Abstract
In this paper, we study a mechanism design of reversed auction on cloud computing. A cloud computing platform has a set of jobs and would like to rent VM instances to process these jobs from cloud providers. In the auction model, each cloud provider (agent) who owns VM instances will submit a bid on the costs for using such VM instances. The mechanism determines the number of VM instances from each agent, and payments that have to be paid for using the chosen VM instances. The utility of every agent is the payment received minus the true cost. Our proposed mechanism is a deterministic truthful mechanism that the utility of each agent is maximized by revealing the true costs. We first provide the analysis of the approximation ratios and then run experiments using both realistic workload and uniformly random data to show the performance of the proposed mechanisms.
Supported in part by NSFC(11671355).
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The authors thank anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions to improve the presentation of this paper.
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Ye, D., Xie, F., Zhang, G. (2019). Truthful Mechanism Design of Reversed Auction on Cloud Computing. In: Du, DZ., Duan, Z., Tian, C. (eds) Computing and Combinatorics. COCOON 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11653. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26176-4_52
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