Abstract
One of the methods of informal logic is the method of argument schemes and one of the most studied of the schemes is the one for Argument from Authority, also called Appeal to Expertise.
Earlier versions of this essay were presented in 2018 at CRRAR in the University of Windsor, at the Wake Forest University Argumentation Conference, at the Russell Philosophy Conference in Healdsburg, California, and at the ISSA Conference in Amsterdam. I am grateful for critical feedback received on each of those occasions. For help with this most recent version I thank CRRAR colleagues, J. A. Blair and Pierre Boulos.
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Notes
- 1.
Adapted from Groarke and Tindale 2013, p. 317. The premises keep the same names (numbers) going forward.
- 2.
The number of auxiliary experts, we suppose, is not small.
- 3.
Or the pattern could include an idle premise.
- 4.
By a “basic scheme” I mean one that has no independent schemes as its parts. Further insistence to get to the bare bones of appeals to authority may lead us to leave premise 5 out of Scheme 3 as well. This implies that Scheme 3 is not really a basic scheme after all.
- 5.
I thank Dr. R. M. L. McKay, Director of the Great Lakes Institute for Environmental Research in the University of Windsor, for bringing these websites to my attention.
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Hansen, H.V. (2020). In Search of a Workable Auxiliary Condition for Authority Arguments. In: van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B. (eds) From Argument Schemes to Argumentative Relations in the Wild. Argumentation Library, vol 35. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28367-4_3
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