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Positivism and the Peace/Power Dialectic: Feminist Reflections in a Transnational Age

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Legal Positivism in a Global and Transnational Age

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 131))

Abstract

Human rights have often been described as the ‘morality of the law.’ Decades of feminist critique have exposed the foundations of law as deeply biased and patriarchal. And yet the idea that almost all legal philosophers are or should be positivists continues to hold sway in some quarters. The claim of this chapter is that the positivist paradigm of law, the idea that a law is valid if it emanates from a particular recognised source, provides a de minimis standard for the basis of legal relations and a starting point for critique, but offers little more. In this reductionist sense then it may be appropriate to state that everyone who engages with law is de facto a positivist. However, in an increasingly complex, diversified and pluralistic society where the transcendence of national borders and processes of globalisation neither recognise nor sustain state specific Grundnormen, legal positivism faces challenges and realities which will not and cannot leave the fundaments of the positivist paradigm unchanged. Rather, examination of the positivist paradigm through the transnational lenses of both human rights and feminist critique demonstrates that the metaphysical austerity lauded by proponents of the positivist position as a virtue, leaves it barren and inadequate to respond to the deep structural inequalities of the law. The patriarchal assumptions of the norms constituting the positivist paradigm must be challenged. The role played by human rights in providing the positivist position with a moral conscience and an opportunity to address not yet imagined atrocities and quotidian injustices in an increasingly globalised society must be critically analysed. In carrying out such a critical examination, this chapter conceptualises and historically establishes positivism at the apex of what is introduced as the peace/power dialectic. The conclusion is that whilst positivism as a historical methodology for peace may not have been (on a generous reading) malicious in establishing the economy of exclusions that it relies on, including gender, race, social class, sexuality and ability, the maintenance of the positivist position as legal truth and the position of power might well be.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Davies (2008), p. 283.

  2. 2.

    Posocco (2016), p. 250.

  3. 3.

    Gardner (2001), p. 201.

  4. 4.

    Gardner (2001), p. 227.

  5. 5.

    Gardner (2001), p. 202.

  6. 6.

    Kelsen (2009), p. 8.

  7. 7.

    Conaghan (2013), p. 87; Davies (2017), p. 23.

  8. 8.

    Sokhi-Bulley (2013).

  9. 9.

    Naffine (2002), p. 80. Reminiscent of the Hegelian dialectic method.

  10. 10.

    Brown (2001).

  11. 11.

    Brown (2001), p. 56.

  12. 12.

    Davies (2011), p. 2.

  13. 13.

    Davies (2011). Davies (2017), p. 282.

  14. 14.

    Naffine (2002), p. 72.

  15. 15.

    Mansell et al. (2015), p. 32.

  16. 16.

    MacKinnon (2007), p. 4.

  17. 17.

    Lacey (1998), p. 147.

  18. 18.

    Naffine (2002), p. 72.

  19. 19.

    Naffine (2002), p. 80.

  20. 20.

    Davies (2017), p. 1.

  21. 21.

    Munro (2007), pp. 49–50.

  22. 22.

    Raz (1970).

  23. 23.

    Davies (2017), p. 25.

  24. 24.

    Cotterrell (2009), p. 777.

  25. 25.

    Davies (2017), p. 22; Douzinas and Gearey (2005), p. 10.

  26. 26.

    Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991), p. 227. In Samuel (1999), p. 204.

  27. 27.

    Naffine (2002), p. 100.

  28. 28.

    Conaghan (2000), p. 351. Citing Kennedy (1997), p. 6: “A project is a continuous, goal-oriented practical activity based on an analysis of some kind…but the goals and the analysis are not necessarily coherent or consistent over time.”

  29. 29.

    de Sousa Santos (1995a), p. 569.

  30. 30.

    Davies (2017), p. 3.

  31. 31.

    Davies (2017), p. 30.

  32. 32.

    Minkkinen (2013), p. 119.

  33. 33.

    Gardner (2001), p. 201.

  34. 34.

    Austin (1995).

  35. 35.

    Austin (1995), p. 157.

  36. 36.

    Bentham (2008), p. 79 and p. 11.

  37. 37.

    See for example: Dickson (2001), p. 5.

  38. 38.

    Some theorists have attempted to move beyond the pyramidal paradigm of legal validity within legal theory: Ost and van de Kerchove (2002).

  39. 39.

    Kelsen (2009).

  40. 40.

    Davies (2017), p. 24.

  41. 41.

    Hart (2012), p. 79.

  42. 42.

    Hart (2012), pp. 81 and 91–93.

  43. 43.

    Hart (2012), p. 3. This perspective does however, differentiate him from a strictly hierarchical understanding of law. On this see: Waldron (2010).

  44. 44.

    Postema (1998), p. 330.

  45. 45.

    Cotterell (2003), pp. 80 and 88.

  46. 46.

    D’Entreves (1967), p. 10.

  47. 47.

    Crenshaw (1991).

  48. 48.

    Conaghan (2009), p. 22.

  49. 49.

    Crenshaw (1991), p. 1245.

  50. 50.

    Crenshaw (1993), p. 383.

  51. 51.

    Postema (1998), p. 338.

  52. 52.

    Davies (2011), p. 2.

  53. 53.

    Davies (2011), p. 2.

  54. 54.

    Davies (2017), p. 28.

  55. 55.

    Davies (2008), p. 284; Davies (2011), p. 2; Davies (2017), p. 21.

  56. 56.

    Le Roy (1999, 2015).

  57. 57.

    Gardner (2001), pp. 222–225.

  58. 58.

    Twining (2009), p. 10.

  59. 59.

    Postema (1998), p. 354.

  60. 60.

    Gardner (2001), p. 227.

  61. 61.

    Postema (1998), p. 348.

  62. 62.

    Davies (2011), p. 1.

  63. 63.

    Gardner (2001), p. 204.

  64. 64.

    Gilligan (1982), Spivak (2010), MacKinnon (1987), p. 45: “take your foot of our necks then we will hear in what tongue women speak”; Russell (2017) and Brayson and Millns (2010).

  65. 65.

    Davies (2008), p. 284.

  66. 66.

    Gardner (2001), p. 203.

  67. 67.

    Gardner (2001), p. 204.

  68. 68.

    Sokhi Bulley (2016), p. 3.

  69. 69.

    Davies (2017), p. 30.

  70. 70.

    Gardner (2001), p. 202.

  71. 71.

    Naffine (2002), p. 101.

  72. 72.

    MacCormick (1992), p. 114.

  73. 73.

    Postema (1998), p. 355.

  74. 74.

    Davies (2008), p. 284.

  75. 75.

    Gardner (2001), p. 203.

  76. 76.

    Davies (2017), p. 34.

  77. 77.

    Midgely (2004).

  78. 78.

    Midgely (2004), p. 1.

  79. 79.

    Midgely (2004), p. 3.

  80. 80.

    Conaghan (2013), p. 73.

  81. 81.

    Russell (2017), p. 287.

  82. 82.

    Irigaray (1991), pp. 37–38, cited in Russell (2017), p. 285.

  83. 83.

    Drakapoulou (2007), p. 33, cited in Russell (2017), p. 286.

  84. 84.

    Russell (2017), p. 286.

  85. 85.

    Conaghan (1996).

  86. 86.

    Held (2006), p. 19.

  87. 87.

    Stein (1999), p. 35.

  88. 88.

    Machiavelli (1998) II.2, p. 275.

  89. 89.

    Rousseau (1998). On the exclusion of women, Rousseau (1991), book V.

  90. 90.

    Wollstonecraft (1995), ch 5.

  91. 91.

    Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, in this book.

  92. 92.

    Stein (1995), pp. 1554–1555.

  93. 93.

    Stein (1995), p. 1555.

  94. 94.

    Gardner (2001), pp. 222–225.

  95. 95.

    Legrand (1996), p. 52, referring to Levi-Strauss.

  96. 96.

    Gardner (2001), p. 202.

  97. 97.

    Gardner (2001), p. 204.

  98. 98.

    Schauer (1996).

  99. 99.

    Gardner (2001), p. 203.

  100. 100.

    Douzinas and Gearey (2005), p. 5.

  101. 101.

    Gardner (2001).

  102. 102.

    Douzinas and Gearey (2005).

  103. 103.

    Davies (2011), p. 2.

  104. 104.

    Somek (2017), p. 5.

  105. 105.

    Somek (2017), p. 5.

  106. 106.

    Postema (1998), p. 337.

  107. 107.

    Ahmed (2006), p. 132.

  108. 108.

    Brown (1993), p. 400.

  109. 109.

    Brown (1993), p. 390.

  110. 110.

    Davies (2011), p. 2.

  111. 111.

    Goodrich (1990), p. vii. Cited in Russell (2017), p. 289.

  112. 112.

    Keenan (2018), p. 3. Keenan’s analysis uses time machines as an analytical tool to examine and critique the Torrens system of land registration in Australia.

  113. 113.

    Keenan (2018), p. 3.

  114. 114.

    Keenan (2018), p. 3.

  115. 115.

    MacKinnon (2007), p. 46.

  116. 116.

    Davies (2008), p. 291.

  117. 117.

    Gardner (2001), p. 199.

  118. 118.

    Gardner (2001), p. 227.

  119. 119.

    Davies (2017), p. 38.

  120. 120.

    Hart (2012), p. 3.

  121. 121.

    Davies (2017), p. 24.

  122. 122.

    Davies (2017), p. 38.

  123. 123.

    Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2012).

  124. 124.

    Hallaq (2002), p. 1712.

  125. 125.

    Hobbes (2008), ch XIV.

  126. 126.

    Toulmin (1992), p. 23.

  127. 127.

    Toulmin (1992), pp. 26–27.

  128. 128.

    Toulmin (1992), p. 24.

  129. 129.

    Toulmin (1992), p. 70.

  130. 130.

    Toulmin (1992), p. 31.

  131. 131.

    Aristotle (2009), V.7. pp. 92–93.

  132. 132.

    Villey (1962), pp. 119–121.

  133. 133.

    Blumenberg (1957), p. 279. Fn 61: “Im Begriff der potential absoluta ist nun aber ein unendliches All des Möglichen impliziert.”

  134. 134.

    Toulmin (1992), p. 144. A claim for which Giordano Bruno was to be burned at the stake: Toulmin (1992), p. 144.

  135. 135.

    Conaghan (2013), p. 211.

  136. 136.

    Conaghan (2013), pp. 208–209.

  137. 137.

    Toulmin (1992), p. 76.

  138. 138.

    Hobbes (2008), ch XXVI.

  139. 139.

    Hobbes (2008), ch I–VI.

  140. 140.

    Gardner (2001), p. 204. Although I would suggest that it is incongruous to cite a political theory as the beginning of the positivist tradition of thought and then to radically limit the scope of positivist thought so as not to include political concerns.

  141. 141.

    Toulmin (1992), p. 16.

  142. 142.

    Held (1999), pp. 37–39.

  143. 143.

    Held (1999), pp. 37–39.

  144. 144.

    Held (1999), p. 32.

  145. 145.

    Dorsett (2007), p. 138.

  146. 146.

    Dorsett (2007), p. 138.

  147. 147.

    Drakopoulou (2007), p. 33, citing (Digest, 1973: II.i.1).

  148. 148.

    Drakopoulou (2007), p. 33.

  149. 149.

    MacKinnon (2007), p. 6.

  150. 150.

    Delaney et al. (2001), p. xiii.

  151. 151.

    Douzinas (2007), p. 22.

  152. 152.

    Douzinas (2007), p. 22.

  153. 153.

    Douzinas (2007), p. 23.

  154. 154.

    See Ioanna Tourkochoriti’s chapter in this book.

  155. 155.

    Brown (2000), p. 238.

  156. 156.

    See: Brown (2000), Douzinas (2007) and de Gouges (2018).

  157. 157.

    On this see: Douzinas (2000).

  158. 158.

    Douzinas (2000), p. 63.

  159. 159.

    Douzinas (2007), p. 20.

  160. 160.

    Douzinas (2007), p. 20.

  161. 161.

    Bentham (1843), p. 489; cited in Waldron (1987), p. 53.

  162. 162.

    Douzinas (2000), p. 6.

  163. 163.

    Lacey (2004).

  164. 164.

    Brayson (2017), pp. 81–82.

  165. 165.

    Benhabib (2004), p. 43; Benhabib (2006), p. 32.

  166. 166.

    Habermas (1996a).

  167. 167.

    Locke (2010).

  168. 168.

    O’Hare (1999), p. 366.

  169. 169.

    de Gouges (2018).

  170. 170.

    de Sousa Santos (2015), pp. 2, 4, and 13.

  171. 171.

    Spivak (1993), pp. 45–46.

  172. 172.

    Brown (2000), p. 231.

  173. 173.

    Douzinas (2007), p. 293.

  174. 174.

    Lorde (1984), p. 112.

  175. 175.

    Williams (1992), p. 165.

  176. 176.

    Williams (1992), p. 164.

  177. 177.

    Douzinas (2000), p. 68.

  178. 178.

    Douzinas (2000).

  179. 179.

    Ahmed (2017), p. 172.

  180. 180.

    Conaghan (2000), p. 351.

  181. 181.

    Conaghan (2013), abstract and p. 167.

  182. 182.

    Grabham et al. (2009), p. 1.

  183. 183.

    MacKinnon (2007), p. 149.

  184. 184.

    Naffine (2002), p. 100.

  185. 185.

    Pettman (1996), p. 49.

  186. 186.

    Butler (1990).

  187. 187.

    Butler (1997), p. 72.

  188. 188.

    Naffine (2002), p. 90.

  189. 189.

    Naffine (2002), p. 98.

  190. 190.

    Hunter et al. (2010).

  191. 191.

    Naffine (2002), p. 73.

  192. 192.

    Naffine (2002), p. 100.

  193. 193.

    Davies (2008), p. 282.

  194. 194.

    Davies (2008), p. 289.

  195. 195.

    Davies (2011), p. 2.

  196. 196.

    Davies (2017), p. 116.

  197. 197.

    Naffine (2002), p. 79.

  198. 198.

    Naffine (2002), p. 79.

  199. 199.

    Sokhi-Bulley (2013), p. 6.

  200. 200.

    Davies (2017), pp. 22–23.

  201. 201.

    Naffine (2002), p. 79.

  202. 202.

    Goodrich (2018).

  203. 203.

    Habermas (1984) and Habermas (1987).

  204. 204.

    Habermas (1996b), Habermas, p. 136; Deflem (2013), p. 85.

  205. 205.

    Bohannan (1936), p. 46.

  206. 206.

    Le Roy (1999).

  207. 207.

    Banakar (2008), p. 59.

  208. 208.

    Banakar (2004), p. 59.

  209. 209.

    Foucault (1991).

  210. 210.

    Brown (2016), p. 64.

  211. 211.

    de Sousa Santos (1995b), p. 481.

  212. 212.

    Vachon (1997).

  213. 213.

    Falk More (1983).

  214. 214.

    Baumann in Legrand (2003), p. 268, footnote 94.

  215. 215.

    de Sousa Santos (2014).

  216. 216.

    Keenan (2014), p. 25.

  217. 217.

    Samuel (2003).

  218. 218.

    See Djeffel’s contribution to this book.

  219. 219.

    Alliot (1983).

  220. 220.

    Sen (2009).

  221. 221.

    Cooper (2013).

  222. 222.

    Davies (2011), p. 2.

  223. 223.

    Davies (2017), p. 24.

  224. 224.

    Gardner (2001), p. 204.

  225. 225.

    Panikkar (1982), p. 77.

  226. 226.

    Naffine (2002), p. 71.

  227. 227.

    Naffine (2002), p. 101.

  228. 228.

    Althusser (2008), pp. 44–51.

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Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, without whose patience this chapter would never have come to fruition.

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Brayson, K. (2019). Positivism and the Peace/Power Dialectic: Feminist Reflections in a Transnational Age. In: Siliquini-Cinelli, L. (eds) Legal Positivism in a Global and Transnational Age. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 131. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24705-8_8

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