Abstract
The populist aim of rebuilding the state on the true will of the sovereign people cannot succeed without a specific constitutional approach towards public budgeting. The budget, in fact, is a tool enabling governments to meet people’s needs, thus bringing about a different degree of economic and social rights protection. Populist coalitions tend to oppose strict balanced budget rules insofar as they are used to override the putative popular will to found a new social order. In Italy, budget constraints, as enshrined into Articles 81, 97 and 119 of the Constitution under the government of Mario Monti, are perceived as an irrational set of rigid rules imposed by foreign countries and supranational organizations with no democratic legitimacy. The legal resentment against “external constraints”, however, is not just a feature of self-proclaimed populist cabinets such as the first Conte government, but has been shared by several recent cabinets, led by Mr Berlusconi and Mr Renzi. This resentment kept together both right- and left-wing parties, which are keen on pursuing short-sighted economic policies, aimed at steering spending to please single and often contradictory popular interests with no regard for their financial and social effects. This phenomenon triggered a substantive change of the constitutional framework: parliamentary debate has been swept away by the executive branch, the functioning of the fiscal council has been put to an indefinite rest, and derogation from a balanced budget has become the rule rather than the exception. At present, only the Constitutional Court appears to stand up to counter a trend on the basis of which legislative discretion by the ruling majority is raised to the rank of an intangible constitutional rule.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Italian Constitutional Court, inter alia see: Judgments No. 9/1958, No. 7/1959 and 16/1961.
- 2.
Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 1/1966, according to which the Constitution does not require “a fiscal policy based upon an automatic balanced budget rule, but on the contrary mandates the achievement of an overall budgetary equilibrium […] which therefore does not rule out a budget deficit” (translation by the author).
- 3.
Article 3, para. 2 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), in particular, mandated that the rule limiting the structural budget deficit to 0.5 per cent GDP took effect in the national law “through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budget process”.
- 4.
Cf. Article 3, para. 2 of Law No. 243/2012 (implementing new Article 81 (6) IC), which stipulates that “the balancing of budgets corresponds to the medium-term objective (MTO)”, which in turn is defined by Article 2, para. 1, lett. e) as “the value of the structural balance determined using the criteria established in EU Law”.
- 5.
See the draft proposal No. 291 submitted to the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati) and the draft proposal No. 321 submitted to the Senate of the Republic (Senato della Repubblica) during the current parliamentary term. Both bills are aimed at repealing Articles 11, 97, 117, para. 1 and 119 IC insofar as they mandate the supremacy of EU Law and international treaty law over domestic law.
- 6.
Italy accuses Brussels of “shaky” accounting, in: www.ft.com, November 20, 2014, and The EU must rationalise its rules on national deficits, in: www.ft.com, June 6, 2019 (last accessed on September 30, 2019).
- 7.
See the message sent by the Italian President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, to the 45th edition of The European House—Ambrosetti Forum in Villa d’Este on Lake Como, available at: https://www.quirinale.it/elementi/35612 (last accessed on September 30, 2019).
- 8.
In this respect, see also the proposal to protect investments linked to climate action made by the new Minister of Economy and Finance, Roberto Gualtieri, and put forward before the Eurogroup convening in Helsinki on September 13, 2019. Originally, the European Fiscal Board (EFB), in its assessment on the EU fiscal rules published on September 11, 2019, available at: www.ec.europa.eu, only vaguely suggested that in well-defined areas a “golden rule” could apply, yet under a strict monitoring system involving EU bodies. Cf. Bartolucci (2019).
- 9.
In this respect see the critical appraisal of the German Council of Economic Experts—Setting the Right Course for Economic Policy—Annual Report 2018/2019, in: www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de, 7 November 2018, 36–38.
- 10.
This idea has been first explicitly endorsed by the Italian Constitutional Court in its Judgment No. 184/2016, according to which “the budget is a ‘public good’ aimed at summarizing and providing certainty to the choices made by a territorial authority with regard both to the collection of revenues and to the implementation of public policies. Those carrying out an electoral mandate are in fact under the imperative duty of undergoing an assessment comparing what is promised with what is achieved” (translation by the author). This principle has been upheld and further elaborated by the Court in the subsequent Judgments, No. 228/2017, 247/2017 and No. 49/2018.
- 11.
Quite ironically, this term was coined by the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George to refer to the budgetary draft law proposed by his liberal government with the aim of bringing about substantial wealth redistribution in the country and “eliminating poverty”, a statement which also Italian Minister of Labour, Luigi di Maio, dared to make in 2018. The draft law was passed by the House of Commons in 1909, but was firmly rejected by the unelected House of Lords in 1910, thus causing a deep parliamentary crisis. The crisis was overcome in 1911 with the restriction of the Lords’ powers and the reaffirmation of the Common’s supremacy. (M. Russell, 2013: 27).
- 12.
Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 165/1963, whereby “[former] Article 81 (1) IC accorded constitutional legal force to a normative accounting standard of the Italian pre-republican legal order, according to which the two Houses of Parliament are entrusted with the primary power to authorise the collection of taxes from the citizens as well as with that of controlling over public expenditures” (translation by the author).
References
Algebris Policy & Research Forum (Ed.). (2019, September). Budgeting for Uncertainty. Time for Eurozone Fiscal Risk Sharing, Issue 3. Available at: www.media.algrebris.com
Alvar Garcia, H. (2019). Neoliberalism as a Form of Authoritarian Constitutionalism. In G. Frankenberg & H. A. Garcia (Eds.), Authoritarian Constitutionalism. Comparative Analysis and Critique (pp. 37–56). Elgar: Cheltenham/Northampton.
Bartole, S. (2004). Interpretazioni e trasformazioni della Costituzione repubblicana. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Bartolucci, L. (2018). Sugli effetti di una ipotizzata rimozione delle “clausole europee” dalla Costituzione. Osservatorio sulle Fonti, 3, 1–14. Available at https://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it.
Bartolucci, L. (2019). La riforma delle regole fiscali europee: la proposta dello European Fiscal Board. Forum di Quaderni costituzionali (10), pp. 1–18. Available at: https://www.forumcostituzionale.it
Begg, I., & Featherstone, K. (2018). From ‘Vincolo Esterno’ to ‘Nemico Esterno’: The Disturbing New Demonisation of the EU. LSE Blogs. Available at: https://www.blogs.lse.ac.uk
Bellamy, R. (2007). Political Constitutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bergonzini, C. (2014). Parlamento e decisioni di bilancio. Milano: Giuffrè.
Bilancia, F. (2018). The Italian Constitutional Conundrum and the Rise of Populism. The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society, pp. 2–7. Available at: https://www.fljs.org
Blanchard, O., & Giavazzi, F. (2004). Improving the SGP Through a Proper Accounting of Public Investment. Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 4220.
Blokker, P. (2017). Populist Constitutionalism. I·CONnect. Available at: https://www.iconnectblog.com
Boggero, G., & Annicchino, P. (2014). Who Will Ever Kick Us Out? Italy, the Balanced Budget Rule and the Implementation of the Fiscal Compact. European Public Law, 20(2), 247–261.
Bognetti, G. (1995). La Costituzione economica italiana. Milano: Giuffrè.
Buchanan, J. M., & Wagner, R. E. (1977/2000). Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes. In H. G. Brennan, H. Kliemt, & R. D. Tollison (Eds.), The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan (Vol. 8). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Camera dei Deputati (Ed.). (2019). Osservatorio sulla legislazione, Rapporto 2017–2018. Available at: www.camera.it
Carli, G. (1996). Cinquant’anni di vita italiana. Bari: Laterza.
Choudhry, S. (2018). Constitutional Resilience to Populism: Four Theses. Verfassungsblog.de, Available at: https://www.verfassungsblog.de
Curreri, S. (2019). L’occasione persa (prime note sull’ordinanza n. 17/2019 della Corte costituzionale). Federalismi.it, 4, pp. 1–9. Available at: https://www.federalismi.it
De Filio, G., & Vicchiarello, P. (2018). La strettoia. La copertura finanziaria come strumento di contenimento dell’attività legislativa di iniziativa parlamentare. Napoli: Jovene.
De Lungo, D. (2013). Tendenze e prospettive evolutive del maxiemendamento nell’esperienza della XV e della XVI legislatura. Rivista AIC, 3, pp. 1–13. Available at: https://www.rivistaaic.it
Delledonne, G. (2014). A Legalization of Financial Constitutions in the EU? Reflections on the German, Italian, Spanish and French Experience. In M. Adams, F. Fabbrini, & S. Larouche (Eds.), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (pp. 181–204). Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing.
Di Porto, V. (2017). La problematica prassi dei maxiemendamenti dei maxiemendamenti e il dialogo a distanza tra Corte costituzionale e Comitato per la legislazione. In V. Lippolis & N. Lupo (Eds.), Il Parlamento dopo il referendum costituzionale (Il Filangieri. Quaderno 2015–2016) (pp. 103–115). Jovene: Napoli.
Dickie, J. (2001). The Notion of Italy. In Z. G. Baranski & R. J. West (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Modern Italian Culture (pp. 17–33). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dornbusch, R., & Edwards, S. (1991). The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Einaudi, L. (1956). Lo Scrittoio del Presidente. Torino: Einaudi.
Francaviglia, M. (2019). Populismo, Costituzione e decisione di spesa pubblica: c’è spazio per le future generazioni? In G. Allegri, A. Sterpa, & N. Viceconte (Eds.), Questioni costituzionali al tempo del populismo e del sovranismo (p. 2019). Napoli: Jovene.
Gianniti, L. (2011). Il pareggio di bilancio nei lavori della Costituente. Astrid Rassegna. Available at: https://www.astrid-online.it
Ifo Institute (Ed.). (2017). Economic Policy and the Rise of Populism – It’s Not So Simple. The EEAG Report on the European Economy, Munich. Available at: www.cesifo-group.de
Lupo, N. (2019). Populismo legislativo?: continuità e discontinuità nelle tendenze della legislazione italiana. Ragion Pratica, 52, 251–271.
Miglio, A. (2019). Le incertezze dell’Italexit tra regole costituzionali interne e diritto dell’Unione europea. Federalismi.it, 12, pp. 1–30. Available at: https://www.federalismi.it
Modugno, F. (1979). È illegittimo l’art. 189 del Trattato di Roma nella interpretazione della Corte di giustizia delle Comunità europee? Giurisprudenza costituzionale, 24(1), 916–938.
Morrone, A. (2019). Lucciole per lanterne. La n. 17/2019 e la terra promessa di quote di potere per il singolo parlamentare. Federalismi.it, 4, pp. 1–9. Available at: https://www.federalismi.it
Mostacci, E. (2016). From the Ideological Neutrality to the Neoclassical Inspiration: The Evolution of the Italian Constitutional Law of Debt and Deficit. In F. L. Morrison (Ed.), Fiscal Rules – Limits on Governmental Deficits and Debt (pp. 173–204). Cham: Springer International.
Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563.
Onida, V. (1969). Le leggi di spesa nella Costituzione. Milano: Giuffrè.
Pistorio, G. (2018). Maxi-emendamento e questione di fiducia. Napoli: ES.
Portinaro, P. (2018). Le mani su Machiavelli. Critica dell’Italian Theory. Roma: Donzelli.
Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Russell, M. (2013). The Contemporary House of Lords: Westminster Bicameralism Revived. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sajò, A., & Uitz, R. (2017). The Constitution of Freedom. An Introduction to Legal Constitutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Santagostino, A. (2017). Luigi Einaudi, the Father of the Fathers of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Scaccia, G. (2012). La giustiziabilità della regola del pareggio di bilancio. In V. Lippolis, N. Lupo, G. Salerno, & G. Scaccia (Eds.), Costituzione e pareggio di bilancio (Il Filangieri. Quaderno 2011) (pp. 211–248). Jovene: Napoli.
Sorrentino, F. (2019). La legge di bilancio tra Governo e Corte costituzionale: il Parlamento approva a scatola chiusa. Federalismi.it, 4, pp. 1–6. Available at: https://www.federalismi.it
Tanzi, V. (2018). Termites of the State: Why Complexity Leads to Inequality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vernata, A. (2017). L’Ufficio parlamentare di bilancio. Diritto pubblico, 23(2), 469–514.
Vermeule, A. (2019). All Human Conflict Is Ultimately Theological. Church Life Journal – University of Notre Dame. Available at: https://www.churchlifejournal.nd.eu
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Boggero, G. (2020). “Kicking the Can Down the Road” Deferring Fiscal Adjustment as a Premise for Italian Budgetary Populism. In: Delledonne, G., Martinico, G., Monti, M., Pacini, F. (eds) Italian Populism and Constitutional Law. Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37401-3_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37401-3_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-37400-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-37401-3
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)