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Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy: Self-Determination in the Age of Automated Systems

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Regulating Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

The use of automated (decision-making) systems is becoming increasingly widespread in everyday life. By, for example, producing tailor-made decisions or individual suggestions, these systems increasingly penetrate—intentionally or unintentionally, openly or covertly—a sphere that has long been reserved for individual self-determination. With the advancing digitalisation of everyday life and the increasing proliferation of such systems, it can become more and more difficult for those affected to recognize the impact of these systems or to avoid their influence. This Chapter illustrates the risks that such systems may pose for individual self-determination and possible ways out.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See also Tischbirek, paras 10 et seq.

  2. 2.

    See Krohn and Linder (2018).

  3. 3.

    See www.generalivitality.de/vmp/.

  4. 4.

    See www.johnhancockinsurance.com/vitality-program.html.

  5. 5.

    Krohn and Linder (2018).

  6. 6.

    See the definition in Section 31 German Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG). According to the GDPR, scoring is a subset of profiling pursuant to Article 4(4) GDPR. The GDPR follows a comprehensive approach, see Selmayr and Ehmann (2018), para 75 et seq.; Schantz (2018), para 8; Pötters (2018), para 24. So, it is doubtful whether the national legislator is allowed to enact a rule like Section 31(1) BDSG that is more restrictive for scoring than Article 22 GDPR. Whether or not Section 31 BDSG can still be considered a ‘suitable measure to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests’ in the sense of Article 22(2)(b) GDPR, is an open question, see Krämer (2018), para 3; skeptical Buchner (2018), paras 4 et seq.; Moos and Rothkegel (2016), p. 567.

  7. 7.

    Hockling (2013).

  8. 8.

    Sachverständigenrat für Verbraucherfragen (2018), p. 62; Hartlmaier (2018).

  9. 9.

    Seibel (2015).

  10. 10.

    See also Hoffmann-Riem, para 10.

  11. 11.

    See comprehensive State Council (2014), State Council (2016).

  12. 12.

    Holland (2018).

  13. 13.

    State Council (2014).

  14. 14.

    Botsman (2017).

  15. 15.

    Botsman (2017).

  16. 16.

    Meissner (2017), p. 3.

  17. 17.

    See Ernst (2017a), pp. 1032 et seq.

  18. 18.

    For a general definition of artificial intelligence see Wischmeyer and Rademacher, paras 5–6.

  19. 19.

    Broemel and Trute (2016), p. 59.

  20. 20.

    See paras 38 et seq. and paras 41 et seq.

  21. 21.

    von Grafenstein et al. (2018), p. 46.

  22. 22.

    Ebers (2018), pp. 423 et seq.

  23. 23.

    O’Neil (2016), pp. 194 et seq.; Calo (2014), pp. 1015 et seq.; Ebers (2018), p. 423; Wolff (2015), p. 202.

  24. 24.

    Sunstein (2016), pp. 124 et seq.; Hansen and Jespersen (2013), pp. 14 et seq.; Lindstrom (2014); von Grafenstein et al. (2018), p. 69; Wolff (2015), pp. 202 et seq.; Seckelmann and Lamping (2016), pp. 191 et seq.

  25. 25.

    Sunstein (2016), pp. 124 et seq.; Hansen and Jespersen (2013), pp. 14 et seq.; Lindstrom (2014); von Grafenstein et al. (2018), p. 69; Weber and Schäfer (2017), pp. 578 et seq.; Seckelmann and Lamping (2016), pp. 191 et seq.

  26. 26.

    von Grafenstein et al. (2018), p. 45.

  27. 27.

    German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 209/83 et al. ‘Volkszählung’ (15 December 1983), BVerfGE 65 p. 43; 1 BvR 256/08 et al. ‘Vorratsdatenspeicherung’ (2 March 2010), BVerfGE 125 p. 232.

  28. 28.

    In detail von Grafenstein et al. (2018), p. 20; see also Weber and Schäfer (2017), pp. 569 et seq.; Purnhagen and Reisch (2016), pp. 637 et seq.

  29. 29.

    See Viseu and Suchman (2010).

  30. 30.

    Thaler and Sunstein (2009), pp. 53 et seq.; Wolff (2015), pp. 201 et seq.; Zillien et al. (2015), p. 87.

  31. 31.

    See von Grafenstein et al. (2018), pp. 35 et seq.

  32. 32.

    Schultz (2007), and von Grafenstein et al. (2018), pp. 39 et seq.

  33. 33.

    Ernst (2017b), pp. 72 et seq.

  34. 34.

    Ebers (2018), p. 423; Broemel and Trute (2016), p. 59.

  35. 35.

    See Tischbirek, paras 9 et seq.

  36. 36.

    See Constitutional Court ‘Volkszählung’ (see note 27), p. 42; Martini (2014), p. 1483; Broemel and Trute (2016), p. 57.

  37. 37.

    See Wischmeyer; see Hoffmann-Riem, paras 51 et seq.

  38. 38.

    Hermstrüwer (2016), pp. 227 et seq.; Radlanski (2016), pp. 11 et seq.; Broemel and Trute (2016), p. 53.

  39. 39.

    See Hoffmann-Riem, paras 54 et seq.

  40. 40.

    Ebers (2018), p. 423.

  41. 41.

    Di Fabio (2001), para 147; Broemel and Trute (2016), pp. 57 et seq.

  42. 42.

    Britz (2007), p. 24; von Grafenstein et al. (2018), p. 54.

  43. 43.

    Petrlic (2016), p. 96; see Jandt (2016), p. 571; Di Fabio (2001), para 107.

  44. 44.

    See von Grafenstein et al. (2018), p. 54 with further references.

  45. 45.

    See von Grafenstein et al. (2018), p. 54 with further references.

  46. 46.

    Ernst (2017b), p. 72.

  47. 47.

    See Huster (2015), pp. 24 et seq.; Wolff (2015), pp. 209 et seq.; Weber and Schäfer (2017), pp. 572 et seq.

  48. 48.

    Thaler and Sunstein (2009), pp. 5 et seq.; see Weber and Schäfer (2017), pp. 575 et seq.; Wolff (2015), pp. 209 et seq. with further references.

  49. 49.

    Sunstein (2016).

  50. 50.

    Ebers (2018), p. 423.

  51. 51.

    See Kloepfer (2002), § 1 para 60; Vesting (2001), pp. 220 et seq.; Druey (1995), pp. 26 et seq.

  52. 52.

    See von Grafenstein et al. (2018), p. 82.

  53. 53.

    See von Grafenstein et al. (2018), p. 111.

  54. 54.

    See Duttweiler and Passoth (2016), pp. 12 et seq.; Crawford et al. (2015), p. 492; von Grafenstein et al. (2018), p. 38.

  55. 55.

    In Germany see Section 4a UWG.

  56. 56.

    Köhler (2019), para 1.59; Picht (2016), para 27; Götting (2016), para 14; Ebers (2018), p. 424.

  57. 57.

    Ebers (2018), p. 424.

  58. 58.

    CJEU C-178/84 ‘Reinheitsgebot für Bier’ (12 March 1987), 1987 E.C.R. 1227, paras 31–36; C-362/88 ‘GB-Inno-BM/Confédération du commerce luxembourgeois’ (7 March 1990), 1990 E.C.R. I-667, paras 13–19; C-220/98 ‘Estée Lauder’ (13 January 2000), 2000 E.C.R. I-117, paras 27 et seq.; recital 18 of Directive 2005/29/EC; see Weber and Schäfer (2017), p. 579.

  59. 59.

    Ebers (2018), pp. 423 et seq.

  60. 60.

    Sosnitza (2016), para 36.

  61. 61.

    See para 22.

  62. 62.

    German Federal Supreme Court X ZR 37/12 (16 October 2012), BGHZ 195, 126 para 17; VI ZR 269/12 (14 May 2013), BGHZ 197, 213 para 17; District Court Cologne 9 S 289/02 (16 April 2003), MMR 2003, 481 et seq.; Schulz (2018), para 18. See also Schirmer, paras 16 et seq.

  63. 63.

    In German law regarding General Terms and Conditions, Section 305c BGB (Civil Code) contains a rule according to which clauses which are surprising for the contractual partner are not valid. Only such contractual conditions shall be legally effective that are expected. This ensures the protection of confidence and takes into account that general terms and conditions are regularly so complex that they are not completely comprehensible for an average consumer, see Basedow (2019), para 1. This protective effect is comparable to the proposal made here. See Hoffmann-Riem, para 23.

  64. 64.

    An illustrative example of the delimitation difficulties that may be associated with this is the consideration of the font in connection with the granting of loans, as described above see para 5.

  65. 65.

    Hermstrüwer (2016), p. 227; Radlanski (2016), pp. 11 et seq.; Broemel and Trute (2016), p. 53.

  66. 66.

    German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 567/89, 1044/89 ‘Bürgschaftsverträge’ (19 October 1993), BVerfGE 89, p. 233.

  67. 67.

    See German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 26/84 ‘Handelsvertreter’ (7 February 1990), BVerfGE 81, p. 242; ‘Bürgschaftsverträge’ (see note 66), BVerfGE 89 p. 214; 1 BvR 2248/01 ‘Erbvertrag’ (22 March 2004), NJW 2004, p. 2008.

  68. 68.

    See Hoffmann-Riem, para 14; see Marsch, para 8.

  69. 69.

    Bachmeier (1995), p. 51; Wuermeling (1996), p. 668; Kamlah (2013), para 2; Ernst (2017a), p. 1031.

  70. 70.

    See Wischmeyer, paras 25 et seq.

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Ernst, C. (2020). Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy: Self-Determination in the Age of Automated Systems. In: Wischmeyer, T., Rademacher, T. (eds) Regulating Artificial Intelligence. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32361-5_3

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