From Agent to Active Sense: Was There an Augustinianism-Averroisant?

Silva, José Filipe

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-35304-9_5

José Filipe Silva⁵

Part of the book series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind ((SHPM,volume 23))

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1 Citations

Abstract

Medieval Augustinians developed an account of perception aligned with the central theses of Augustine’s philosophy of perception. According to this theory, in perception the soul is the agent of its own perceptual acts. At the same time, some medieval thinkers followed Averroes in defending the existence of an agent sense in addition to the traditional five external senses to explain how perception is possible. Debates issued not only about the existence of such a sense, but also about whether it is internal or external to the perceiving subject. The purpose of this article is not to investigate this active model of perception as such. Instead, the aim is to show the connection between this Averroist model and the Augustinian philosophy of perception in their common goal of denying to the object the role of efficient cause of perception.

The author would like to acknowledge the funding from the European Research Council under the ERC grant agreement n. 637747 for the project “Rationality in Perception: Transformations of Mind and Cognition 1250–1550”. Many thanks also to Ana Mar´ıa Mora-M´arquez and the audience in Ostrava for the many comments and suggestions.

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Notes

1.
Cf. Augustine, De quantitate animae, XXX, 59.
2.
“Telle est l’hypoth`ese que, sur un point unique, nous voudrions soumettre `a l’´epreuve des faits, en recherchant quelle influence la pens´ee d’Avicenne peut avoir exerc´ee sur les destins de l’augustinisme m´edi´eval.” (Gilson 1926, 7)
3.
I therefore side with Mahoney (1971), and against South (2002).
4.
This awareness of awareness, as well as the distinction between the form of the thing in the thing and the form of the thing in the sense, are rational events.
5.
See Silva (2012); Silva and Yrjönsuuri (2014) for references and a detailed examination of these claims; see also Silva and Toivanen (2010).
6.
Whether or not it suffices to avoid this accusation of crossing ontological orders in causation, in order to claim, as Albert the Great does, that “sensible things do not act upon the soul, but only in the bodily organs […] the organs however are animated and therefore the motion from the sensible thing reaches the soul” (In De anima, II, 3, 1, 98), is another question.
7.
See for instance the interesting passage from Peter of Auvergne published in Pattin and quoted by Biard (2005, n.14), clearly associating the activity of the soul and its nobility in both Averroes and Augustine (interestingly enough Aristotle is also brought into the mix).
8.
See Brenet (2014).
9.
See Brenet (2014, 150).
10.
John of Jandun, In De anima, 32r–37v.
11.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 32vb: “Quidam autem modernorum doctorum in filosofia inquisiverunt de ista quaestione, & post multam disputationem & considerationem determinaverunt eam ad partem negativam, dicentes in anima sensitiva nullum esse sensum activum ipsis sensationis.”
12.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 32vb: “[…] sed omnes virtutes ipsius animae sensitivae esse passivas a sensibilibus.”
13.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 32vb: “[…] si esset sensus agens, tunc contingeret animal sentire absente sensibili.”
14.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 32va: “Sed, si quaeritur ab eis, quid sit immediatum per se principium activum sensationis, ipsi multum diversificat in hoc. Dicit enim unus & Prior, quod species rei sensibilis est immediatum per se principium activum ipsius sensationis, eo modo quo actus secundus indiget agente, sicut etiam species intelligibilis est immediatum principium & activum & elicitivum intellectionis.”
15.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 32va: “[…] species rei seu formae sensibilis non est simpliciter nobilior quam virtus animae sensitiuae […] species sensibilis est quodam accidens”. The argument could also be formulated (as Jandun does) by appealing to two central assumptions: that to bring about its own act is superior to being actualized by something else; and that to be active with respect to another is superior to receiving something from another, i.e., to produce a change is superior to being acted upon.
16.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 33ra: “[…] necesse est in anima sensitiva esse virtutem naturalem per se activam sensationis”.
17.
Cf. John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 32rb.
18.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 32va: “[…] sensatio necessario indiget aliquo per se principio actiuo immediato”.
19.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 32va: “Et dico ad presens, sicut alias dixi, quod necesse est in anima sensitiua esse virtutem naturalem pe se actiuam sensationis. & haec potest vocari sensus actiuus”.
20.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 33rb: “Alius vero sociorum nostrorum, de quo tactum est, dixit, quod sensatio non indiget aliquo per se principio activo & quod ipse sensus non est in potentia essentiali ad ipsum sentire. Sed salva amicitia eius mihi videtur quod ipse peccat, quia, cum sensatio seu sentire sit finis per se intentus a natura animalis, necesse est ipsum habere in animali causam per se agentem.”
21.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 32va: “[…] ipsa sensatio est quidam effectus per se intentus ab animali […] naturae est quid per se intentum ab illa natura […] sentire est finis ipsius animalis”.
22.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 33vb: “Item, in verbis istius, si bene considerantur, conceditur nostrum propositum, dicit enim quod, cum sensus habuerit in organo suo speciem representantem ipsum sensibile, exibit sensus in actum suum de se absque quod ad actionem transmutetur ab aliquo per se agente, ita quod suum actum eliciet ex sui natura.” (Emphasis added).
23.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 33ra: “[…] ergo sensus est per se activus sui actus. & sic habeo, quod sensatio dependet ab aliquo principio activo per se”. Jandun scornfully dismisses the view according to which the agent sense would act directly upon the external thing in order to make it generate its representations (intentiones seu species) (q.16, 32vb).
24.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 33rb: “Sed pono virtutem naturalem animae omnino effectivam huius actus, qui est sentire”.
25.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 33ra: “[…] species sensibilis est immediatum per se principium receptivum sensationis seu ipsius sentire”.
26.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 33rb: “Istis rationibus coniunctis dico, quod necesse est esse sensum agentem modo predicto, scilicet, quod est immediatum principium activum sensationis in sensu passivo disposito speciem rei sensibilis a sensibili generato.” On a similar reading, see Brenet (2003, 182).
27.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 33vb: “Ex his arguo sic, si species sensibilis non est per se principium actiuum sensationis, necesse est ut sensus agens fit eius actiuus”. On how this model is seen to transfer to the passive sense-agent sense relation, with special focus on Zabarella, see South (2002, 19–20).
28.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 33vb: “[…] sensus nunquam recipiat actum sentiendi sine specie rei sensibilis”. See also q.16, 35vb, where Averroes argues against a completely active sense, like the view proposed by the Ancients (sicut dixerunt antiqui).
29.
The overall claim, then, is that there are only five external senses, but that each of these has a passive and an agent sense: “[…] unicuique sensui passiuo correspondet virtus actiua sensationis” (q.16, 34rb); “[…] sensus actiuus est in eodem organo cum passiuo” (q.16, 34va); the agent sense is not an extra sense, a sixth sense as it were, above and beyond the five sense modalities established by Aristotle, but an aspect of any sense modality.
30.
John of Jandun, In De anima, q.16, 33vb: “[continuation of the text quoted in footnote 22] recipitur huiusmodi actus in quadam alia virtute naturali animae informata & preparata specie rei sensibilis, quae ipsum sensibile representat”.
31.
Cf. Averroes, In De anima, II, comm. 37; see Sobol (1984), lxxix. On the distinction between the two issues, see Sobol (1984), lxxxi.
32.
Jandun explicitly asserts that the reason why Averroes introduced the issue of the agent sense was because he took as a fact that the object cannot move the senses (to actual sensation); see q.16, 35rb.
33.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 241–260); edited as question 9 of Book II by Peter Sobol in Sobol (1984, 124–145).
34.
John Buridan In De anima (ed. Pattin, 241): “[…] manifestum quod Aristoteles volens declarare quod anima est causa corporis sicut agens […] Ideo debet dici quod sensus est virtus activa”.
35.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 242): “[…] sensatio et intellectio sunt actiones immanentes […] Igitur sensus est agens sensationem; igitur est virtus activa”.
36.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 242): “Consequentia ut prius, quia eius operatio est nobilior, cum agere sit nobilius quam pati et sensibile ageret sensationem ad quam sensus non se haberet nisi passive”.
37.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 242): “Notandum est igitur quod ‘sensibile’ est illud quod possibile est sentiri et ‘sensitivum’ quod est potens sentire”.
38.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 243): “[…] sentire non significet adaequate idem quod habere in se speciem illius sensibilis quia tunc era sentiret”.
39.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 260): “[…] licet sensus bene sit in potentia ad recipiendum sensationem, tamen non est in actu sufficienti sine specie sensibili ad agendum istam, quam tamen speciem oportet fieri ab obiecto exteriori”.
40.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 244): “[…] sensus, id est anima sensitiva, est virtus activa et passiva. Dico virtus activa quia ipsa est potentia vegetativa et motiva secundum locum et etiam quia ipsa agit ad sensationem producendam, ut dicetur postea. Dico etiam quod est virtus passiva, quia ipsa recipit sensationem, ut dicetur postea”.
41.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 260): “Sed quia non est alia res sensus agens et sensus patiens, sufficiebat igitur distinguere organa in quibus fiunt sensationes et obiecta a quibus fiunt species sensibiles in illis organis per quas species anima exercet actum sentiendi”.
42.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 244): “[…] anima non agit ad productionem speciei sensibilis in organo sensus exterioris ut in oculo”.
43.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 245): “[…] anima nihil operatur passive ad recipiendum speciem sensibilem in organo sensitivo”.
44.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 251): “[…] cum enim sensibile non agat nisi speciem sensibilem, nec anima recipiat illam, sed organum solum, videtur quod sensibile nihil agat in animam quae est sensus. Et sic sensus nihil patitur a sensibili. Similiter credo quod sensibile nihil agat in sensum proprie loquendo. Et sic etiam sensus, id est anima sensitiva, nihil patitur a sensibili”.
45.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 251): “[…] anima non patitur proprie a sensibili, sed dicitur pati ab eo secundum impropriam locutionem et attributionem, scilicet ex eo solum quod subiectum in quo est, scilicet organum, patitur a sensibili”.
46.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 244): “[…] Secunda conclusio est quod organum subiectum animae se habet ad speciem sensibilem apud sensationem passive scilicet in recipiendo illam speciem et obiectum, active scilicet in producendo eam, quia vel anima vel organum se habet passive ad illam, sed non anima, ut dicetur postea, ergo organum”.
47.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 258): “Item, anima non agit ad productionem speciei sensibilis et ipsa agit ad productionem sensationis”.
48.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Pattin, 256): “[…] anima sensitiva sive in nobis, sive in brutis, agat ad producendam sensationem et quod sic debeat dici sensus agens”.
49.
See also q.10.
50.
On this, see Biard (2005, 235sq).
51.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Sobol, 147–148): “Supponebant enim quod non argui posset nobilitas potentie nisi ex nobilitate operationis vel modi operandi. […] Si dicatur quod non agit eam [anima sensitiva] sed solum patitur et recipit eam, tunc oportet dicere quod obiectum agit eam, etiam tamquam principale agens, et non potest argui maior nobilitas anime sensitive quam ex sensatione, cum ista sit eius nobilissima operatio.”
52.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Sobol, 149–150): “Ymo etiam sensatio sit nobis data ad serviendum intellectui quantum ad intelligere, tamen brutis non videtur esse data nisi ad nutritionem vel augmentationem vel similis generationem et omnino ad necessitatem vite exercendam et procurandam”.
53.
John Buridan, In De anima, (ed. Sobol, 149): “Igitur falsum est dicere quod anima sensitiva non agit ipsam sensationem”.
54.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Sobol, 149): “[…] anima sensitiva, sive in nobis sive in brutis, agat ad sensationem sentientis producendo, et quod sic debeat dici sensus agens”. Cf. Biard (2005, 235).
55.
See Silva (2019).
56.
Cf. John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Sobol, 155).
57.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Sobol, 157): “[…] quasi dicit quod odorare est actus sentiendi adveniens ultra passionem ab odore, scilicet ultra receptionem speciei odoris ab odore”.
58.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Sobol, 157–158): “[…] species sensibilis se habet ad sensationem tanquam dispositio necesaria preexigita ad sensationem, quia experitur quod non est sensatio nisi organum receperit a sensibili exteriori representationem ipsius, quod vocamus istam speciem sensibilem”.
59.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Sobol, 157): “Item anima non agit ad productionem speciei sensibilis. Et ipsa agit ad productionem sensationis”.
60.
Cf. John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Sobol, 159).
61.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Sobol, 159): “[…] licet sensus bene sit in potentia ad recipiendum sensationem, tamen non est in actu sufficienti sine specie sensibili ad agendum istam”.
62.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Sobol, 160): “Et sic expressit satis quod anima est agens ad sensationem et non solum recipiens”.
63.
Albert the Great, In De anima, II, 3, 1, 96. For Albert, sense is a passive power because it cannot be actual except when the external (causing) object is present (see II, 3, 1, 97).
64.
John Buridan, In De anima (ed. Sobol, 160).
65.
I am grateful to Joël Biard for pointing this out to me in a personal communication, which revises his own view from Biard (2002).
66.
Ps. Blasius of Parma, In De anima, II, q.10, 152: “In oppositum est Aristoteles in secundo huius. Nam dicit quod ipsa anima respectu operationum vitalium se habet multiplici genere esse, scilicet agentis, et efficiens etc., unde dicit quod ipsa respectu operationum vitalium motuum est principium, ex quo videtur animam contrahere ad sensationem. Et, per consequens, non est ponendum animam respectu sensationis esse pure passivam. Ymmo etiam activa”.
67.
Cf. Ps. Blasius of Parma, In De anima, II, q.10, 152.
68.
Cf. Ps. Blasius of Parma, In De anima, II, q.10, 154.
69.
Ps. Blasius of Parma, In De anima, II, q.10, 152: “Igitur sensus est principium activum sensationis et per consequens ponendus est sensus agens”.
70.
Ps. Blasius of Parma, In De anima, II, q.10, 154: “Secunda conclusio: quod est dare sensum agentem et non solum sensum passivum. Patet, nam anima sensitiva est principale agens suae operationis”.
71.
Ps. Blasius of Parma, In De anima, II, q.10, 155: “[…] si in sensu non est aliqua species sensibilium, non vadit in actum sentiendi”.
72.
Ps. Blasius of Parma, In De anima, II, q.10, 155: “[…] obiecto praesente, ipsum obiectum multiplicat speciem suam per medium usque ad sensum inclusive”.
73.
Ps. Blasius of Parma, In De anima, II, q.10, 154: “Alio modo si obiectum et species solum concurrerent ad sensationem, sequitur quod quandocumque species esset in sensu sentiret, hoc est falsum”.
74.
Ps. Blasius of Parma, In De anima, II, q.10, 155: “[…] non fit sensatio nisi sensus advertat”.
75.
Ps. Blasius of Parma, In De anima, II, q.10, 154: “[…] Quantum ad secundum sit ista conclusio: sensus activus et passivus non sunt substantiae distinctae, sed eadem substantia est activus et passivus: in recipiendo speciem sensibilis dicitur sensus passivus; et in eliciendo vero sensationem communem dicitur sensus activus”.
76.
I use the transcription by M´ario Santiago Carvalho. See References.
77.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 87: “Ducuntur uero ea potissimum ratione, quod una eademque uirtus simul pati, et agere nequat”.
78.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 88: “[…] quo etiam pacto obiectum sensi[bi]le, quod a sensu re ipsa distinguitur, sensum praeparat, ac disponit, sui ad ipsum transmittendo similitudinem”.
79.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 88: “Aliorum opinio est sensum esse potentiam tantummodo passiuam. Hi autem bipartita uia incedunt; quidam putant sensum nihil praestare aliud, quam recipere speciem a re obiecta, sicque sensionem non a sensu, sed a re sensibili effici”. The other alternative presents the soul as pure potentiality to receive forms.
80.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 89: “Dicendum potentiam sensitiuam tripliciter spectari posse; uidilicet, ut recipit speciem ab obiecto, ut ea informata actum sentiendi profert, ut eiusmodi actum in se recipit”. Something very similar to this account seems to be at play in Zabarella, Liber de sensu agente, ch. 3, 384 (Leijenhorst 2014, 174), with the qualification that (iii) means the reception of the act in the power rather than in the animated sense organ.
81.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 89: “Si igitur primo, uel tertio modo consideretur, haud dubie potentia passiua est; cum sic non operetur, sed patiatur: si secundo, est potentia actiua, quia sic non patitur, sed operatur.”
82.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 89: “[…] asserentem uisionem esse operationem obiecti, quia tunc etiam speculum uideret, cum in eo obiectum per speciem ab eo productam eluceat”.
83.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 88: “Adde quod saepe recipimus speciem rei in oculo, nec tamen rem uidemus: quod fieri non posset, si receptio speciei esset uisio”.
84.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.2, a.3, 94: “Sunt qui putent species concurrere tantum in genere materialis causae, determinando uidilicet potentiam, quae discriminatim se habet ad percipiendum quodlibet particulare sub obiecto suo comprehensum, ut paulo supra diximus”.
85.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.2, a.3, 95: “Aduerte autem speciem concurre non solum actiue ad operationem, uti diximus: sed etiam formaliter, quatenus concurrit ad specificationem actus, determinando potentiam ad hanc potius, quam ad illam operationis speciem”. See also q.3, a.1, 97: “[…] concurrit Socrates ad praedictam uisionem in genere causae formalis extrinsecae, eam terminando, specificandoque”.
86.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 89: “Et esse eundem actum sensus et sensibili, idest, tam obiectum quam sensum concurre ad eundem actum, quia ad actum sentiendi, quem potentia sensitiua exercet, concurrit etiam obiectum interuentu speciei, quam in eodem sensu produxit”.
87.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.2, a.3, 94: “Secundo, quia omnis forma agentis, cui per se assimilatur effectus, concurrit actiue ut principium talis effectus […] quia huius forma [of the species] est similis formae illius [of the object]”.
88.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.2, a.3, 95: “[…] ita ut ambae tanquam duae partiales causae diuersae tamen rationis, seu tanquam duae partes unius integri agentis immediati uires suas conferant, iungantque ad actionem cognoscendi”.
89.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.2, a.3, 94: “[…] multo uerisimilior tamen est contraria, quae statuit speciem concurrere etiam actiue cum potentia ad eius actionem”.
90.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.2, a.3, 95: “Respondemus non ita se rem habere, sed potentiam uendicare suam peculiarem uirtutem ad agendum, similiterque speciem uendicare suam; ita ut ambae tanquam duae partiales causae diuersae tamen rationis, seu tanquam duae partes unius integri agentis immediati uires suas conferant, iungantque ad actionem cognoscendi. Nam quod species suam habeat actiuitatem probatum est. Quod uero illa non sit tota actiuitas potentiae ex eo ostenditur, quia saepe accidit, ut potentia ex eadem specie eliciat intensiorem notitiam; quia nimirum profert ex se maiorem conatum: quod non esset, nisi ipsa haberet propriam actiuitatem distinctam ab actiuitate potentiae.”
91.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 88–89: “[Aristotle] docuit animam esse causam efficatricem alterationis eius, quae secundum functiones sensum fit.”
92.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.2, a.3, 95: “Et uero, quia prius est potentiam uniri intentionaliter cum re cognita, quam tendere in obiectum; prius se habet species ut principium formale, quam ut principium efficiens.”
93.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 90: “[…] quaedam potentiae agunt in sua obiecta, ut altrices in alimentum; aliae ab iis patiuntur eorum in se imagines recipiendo, ut sensu”.
94.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 90: “Ad tertium dicendum Aristotelem eo loco tantum docere potentias sensitiuas immutari ab obiectis, non autem negare eas operari simul, concurrendo cum speciebus”.
95.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.2, a.3, 95: “[…] licet cognitione ab specie proficiscatur; oriri nihilominus ab anima ut a vitae fonte, praecipuaque uitalium functionum causa, cuius instrumenta sunt potentia, et species”.
96.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.1, a.1, 88: “Sequitur etiam functiones sensuum non esse uitales, siquidem omnis uitalis actio ab interno principio dimanat”.
97.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, II, Ch.6, q.2, a.3, 94: “[…] actio uitalis a solo principio uitae, quale species non est”.
98.
Conimbricenses, In De anima, III, Ch.1, q.1, a.4, 239: “[…] reiecta opinione Philoponi, et aliorum, qui uirtutem quandam animaduersoriam, siue attentricem finxerunt; dicendum interdum oculum rei praesentis imagine imbutum non elicere uisionem. Uerum id non ex eo prouenire, quod desideretur actio alterius facultatis, cuius sit ad obiectum aduertere; sed quia ipsa uis cernendi non tendit in obiectum; quod tunc accidit, cum in rem aliam uehementi applicatione intendi sumus.”
99.
Biard (2005, 242); in page 246 he goes as far as to suggest a “Franciscan Augustinianism”. I extend my thanks to Joël Biard for calling my attention to his article and for clarifying discussions. I address the question of the relationship of unity and activity in a different forthcoming article.

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University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
José Filipe Silva

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José Filipe Silva
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Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France
Véronique Decaix
Gothenburg University (FLoV), Gothenburg, Sweden
Ana María Mora-Márquez

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Silva, J.F. (2020). From Agent to Active Sense: Was There an Augustinianism-Averroisant?. In: Decaix, V., Mora-Márquez, A. (eds) Active Cognition. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35304-9_5

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35304-9_5
Published: 11 March 2020
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-35303-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-35304-9
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