Abstract
To varying degrees the philosophical problem of self-deception has occupied philosophers from Plato to Nietzsche. Do we deceive ourselves or not? If so, in what circumstances do we deceive ourselves or let some others deceive us? What consequences may it have? Is it something that we should avoid or can it have positive consequences for the person? Such questions find many of their answers in a debate between intentionalist and non-intentionalist theories. However, I distinguish here between the cognitive and the ethical aspect of the problem, argue that this distinction has not been respected as much as it might have been in recent philosophy, and explore the ways in which literary treatments of self-deception may help us to distinguish its ethical dimension more clearly. By ethics I refer both to the relationship of self and other and to that of self to self.
“I have done that,” says my memory. “I cannot have done that,” says my pride, and remains inexorable. Eventually, memory yields.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
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Notes
- 1.
Donald Davidson, “Deception and Division,” Problems of Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 208; hereafter abbreviated “DD.”
- 2.
Donald Davidson, “Paradoxes of Irrationality,” Problems of Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 174.
- 3.
Alfred Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 26; hereafter abbreviated SDU.
- 4.
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 183.
- 5.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1968), p. 295.
- 6.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 265.
- 7.
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, “User-friendly Self-deception,” Philosophy 69: 268 (1994): 212.
- 8.
Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (London: Sphere Books, 1971), p. 447.
- 9.
Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth (New York: Knopf, 1995), p. 636.
- 10.
Robert Audi , “Self-deception, Rationalisation, and Reasons for Acting,” Perspectives on Self-deception, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 97.
- 11.
Mike W. Martin, Self-deception and Morality (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986).
- 12.
Alfred Mele, “Self-deception,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 33: 133 (1983): 365.
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Talay Turner, Z. (2019). Self-deception as a Philosophical Problem. In: Hagberg, G. (eds) Narrative and Self-Understanding. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28289-9_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28289-9_9
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