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Collective Standards

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The Future of Economic Design

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Design ((DESI))

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Abstract

I describe the problem of collective standards used in negligence, contract, defamation, obscenity, and international law. I suggest how economic theorists might contribute to this problem.

I would like to thank Henrik Lando, Guido Maretto, and Vera Shikhelman for reading earlier versions of this work.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1)(b).

  2. 2.

    See United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d. 169 (2nd. Cir. 1947).

References

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Correspondence to Alan D. Miller .

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Miller, A.D. (2019). Collective Standards. In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_58

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