Abstract
Annalisa Coliva draws attention to Waismann’s acute attention to fine-grained linguistic distinctions in the use of English epistemic vocabulary. Coliva notes that although Waismann often misses out on directing these observations to an overarching philosophical analysis, he does come close to Wittgenstein’s groundbreaking views regarding a phrase like “I know” when used in relation to hinges and avowals. The sketchiness of Waismann’s remarks notwithstanding, the two papers achieve to raise momentous philosophical points. He analyses knowing in certain cases as a limiting case of believing, which for Coliva could have dramatic consequences for knowledge-first epistemologies.
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Notes
- 1.
See Bilgrami (2006), Coliva (2016), Moran (2001), and Scanlon (1998). The distinction would thus be between those beliefs which are the result of a subject’s conscious judgement, for which she can provide reasons, and those which are more passively acquired, may be unconscious, and are held with no reason in their favor, perhaps in deference to the community from which one acquired them.
- 2.
See Sect. 3 for a discussion.
- 3.
See Sect. 3 for a discussion.
- 4.
For a discussion of, for instance, the difference between Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning and G. E. Moore’s with special reference to uses of “to know”, which is pertinent to the topic of these papers, see Coliva (2010, 208–210 and Chapter 1).
- 5.
Cf. Wittgenstein (1953, II, xi).
- 6.
Wittgenstein’s account of Moore’s paradox is altogether problematical. For a discussion, see Coliva (2015).
- 7.
- 8.
For a more comprehensive analysis of Wittgenstein’s views on hinges, see Coliva (2010, Chapter 4).
References
Bilgrami, A. 2006. Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Coliva, A. 2010. Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. London: Palgrave.
———. 2015. How to Commit Moore’s Paradox. Journal of Philosophy, CXII 4: 169–192.
———. 2016. The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. London: Palgrave.
———. 2018. Wittgenstein, Self-Knowledge and Nature. In Wittgenstein and Naturalism, ed. T. Raleigh and K. Cahill, 96–118. Oxford and New York: Routledge.
Moran, R. 2001. Authority and Estrangement. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Scanlon, T. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Waismann, F. 1977a. Belief and Knowledge. In Philosophical Papers, 166–178. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company.
Waismann, F. 1977b. Two Accounts of Knowing. In Philosophical Papers, 179–185. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company.
Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 1969. On Certainty. Oxford: Blackwell.
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Coliva, A. (2019). Waismann on Belief and Knowledge. In: Makovec, D., Shapiro, S. (eds) Friedrich Waismann. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25008-9_5
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