Abstract
This article addresses the role of “facts” in the application of the law; distinguishing “facts of reality”—things as they are—and the “state of facts” as established by a court when rendering a judgment. The law being a normative order, an order of “ought”, can only process “facts of reality” by transforming them into “states of fact”. This process designates their entry into the legal system. Hence the author construes the finding of fact as being a separate, procedural act of law, its formula being: “The court deems it established”. Of course, the “state of fact” itself is often layered and contains normative elements, which are transformed into factual ones. This repeated transformation is prone to errors and conceals accountability in the relationship between the court and expert witnesses. This is a particularly topical issue which even increased cooperation may not change for the better; instead, the separation between expert knowledge and decision making should be made transparent.
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Notes
- 1.
Cf., for example, Engisch (1996), p. 57.
- 2.
Here, concrete, individualized facts, general empirical propositions and logical inferences are linked together—cf. Wolff (1947), p. 165, and, more in-depth, Petschek and Stagel (1963) p. 215. On “empirical judgments”, cf. Rechberger (1974), p. 113; on the problem of judicial everyday theories, see also Pawlowski (1999), para 266.
- 3.
Cf. for more details Merli (2013), pp. 173–188.
- 4.
According to Klecatsky (1961), p. 311. On the other hand, the Austrian Administrative Court does not consider it problematic that an administrative body draws on its own expert knowledge when deciding a case (cf. VwSlg 8303 A/1972; VwGH 31 January 1995, 92/05/0230).
- 5.
Cf. Weiner (1966).
- 6.
For example, Article 91 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Act empowers the jury (Geschworene) to decide upon the “guilt” (Schuld) of the accused, which is understood to encompass both the facts and the law.
- 7.
Cf. Kaufmann (1985), p. 1065.
- 8.
Cf. VfGH 10 March 2015, G 180/14, among others.
- 9.
Cf. Merli (2015), p. 29.
- 10.
For a basic explanation, cf. Eisenberger (2016), pp. 118, 128.
- 11.
Cf. Eisenberger (2016), p. 150.
- 12.
Cf. Kelsen (1967), pp. 70 ff.
- 13.
The modern German terminology is very keen to distinguish correctly between the elements of the offence (Tatbestand) and the state of facts (Sachverhalt). For the historical development of this wording, see the original German version of this article: Jabloner (2016), p. 203.
- 14.
Cf. Luhmann (2004), p. 381.
- 15.
Ringhofer (1966), p. 25.
- 16.
Cf. Engisch (1996), p. 69.
- 17.
It is a feature of a more modern worldview that certainty has been dispensed with. Such a view can permit only one religion. If God is no longer properly believed in, then certainty must be defined differently. So here it is precisely the beginning of the Enlightenment that gives birth to monsters.
- 18.
On why a seemingly pragmatic model of scientific truth finding—consensus theory—approaches a legal proceeding, cf., pointedly, Möllers (2010), p. 127.
- 19.
Cf. Schweizer (2015), p. 79.
- 20.
Petschek and Stagel (1963), p. 227.
- 21.
Kelsen (1967), p. 239.
- 22.
Prima vista, one could understand the facts as fiction. The concept of fiction, however, is dubious. In a legal sense, it can only be used where something is established as counterfactual, not merely if it is established. In contrast to Vaihinger, Kelsen argued that, although the law can be seen as fiction, this view is not helpful within the law. Of course, the court’s acceptance of the facts does not preclude that things have actually happened; on the contrary. Seen in this way, the facts are normalized by the court, but not fabricated. For more detail, cf. Kletzer (2015).
- 23.
Alternatively, state of facts could also be interpreted as a resolute condition of validity.
- 24.
The other founder of the “Pure Theory”, Adolf Merkl, remarked that in a dynamic perspective, a legal act of a certain force is composed of various partial acts like the many frames of a film. Cf Merkl (1927), pp. 91 ff.
- 25.
The binding effect of the facts resulting from the force of law (in the broader sense) is discussed in doctrine and case law in two contexts, first with regard to which factual changes terminate the scope of the decision and how to react to this in procedural terms—cf. Ringhofer (1953), pp. 87, 120.
- 26.
Cf. Pawlowski (1999), para 267.
- 27.
Cf. VwSlg 6714/A and 9723A/1978 as well as Ringhofer (n. 14) 366. This case law, however, has rarely gained practical relevance.
- 28.
The discipline of historiography, as any science (Wissenschaft), is involved in a constant process of falsification. Here it should be noted that, in exceptional cases, the law “dogmatizes” certain historical truths positively or negatively. This is the case when Holocaust denial is a criminal offence or, vice versa, when it is not allowed to accuse someone of an offence that has already been struck from his criminal record. The motive behind such prohibitive norms is not the suppression of lies or truths, but to contain the danger emanating from certain assertions.
- 29.
Which is to say, the people who apply the law.
- 30.
- 31.
- 32.
- 33.
- 34.
Engisch (1996), p. 61.
- 35.
Cf. Searle (2010), p. 90.
- 36.
This also applies to foreign law, in the sense of private international law. The court hears an expert witness on foreign law, thus treating the law as a fact.
- 37.
- 38.
Engisch (1996), p. 15. For a critique of this metaphor, cf. Müller (1994), p. 254. At this point of consideration, however, it is not a question of how the authority establishes the facts, but how the established facts become “state of facts”, that is to say, how they find their way into the proceedings.
- 39.
Mayer (1990), p. 145.
- 40.
This is—so to say—the global problem of applying the law. Cf. Weiner (1966).
- 41.
“Sachkundige Wertungen”, cf. Funk (1990), p. 9.
- 42.
For more detail, see the original German version.
- 43.
Cf. Pawlowski (1999), para 268.
- 44.
For more, cf. Pürgy (2013), pp. 27 ff.
- 45.
Cf. Grunsky (1974), p. 412.
- 46.
Franßen (1998), p. 417.
- 47.
The Administrative Court has now restated this classic case law—cf. most recently Erk Ro 2014/03/0076; Ro 2014/04/0068; Ra 2014/03/0038; 2014/18/0097; Ra 2014/19/0171 and Ra 2015/10/0024.
- 48.
Similarly, cf. Klecatsky (1961), p. 316.
- 49.
From Bergthaler (2012), p. 59, who has in mind a situation in which a court has to decide a dispute over the correct scientific method.
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Acknowledgments
This essay is a modified English version of my inaugural lecture at University of Vienna on 3 December 2015. Hence, it is still clearly embedded in the German—better to say: Austrian—language of academic legal discourse (Rechtswissenschaft). An earlier version was published under the title “Der Sachverhalt im Recht” in the Journal of Public Law (Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht), Vol. 71 (2016), at pp. 199–214. For extended acknowledgements and thanks, see there. Here I have to thank Christoph Bezemek and Ulrich Wagrandl for helping me with the English version. It remains for the author to express his hope that the present attempt offers an abstract academic perspective that allows the essay’s core claims to be reflected on a general level.
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Jabloner, C. (2019). How the Facts Enter Into the Law. In: Bersier Ladavac, N., Bezemek, C., Schauer, F. (eds) The Normative Force of the Factual. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 130. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18929-7_7
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