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Institutional Turn(s) in Theories of Legal Interpretation

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Legal Interpretation and Scientific Knowledge

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Abstract

The paper gives an overview of recent doctrines of legal interpretation that can be subsumed under the common name “institutional turn” in theories of legal interpretation. Among the reviewed theoretical positions are the ones from Jeremy Wаldron, Victoria Nourse, Cass Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule, Scott Shapiro. It is concluded that the institutional turn in legal interpretation offers some significant insights into legal interpretation and interesting perspectives on the appropriate interpretative methodologies. The turn, however, does this by eschewing parts of traditional accounts of legal interpretation that are arguably worth preserving in any theory of legal interpretation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    von Savigny (1841).

  2. 2.

    Lieber (1839).

  3. 3.

    Normative theories of interpretation in the Anglo-American world often make the claim that they are also accounts of what interpretation is. The tendency to confine interpretation to, say, textual interpretation leads at times to skeptical conclusions that we cannot in fact claim that legal interpretation is something determinate (see: Spaić 2018).

  4. 4.

    The lack of institutional awareness in classical theories of interpretation divorces them from addressing issues of authority. The question of who should decide which interpretation is valid remains in this way completely out of reach for most theories of legal interpretation (Christiano 2000, p. 514).

  5. 5.

    Waldron (1999, p. 7).

  6. 6.

    Waldron (1999, p. 9).

  7. 7.

    Waldron (1999, p. 10).

  8. 8.

    Goldsworthy (2001, p. 75).

  9. 9.

    Waldron (1999, p. 24).

  10. 10.

    Waldron (1999, pp. 25–27).

  11. 11.

    Waldron (1999, p. 69).

  12. 12.

    Waldron (1999, p. 75).

  13. 13.

    Waldron (1999, p. 80).

  14. 14.

    Waldron (1999, pp. 82–83).

  15. 15.

    Waldron (1999, p. 83).

  16. 16.

    Waldron (1999, p. 85).

  17. 17.

    Waldron (1999, p. 87).

  18. 18.

    Waldron (1999, p. 89).

  19. 19.

    Waldron (1999, p. 120).

  20. 20.

    Waldron calls this way of doing jurisprudence “single author jurisprudence”. Waldron (1999, p. 121).

  21. 21.

    Fish (2008).

  22. 22.

    Waldron (1999, p. 165).

  23. 23.

    Waldron (1999, pp. 130–131).

  24. 24.

    Waldron (1999, p. 132).

  25. 25.

    Waldron (1999, p. 138).

  26. 26.

    Waldron (1999, p. 143). Still he agrees that legislation is a speech act. See Waldron (1999, p. 143).

  27. 27.

    Goldsworthy (2001, p. 82).

  28. 28.

    Nourse (2012, pp. 72–73).

  29. 29.

    Nourse (2012, p. 82).

  30. 30.

    Nourse (2012, p. 83).

  31. 31.

    Nourse (2012, p. 86).

  32. 32.

    Nourse (2012, p. 87).

  33. 33.

    Nourse (2012, pp. 87–89).

  34. 34.

    Nourse (2012, pp. 72–73).

  35. 35.

    Nourse (2012, p. 75).

  36. 36.

    For the most part, Nourse is talking about the rules of Congress in the US political system. Her argument is however not confined to the US political system nor to a specific legislative body.

  37. 37.

    Nourse (2012, pp. 92–97).

  38. 38.

    Nourse (2012, pp. 98–109).

  39. 39.

    Nourse (2012, p. 109).

  40. 40.

    Nourse (2012, p. 70).

  41. 41.

    Nourse (2012, p. 118).

  42. 42.

    Sunstein and Vermeule (2003, p. 886).

  43. 43.

    Sunstein and Vermeule (2003, p. 886).

  44. 44.

    Sunstein and Vermeule (2003, p. 887).

  45. 45.

    Sunstein and Vermeule (2003, pp. 914–915).

  46. 46.

    Sunstein and Vermeule (2003, p. 916).

  47. 47.

    Sunstein and Vermeule (2003, pp. 917–919).

  48. 48.

    Sunstein and Vermeule (2003, p. 925).

  49. 49.

    Sunstein and Vermeule (2003, pp. 922–923).

  50. 50.

    Sunstein and Vermeule (2003, pp. 923–924).

  51. 51.

    Sunstein and Vermeule (2003, p. 950).

  52. 52.

    Sunstein (2007, pp. 825–826).

  53. 53.

    Vermeule (2006). He is explicit in claiming that an institutional approach doesn’t necessarily entail formalist conclusions (Vermeule 2006, p. 1).

  54. 54.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 1).

  55. 55.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 3).

  56. 56.

    Lleras (2008).

  57. 57.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 70).

  58. 58.

    Vermeule considers theories of legal interpretation that have indeed taken institutional capacities into account, but ultimately rejects them because of their lack of empirical insight into the institutional capacities and systemic effects. One group of theories that he calls “out-and-out philosophizing” derives the proper methodology of interpretation from non-institutional values like democracy, integrity and so on. The second group—“stylized institutionalism”—relies on empirically unfounded views of the main institutions of a legal system. “Asymmetrical institutionalism” as the third group of institutionally-aware theories, takes an idealized view of one institution or group of institutions (often courts that are considered as superior to legislatures) and starts formulating a theory of legal interpretation. See Vermeule (2006, pp. 16–17).

  59. 59.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 3).

  60. 60.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 2).

  61. 61.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 4).

  62. 62.

    Vermeule (2006, pp. 72–73).

  63. 63.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 7).

  64. 64.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 9).

  65. 65.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 64).

  66. 66.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 66).

  67. 67.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 67).

  68. 68.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 68).

  69. 69.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 70).

  70. 70.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 70).

  71. 71.

    Vermeule (2006, pp. 74–75).

  72. 72.

    Vermeule (2006, p. 76).

  73. 73.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 241–247).

  74. 74.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 255).

  75. 75.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 256).

  76. 76.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 257).

  77. 77.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 370).

  78. 78.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 353–354).

  79. 79.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 355).

  80. 80.

    Pino (2013, p. 190).

  81. 81.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 355–356).

  82. 82.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 357).

  83. 83.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 358).

  84. 84.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 358).

  85. 85.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 241–247).

  86. 86.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 359).

  87. 87.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 359).

  88. 88.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 359).

  89. 89.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 361).

  90. 90.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 362).

  91. 91.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 365).

  92. 92.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 368).

  93. 93.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 369).

  94. 94.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 370).

  95. 95.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 372).

  96. 96.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 375–377).

  97. 97.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 363).

  98. 98.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 377).

  99. 99.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 380).

  100. 100.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 381).

  101. 101.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 381).

  102. 102.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 382).

  103. 103.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 383).

  104. 104.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 383).

  105. 105.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 384).

  106. 106.

    Sunstein (2015).

  107. 107.

    See Spaić (2018).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law, Belgrade, Serbia

    Bojan Spaić

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  1. Bojan Spaić
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Correspondence to Bojan Spaić .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Lisbon Centre for Research in Public Law (CIDP) and Lisbon Legal Theory Group (LxLTG), University of Lisbon School of Law, Lisbon, Portugal

    David Duarte

  2. Lisbon Centre for Research in Public Law (CIDP) and Lisbon Legal Theory Group (LxLTG), University of Lisbon School of Law, Lisbon, Portugal

    Pedro Moniz Lopes

  3. Lisbon Centre for Research in Public Law (CIDP) and Lisbon Legal Theory Group (LxLTG), University of Lisbon School of Law, Lisbon, Portugal

    Jorge Silva Sampaio

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Spaić, B. (2019). Institutional Turn(s) in Theories of Legal Interpretation. In: Duarte, D., Moniz Lopes, P., Silva Sampaio, J. (eds) Legal Interpretation and Scientific Knowledge. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18671-5_8

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