Abstract
This chapter claims that the main normative thesis of Sosa (that the ultimately desirable status for performances in general is the full aptness) can be subject of the objection of overintellectualisation of epistemic processes. It is proposed a way to safeguard Sosa’s perspective from this objection: to replace the Normative Thesis (NT), expressing the idea of full aptness, with the thesis that the ultimately desirable state of performances in general is the Simple Normative Thesis (SNT), stating that the fully desirable status for performances in general is (simple firstorder) aptness. With the rise of externalism, reflection’s central status in epistemology has come under threat: key epistemic phenomena such as knowledge and justified belief are no longer widely taken to essentially involve reflection. One notable exception to this trend is Sosa who, surprisingly enough, is a card-carrying externalist. Sosa develops a kind of virtue epistemology that promises to rehabilitate the status of reflection in epistemology. In this paper, I argue that Sosa remains ultimately unsuccessful in this regard. The thesis that is key to Sosa’s rehabilitation of reflection succumbs to exactly the kind of problem that dislodged reflection from its throne in epistemology. I then develop an alternative on behalf of Sosa. While the alternative view does avoid the problem Sosa encounters, it will not serve to rehabilitate the status of reflection. As virtue epistemologists, then, we will do well to continue to think of reflection has having been dislodged from its throne in epistemology.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
The perhaps most prominent advocates of reliabilism are Alvin Goldman (1979) and Ernest Sosa (1980). However, the view has a number of further noteworthy supporters, including Juan Comesaña (2010), Sandy Goldberg (2010), Peter Graham (2012), John Greco (1999), Hilary Kornblith (2002) and Jack Lyons (2009), to name but a few. I have also defended versions of the view elsewhere (Kelp 2018, 2019).
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This view is most prominently defended by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (2001).
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Couldn’t Sosa avoid this problem by restricting the claim that the fully desirable status for performances is full aptness to performances of (adult) humans and weakening the requirement for performances of unsophisticated agents, perhaps to animal aptness? Even if we can get rid of the air of ad hocness that might appear to trouble this proposal, note that in Sect. 3.4, I will develop an alternative to NT on behalf of Sosa that can offer a unified account of the performances of both unsophisticated and sophisticated agents, while also accommodating the motivations for NT. As a result, this move is bound to remain unsuccessful at any rate because a more choiceworthy alternative to resulting view is available.
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Kelp, C. (2019). The Status of Reflection in Virtue Epistemology. In: Silva-Filho, W., Tateo, L. (eds) Thinking About Oneself. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 141. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18266-3_3
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