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Selecting the Right Game Concept for Social Simulation of Real-World Systems

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Advances in Social Simulation

Part of the book series: Springer Proceedings in Complexity ((SPCOM))

Abstract

Game theoretical models can be used for social simulation of real-world systems. These models describe the interaction between actors who have to make a decision. Before application of those models, the game concept that describes the situation at hand needs to be selected. Selecting the right game concept is crucial when choosing a model to simulate the process, but not trivial. In this paper we present a taxonomy of game concepts to select a set of suitable models.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Knowledge about the game and the players in the game is common knowledge [40].

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Acknowledgements

This research is funded, through the Railway Gaming Suite 2 program, by ProRail (the Dutch Railway Infrastructure Manager) and Delft University of Technology.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Femke Bekius

  2. Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

    Sebastiaan Meijer

  3. KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

    Sebastiaan Meijer

Authors
  1. Femke Bekius
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  2. Sebastiaan Meijer
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Femke Bekius .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer and Systems Sciences, Stockholm University, Kista, Sweden

    Harko Verhagen

  2. Norwegian College of Fishery Science, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway

    Melania Borit

  3. Linnaeus University Centre for Data Intensive Sciences and Applications, Växjö, Sweden

    Giangiacomo Bravo

  4. Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

    Nanda Wijermans

Appendix

Appendix

Table 7.2 List of game concepts
Full size table

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Bekius, F., Meijer, S. (2020). Selecting the Right Game Concept for Social Simulation of Real-World Systems. In: Verhagen, H., Borit, M., Bravo, G., Wijermans, N. (eds) Advances in Social Simulation. Springer Proceedings in Complexity. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34127-5_7

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