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Technological Change and Market Design

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The Future of Economic Design

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Design ((DESI))

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Abstract

Technological innovations lead to new market designs and new designs catalyze the emergence of new technologies. Building on examples drawn from recent advances in medical, electricity, car, computing, and data collection technologies, this note discusses the relationship between technological change and market design with an emphasis on new questions for market design theory.

U. Zürich. For their comments, I would like to thank Ernst Fehr, Todd Hare, Anna Myjak-Pycia, Nick Netzer, Christian Ruff, Manuela Steinauer, and Utku Unver.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Zürich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006, Zürich, Switzerland

    Marek Pycia

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  1. Marek Pycia
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Correspondence to Marek Pycia .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. CNRS - Paris School of Economics, Paris, France

    Jean-François Laslier

  2. University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Hervé Moulin

  3. Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL, CNRS, LAMSADE, Paris, France

    M. Remzi Sanver

  4. Union College, Schenectady, NY, USA

    William S. Zwicker

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Pycia, M. (2019). Technological Change and Market Design. In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_74

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