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The Enforcement of International Law

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The Changing Global Order

Part of the book series: United Nations University Series on Regionalism ((UNSR,volume 17))

Abstract

There are many conflicts around the world that involve violations of international law (e.g. the civil war in Syria). However, unlike in the national systems, there is no centralized world enforcer. Therefore, a question arises whether in the current state of affairs international law can be enforced. This chapter uses key theories of international relations (IR) to explain the problem of enforcement in the context of international law. In particular, the chapter focuses on three international institutions that play a role in the maintenance of global order: United Nations Security Council, International Court of Justice, and International Criminal Court. These institutions are analyzed from the perspective of IR theories to explain their emergence and functionality. Having different levels of impact on international law, all three institutions derive their authority from the States that delegate to them decision powers. Finally, the chapter offers some thoughts on the implications emerging powers have on the changing global order.

That part of the law which provides the means by which it shall be enforced is of as much importance as the law itself.

Andrews (1909: 85)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    There are many more security threats in different parts of the world. For a recent overview see, Watch List 2017, Special Report No. 3 by the International Crisis Group (24 February 2017).

  2. 2.

    International law includes many areas such as trade, environment, health, security, etc. The enforcement problem and States’ solutions for it differs (see the extensive work of Koremenos 2016 on institutional design). This chapter deals only with the part of international law that concerns security, therefore, any reference to ‘international law’ is limited to this area.

  3. 3.

    In this chapter, the concepts ‘international law’ and ‘public international law’ are used interchangeably.

  4. 4.

    The direct costs are for instance, the long negotiations to agree on the nature and details of the delegation. The indirect costs of delegation is the partial forgone powers of the States to enable centralization of enforcement.

  5. 5.

    See http://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations (accessed August 1, 2017).

  6. 6.

    Civil law originates from the Roman Empire and puts a great emphasize on the written law (codes). This is the most widespread legal system in the world. Common law is rooted in the British Isles and largely relies on courts’ judgment (judge made law). Finally, the Islamic law is mostly based on religious principles (Mitchell and Powell 2011: 11–12).

  7. 7.

    Information about the sanctions regimes can be found on the UN official website. See, https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/information (accessed March 28, 2017).

  8. 8.

    For the type of SC sanctions and the frequency of their application in the years 1990–2017, see Security Council Practices and Charter Research Branch, Graphs on currently active sanctions regimes and restrictions (31 March 2017).

  9. 9.

    For information on the monitoring groups please visit SC official website https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/information (accessed April 2, 2017).

  10. 10.

    See for instance, Russia and China veto UN resolution to impose sanctions on Syria (1 March 2017, The Guardian), available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/01/russia-and-china-veto-un-resolution-to-impose-sanctions-on-syria (accessed April 10, 2017). The mentioned draft resolution included sanctions short of force. However, it is clear that if economic and financial sanctions are vetoed, any suggestion to use force will be vetoed as well.

  11. 11.

    For general information on the UN peacekeeping see, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ (accessed July 29, 2017). For the different SC resolutions authorizing peacekeeping operations see http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/peacekeeping_missions.shtml (accessed July 29, 2017).

  12. 12.

    “Syria war: US launches missile strikes in response to ‘chemical attack’” (BBC News, April 7, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39523654 (accessed April 16, 2017).

  13. 13.

    The three mentioned events have different levels of justification, which are not discussed in this chapter. Those examples are only presented as situations where the formal procedure of the UN Charter for the use of force was not followed.

  14. 14.

    This is not to say that States do not act unilaterally. The argument only stresses the fact that in most cases, prior to taking actions unilaterally, States seek SC’s approval to reduce political costs. Political costs refer to condemnation (and other active negative responses) by other States.

  15. 15.

    For all resolutions on Syria see http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/search.php?IncludeBlogs=10&limit=15&tag=%22Security%20Council%20Resolutions%22+AND+%22Syria%22&ctype=Syria&rtype=Security%20Council%20Resolutions&cbtype=syria, and for the drafts that were vetoed see, http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick (accessed July 30, 2017).

  16. 16.

    This concept and its development are discussed in Chap. 18.

  17. 17.

    See the official website of the ICC: https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (accessed April 11, 2017).

  18. 18.

    See the official website of the ICC https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/RomeStatute/Pages/default.aspx (accessed April 11, 2017).

  19. 19.

    https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/albashirEng.pdf (accessed April 11, 2017).

  20. 20.

    There is a difference between signature and ratification of an international agreement in general and the Rome Statute in particular. Representatives of States signed the Rome Statute at the Diplomatic Conference. However, ratification was required to make the Statute binding on the State.

  21. 21.

    Russia Withdraws Signature from International Criminal Court Statute (November 16, 2016, The Guardian), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/16/russia-withdraws-signature-from-international-criminal-court-statute (accessed August 1, 2017).

  22. 22.

    South Africa to quit international criminal court (October 21, 2016, The Guardian), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/21/south-africa-to-quit-international-criminal-court-document-shows (accessed August 1, 2017).

  23. 23.

    See, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12791.doc.htm; http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick (accessed April 16, 2017).

  24. 24.

    See http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47860#.WPNunxSZzjA (accessed April 16, 2017).

  25. 25.

    See, “Syria war: US launches missile strikes in response to ‘chemical attack’” (April 7, 2017, BBC News), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39523654 (accessed April 16, 2017).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Rotterdam Institute for Law and Economics (RILE), Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko

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  1. Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko
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Correspondence to Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Madeleine O. Hosli

  2. Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Leiden University, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Joren Selleslaghs

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Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, E. (2020). The Enforcement of International Law. In: Hosli, M.O., Selleslaghs, J. (eds) The Changing Global Order. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 17. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21603-0_18

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