Abstract
Is Rawls’s political liberalism so thoroughly aligned with the principle of neutrality that no space is left for proposals aimed at strengthening a liberal ‘conception of the good’? The argument I develop here attempts to establish the grounds for a ‘virtue-based liberal perfectionism’ that, drawing on the present debate between liberal neutralists and perfectionists, re-introduces the virtues as a category of goods that have so far been largely neglected in the theoretical context of liberal theory. The argument does not start from zero, but is grounded in Rawls’s views on the virtues and self-respect as outlined in his major works. Rawls’s views also seem very compatible with Kramer’s recent proposal of an aspirational perfectionism. I propose to take some further steps in the direction already laid out by their contributions. My conclusion is in favour of an enlarged understanding of ‘public reason’ in which reasonableness no longer hinges merely on Rawls’s key notion of reasonableness as reciprocity but, following Von Wright, on an idea of reasonableness as encompassing everything that is concerned with ‘the right way of living’.
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Notes
- 1.
It is fair to say that not all Kantian theorists take an ‘act-centred’ view. In Political Liberalism, Rawls occupies an intermediate position, giving special importance to the notion of ‘reasonable persons’ Cf. (PL, 48, 58 ff). Also, it should be emphasized that Kant himself had an understanding of moral value wherein what counts most is that a certain action derives from the ‘good will’, a crucial feature of the agent.
- 2.
- 3.
One controversial question is: ‘education of what virtues?’. For example, it may be argued that education regarding the Christian virtue of ‘humility’ would be opposed to that of Nietzschean ‘proud self-assertion’ (if we want to consider the latter as a virtue). Or the classical virtue of generosity would require an education opposed to Humean parsimony. (To be sure Hume reserves an important place for ‘generosity’ in his theory but conceives of it as one of the qualities of benevolence, with a larger scope than the classical Aristotelian understanding Cf. Hume 1888, 3.3.3.3). The problem of different and incompatible catalogues of virtues is well-known in the EV literature. I believe that some virtues are more basic to the ‘human condition’ than others and make a more effective contribution to character education. See Sect. 5 and the argument in Nussbaum (1988).
- 4.
Insofar as a citizen lives a life aimed at realizing his own goals, ambitions and ideals, the ‘construction of character’ through an education of the virtues—commended by an ancient tradition—is helpful in defining one’s capacity for deliberation and choice. ‘Action-centred’ theories are limited because they are not concerned with the individual problem of ‘how to make my life go well’. Rawls dealt quite extensively with the problem of ‘plans of life’ (TJ 407 ff.), and later with the problem of moral worth of persons within what he calls ‘the full theory of the good’ (TJ, 347 ff.).
- 5.
He enlarges and reemphasizes his point with the much stronger ‘thesis of the unity of value’ in Justice for Hedgehogs (2011).
- 6.
Even when admitting that an Aristotelian EV does not endanger the fundamental values of liberalism, critics may object that it endangers the fundamental values of non-liberals who claim an equal right to respect. My reply to this objection is that if those non-liberals reject the fundamental values of liberalism, as happens for example with radical Muslims, they place themselves out of the liberal society. Thus, we should not care if the EV is not compatible with their basic values. In turn, moderate Muslims can find a place for their values in a sort of ‘overlapping consensus’ framework. They will accept by definition liberal fundamental values. Consequently, they should also be open to the EV I am proposing. (I argue in favour of a sound ‘overlapping consensus’ between an Aristotelian classical EV and Islamic EV in Mangini 2016.)
- 7.
It can be defined as a view that concentrates on «enhancing the lives of individuals indirectly by improving the stature of their society directly» (Kramer 2015a, 48).
- 8.
Rawls’s understanding of the ‘reasonable person’ seems quite close to an agent-centred EV, although limited to ‘moral’ traits of character such as reasonableness, toleration, etc. As we shall see, however, in TJ his views on the virtues are closer to the classical position.
- 9.
A ‘comprehensive doctrine’ is one that covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated system. Cf. (PL, 13).
- 10.
In a Rawlsian liberal framework, the institutional endorsement of virtue-related practices or policies may not be opposed. The problem may come from ‘controversial’ virtues such as humility or others that depend on some religious conception of the good. In this paper I argue in favour of a secular VBLP, the virtues of which should be conducive to the realization of most citizens’ life plans in a liberal society, thus strengthening its ‘social tissue’. Cf. Sect. 5.
- 11.
Sometimes ideal world theories have unclear consequences for the “non-ideal settings of the real society”. Cf. Kramer (2015b, 6 n. 14).
- 12.
Correctly, Kramer emphasizes that there are pro tanto moral reasons in favour of the performance of paternalistic actions. In some circumstances sane adults are inebriated or intoxicated to the point that their actions may be harmful to themselves and others. In these cases paternalistic actions may not be prima facie wrong, as Quong holds. Cf. (Kramer 2015b, 2).
- 13.
Quong wants to go beyond Rawls in extending the thrust of neutrality beyond constitutional essentials, but in so doing he neglects entirely the ‘claims of the good’ at the political level.
- 14.
This «includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct and in the limit to our life as a whole» (PL, p. 13).
- 15.
It may also be noted how ‘health’ is also listed by Rawls as a primary natural good (together with ‘vigor, intelligence and imagination’), while Sher’s ‘prosperity’ coincides with ‘Rawls’s ‘wealth’ and is included among the primary social goods (TJ, 62). I have to thank Matthew Kramer for having drawn my attention to this overlap.
- 16.
Using a distinction which runs in the moral debate, we might say that there is a large moral determinacy of correct answers in the first layer and the possibility of an increasing one in the second layer: an answer is correct «even though its correctness cannot be demonstrated to the satisfaction of some reasonable people who reflect carefully on the matter» (Kramer 2009, 90). In turn, moral indeterminacy is clearly dominant in the third layer where disagreement is more frequent. “By contrast, the resolution of a dispute is demonstrably correct only if its singular appropriateness would be perceived and endorsed by virtually every sensible person who might competently ponder the arguments in favour of it” (Ibid.). Demonstrability, as Kramer points out, is a higher epistemological standard that, in my view, is attainable only at the level of hypotheticals such as Rawls’s ‘original position’.
- 17.
A recent and helpful discussion may be found in Kramer (2015a, 13 ff.).
- 18.
It should be noted that the virtues might work as natural antidotes to the well-known weakness in the ‘spirit of a liberal democracy’, known since de Tocqueville as ‘individualism’. Starting with this consideration among others, the list of political virtues which, following Rawls’s list, might be called on in a liberal democracy is strengthened by Alessandro Ferrara with, for example, “presumptive generosity, openness, hospitality, agape” Ferrara (2014, Chap. 2). However, while Rawls’s social virtues remain close to the tradition and preserve the same constitutive features (deriving from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1105 a 26–35), modern candidates do not share the same grounds.
- 19.
He also mentions an Aristotelian variant with “far stronger claims” but does not develop it.
- 20.
Further, from an ethical perspective this virtue-based view promises to offer some degree of action-guidance for individual life, differently from the usual (political) perfectionist theories.
- 21.
It is important to keep in mind that the virtues by their very structure require autonomous and rational choice and deliberation. An inculcated virtue would not be as such according to the Aristotelian conception.
- 22.
On this point VBLP goes one step further than aspirational perfectionism because of its ethical thrust into individual lives.
- 23.
The denial that rights and duties are coherent with the language of moral excellence does not undermine the claim that the flourishing of a liberal democracy, in Rawls’s understanding, requires both public institutions working correctly within the domain of public reason and the exercise of civic and political virtues by public officials and, to some extent, by citizens. Among these virtues we can surely locate the correct exercise and adjudication of rights and duties by citizens first, and judges later. It is especially worth mentioning, in my view, how Kramer’s pervasive goal of self-respect in his aspirational-perfectionist conception can be achieved only if distributive justice works to grant to each and every citizen a warranted sense of self-respect. Cf. Kramer (2017b, 402–3).
- 24.
The ‘moral stature’ of a society is surely a threshold not easily assessed, as it refers to large number of types of conduct. However, on average we should be able to assess general social trends such as, for example, the corruption of a society (if we look at its weaknesses), or the level of volunteerism (if we look at its strengths).
- 25.
I have presented some general considerations on ‘objective list theories’ in Mangini (2010, p. 113 ff.).
- 26.
Liberal authors such as Kramer might charge VBLP as being dangerously close to ‘edificatory perfectionism’, described as the expression of a ‘quidnunc mentality’ of busybody officials who want to affect people’s freedom of choice. Like the busybody caretaker of a little village, meddlesome officials of an edificatory perfectionist society would distribute subsidies (and punishments) according to the way people have followed (or violated) their requirements. Cf. Kramer (2017a, 282). I wonder whether this charge can be addressed against all those theories that Kramer dubs as examples of ‘edificatory perfectionism’. Surely much can also be said in defense of straightforward perfectonist attempts such as Hurka’s Perfectionism (1993), but the situation is definitely more complex in the case of VBLP. In a nutshell, as Rawls agrees, the virtues enhance the moral worth of citizens in a well-ordered society and we may propose them through education. Once this first step is carried out there is no possible check by busybody officials: either it is successful (to some extent) and we shall detect it, (eg.: a lesser degree of corruption) or it is not. In the latter case the outcome is familiar in many societies and only criminal law may be called upon to remedy the situation.
- 27.
Cf. my comments on the two conceptions of reasonableness in “Toward a Theory of Reasonableness” in Ratio Juris, vol. 31, n. 2, June 2018.
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Acknowledgements
I have to acknowledge the contribution of Alessandro Ferrara and Matthew Kramer. Kramer’s suggestions, given the common interests in liberal perfectionist theory, have especially improved the substance of the argument of this paper. Of course needless to say all mistakes remain my only responsibility.
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Mangini, M. (2019). Liberal Perfectionism and the Virtues. In: Grimi, E. (eds) Virtue Ethics: Retrospect and Prospect. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15860-6_11
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