Schopenhauer’s Logic in Its Historical Context

Abstract

Schopenhauer never wrote a whole book on logic, but there are nonetheless several passages in his works where he reflects extensively on the topic. His approach to logic is dominated by two beliefs that were very common in the period: firstly, that there had been hardly any developments in the field of logic since Aristotle and, secondly, that everybody intuitively and unwittingly follows the rules of logic without first needing to be taught. Although Schopenhauer argues that there had been no crucial developments in logic since the days of Aristotle, he does give a short list of the enhancements and additions that logic had undergone in the intervening period. However, Schopenhauer does not prove himself to be a historian of logic. Rather, he positions himself within the context of the contemporary debate on logic. As a result, he places a clear emphasis on, firstly, the principle of sufficient reason of knowing and, secondly, the separation of concepts and representations of perception. This paper works through Schopenhauer’s own list of the main developments in the history of logic and offers critical commentary on it. It concludes by examining some of the issues that do not appear on Schopenhauer’s list.