Abstract
Over the past few years there has been growing interest in the issues of cybersecurity and maritime security, but far too little attention has been paid to the combination of the two security problems; and yet there are clear and critical points of intersection. The dependence of the international maritime community on cyberspace is substantially increasing and, thus, forges new and unexpected vulnerabilities. Maritime transport and all related activities are conducted by technology-intensive platforms, which today rely heavily on information systems. The maritime community, consisting of maritime transport, port operations, critical offshore infrastructure and digital economic transactions is heavily structured around online systems. The chapter assesses the risks and vulnerabilities of the international maritime sector in regard to cybersecurity and identifies potential tools and international measures to enhance cyber resilience in the wider maritime security field. The chapter contributes to a deeper understanding of the wider dynamics of these implications, providing the basic principles, comprehension and framework in order to apply cyber resilience together with situational awareness, business continuity plan and risk management.
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Notes
- 1.
These events will be analysed later on. We refer to the ransomware attack at NHS and the “Petya” attack respectively.
- 2.
These include but are not limited to Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) and the NATO Shipping Centre (NSC).
- 3.
USCG Cyber Strategy 2015. The UK Maritime Strategy identifies cyber-attacks at the maritime domain as one of the five Maritime Security Risks (UK Government 2014, p. 19).
- 4.
TMSA 3 programme provides companies with a means to improve and measure their own safety management systems. For further details see www.ocimf.org/sire/about-tmsa.aspx.
- 5.
For further details see IMO (2016).
- 6.
Although common sense, research conducted by Chatham House, a UK-based think tank, has indicated that such response plans are not in place in most of the world’s shipping companies, at the time of writing if this chapter (Autumn 2018).
- 7.
These four case studies where part of an Industrial e-paper that was published by Knect365, where the writer was asked to comment and advise. Further details can be found on Knect365 (2018).
- 8.
In general, ship systems are distinguished in two categories, the IT and OT. The first category includes IT System Management, Surveillance within the ship, Maintenance monitoring, crew and passenger entertainment and any other system that offers support to a ships’ operation cycle. OT systems are the core systems that control the ship’s daily operations and include power generation and distribution, propulsion, navigation and steering, ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore, along with emergency and distress communications and so forth. These are the systems that are first on the priority list regarding cybersecurity for ships. For further details see http://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-source/resources/safety-security-and-operations/guidelines-on-cyber-security-onboard-ships.pdf?sfvrsn=16
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Annex A (Table 8.2)
Annex A (Table 8.2)
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Kapalidis, P. (2020). Cybersecurity at Sea. In: Otto, L. (eds) Global Challenges in Maritime Security. Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34630-0_8
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