Abstract
Coercive behaviour is hard to control in the remote electronic voting setting. This is why a number of protocols have been proposed that aim at mitigating this threat. However, these proposals have remained largely academic. This paper takes the practical viewpoint and analyses the most common assumptions that are required by the various schemes, together with the exact level of coercion-resistance they provide.
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Notes
- 1.
It is hard to get reliable statistics on the extent of Tor filtering, but there exists indirect evidence in the form of the share of users relying on Tor bridges (https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-table.html) and observed irregularities (https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-censorship-events.html).
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Acknowledgments
The research leading to these results has received funding from the Estonian Research Council under Institutional Research Grant IUT27-1 and the European Regional Development Fund through the Estonian Centre of Excellence in ICT Research (EXCITE) and the grant number EU48684.
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Krips, K., Willemson, J. (2019). On Practical Aspects of Coercion-Resistant Remote Voting Systems. In: Krimmer, R., et al. Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11759. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30625-0_14
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