ongoing support and feedback, and my committee members, Luis Cortest, Stephen Ellis, Neal Judisch and Nancy Snow for insightful comments and criticisms. My thinking on this topic has also benefited greatly from discussions with many friends and colleagues. I especially wish to thank Nathan Carson, Everett Fulmer, Jonathan Nelson and Benjamin Polanski.
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Parish, M. (2020). Why Should We Care About Human Nature?. In: Hähnel, M. (eds) Aristotelian Naturalism. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37576-8_21
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