Abstract
Authentication is one of the most important issues in the information technology field and, primarily, in Cryptography. With the diffusion of devices for the Internet of things, the interest in efficient and with low computational loads authentication protocols, has increased more and more in the last few years. Indeed, traditional protocols, based on symmetric primitives and, in general, on pseudo-random functions, are not suitable for computationally constrained devices. On the other hand, one of the most interesting families of protocols for such devices seems to be the one based on the learning parity with noise problem. In this paper, building on some previous works, we propose a new instance of a lightweight authentication protocol constructed on this problem. We describe some optimizations which could be employed to improve the efficiency of an implementation, and we give also a look at the real world, discussing the applicability of our proposal to several devices available on the market.
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Notes
- 1.
As a side note, we stress that the learning parity with noise problem is considered appealing since it offers the possibility to design protocols with security reductions and, unlike other numerical problems used in Cryptography, it does not succumb to known quantum algorithms. Moreover, as stated, the protocols based on it are usually very efficient and suitable for devices with low computational power, e.g., RFID Tags.
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D’Arco, P., Nilo, M. (2019). A New Instance of a Lightweight Authentication Protocol Based on the LPN Problem. In: Esposito, C., Hong, J., Choo, KK. (eds) Pervasive Systems, Algorithms and Networks. I-SPAN 2019. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1080. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30143-9_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30143-9_10
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