Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to consider a series of key contributions to moral neuroeducation from a threefold phylogenetic, ontogenetic and functional perspective. I will argue that an individual’s transition from social to moral behaviour occurs through the concurrence of certain faculties with a specific degree of complexity. With regard to both phylogenesis and ontogenesis, certain kinds of prosocial behaviours become moral in certain specific conditions. The study of these conditions reveals which faculties are involved in moral behaviour, how they do so, and how they relate to one another. A third functional perspective thereby becomes necessary to explain how morality functions at both the psychological and cerebral levels. A knowledge of the psychological faculties and cerebral structures of morality, as well as an understanding of how they function, is of particular relevance for the creation of tools and pedagogical models for the teaching of moral values, norms and principles. Such a knowledge can be used to promote a sound practice of moral thinking, as well as the adoption of certain types of moral stance, for example favouring prosociality to the detriment of xenophobia, or rationally justified rules as opposed to those based solely on intuition.
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Richart, A. (2019). Moral Neuroeducation from a Phylogenetic, Ontogenetic and Functional Perspective. In: Calvo, P., Gracia-CalandÃn, J. (eds) Moral Neuroeducation for a Democratic and Pluralistic Society. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22562-9_3
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