Abstract
I describe the problem of collective standards used in negligence, contract, defamation, obscenity, and international law. I suggest how economic theorists might contribute to this problem.
I would like to thank Henrik Lando, Guido Maretto, and Vera Shikhelman for reading earlier versions of this work.
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Notes
- 1.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1)(b).
- 2.
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d. 169 (2nd. Cir. 1947).
References
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Miller, A. D., & Perry, R. (2013a). Good faith revisited. Iowa Law Review, 98, 689–745.
Miller, A. D., & Perry, R. (2013b). A group’s a group, no matter how small: An economic analysis of defamation. Washington and Lee Law Review, 70, 2269–2336.
Parisi, F. (2004). The efficiency of the common law hypothesis (pp. 519–522). Boston: Springer.
Rubinstein, A. (1983). The reasonable man - A social choice approach. Theory and Decision, 15, 151–159.
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Miller, A.D. (2019). Collective Standards. In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_58
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