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How Do Economists Think?

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Social Philosophy of Science for the Social Sciences

Part of the book series: Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences ((THHSS))

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Abstract

I argue that most economists pay little attention to epistemological considerationsand developments in the philosophy of science when doing their research. Consequently, a number of philosophers of science have been critical to the status of knowledge in economics. Still, there are quite clear thoughts on how knowledge is generated within economics. In this chapter, I explain and discuss how economists think about gaining new insights about the world. I discuss the interpretation of formal economic models as well as the status of empirical research in economics. Finally, I discuss how economics and the other social sciences think about each other regarding the scientific status of the respective fields.

This chapter is based on lectures in SV9101 – Philosophy of science given at the University of Oslo. I am grateful for comments from and discussions with several generations of students as well as Jaan Valsiner and Maren E. Bachke.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A rare exception is the volume edited by Cullenberg, Amariglio, and Ruccio (2001).

  2. 2.

    In 1996, physics professor Alan Sokal published a paper in the journal Social Text where he claims that quantum gravity is a social construct (Sokal, 1996a). The paper was a hoax, consisting of a number of quotations and plenty of fancy language, but with no arguments of any sort. Upon publication, Sokal (1996b) revealed that the paper was indeed a hoax and raised strong criticisms against this line of writing.

  3. 3.

    Expositions of this model can be found in any microeconomics textbook. See, e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for a thorough introduction to the class of models.

  4. 4.

    The terminology dates from the 1970s where most freshwater economists were working in universities close to the US Great Lakes, whereas the saltwater economists were based on the US east and west coast.

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Correspondence to Jo Thori Lind .

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Lind, J.T. (2019). How Do Economists Think?. In: Valsiner, J. (eds) Social Philosophy of Science for the Social Sciences. Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33099-6_15

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